Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

84. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State¹

Warsaw, April 21, 1965, 1932Z.

2153. Cabot-Wang talks. Deptel 1805.² 125th meeting. 3 hours 5 minutes.³

1) In opening statement I covered all guidance subjects except American prisoners and contingency items. At point where I said I wished pass him copy our reply to 17-nation appeal, he waved it away and would not receive it, saying they already clear on that and did not need it.

2) After consultations on Chinese side Wang replied saying he absolutely did not agree with my statement. Said he had learned about the President’s speech. Said we claimed be ready for unconditional discussions for peaceful settlement but he thought this was simply a swindle. Said we had torn up Geneva Agreements and launched aggression and were now trying to play with peace hopes to save ourselves from defeat, but this impossible. When we were bombing day and night, how can we claim to be ready for peaceful negotiations. President said US must be prepared for long conflict. 24 hours after President’s speech there was large-scale bombing. In week following there were new landings of forces and more planned. Wang claimed President actually laid down three preconditions, according to what I said:

1) Independent South Viet-nam with its security guaranteed, which Wang said ruled out Vietnamese union; 2) South Viet-nam must have freedom from attacks; and 3) US would not withdraw under the cloak of meaningless agreement. Wang said this was aimed at legalizing our aggressive actions; also aimed at forcing Viet-nam people recognize we have right to act as we please, that is, US demands equal unconditional surrender to which we would never get agreement. Also claimed US plan spend $1 billion was gross insult. US would meet with failure attempting to buy over people with a few stinking dollars. US should listen carefully to the voice of Vietnamese people who determined fight to the end if US forces are not withdrawn.

3) Wang continued Ho Chi Minh declared US imperialistic acts will not prevent Vietnamese people from carrying on patriotic struggle to final victory. US must first withdraw from South Viet-nam. End of Nazi Germany and Japanese militarists was lesson for US. Command of war in Viet-nam was not in Hanoi or Peking but in Washington. On behalf Chinese people Chou En-Lai had said Chinese would send South Vietnamese people all their needs, including arms, and would send own men when South Vietnamese people want them.

4) Wang spoke of air engagement Hainan, calling it act of direct military provocation against China. Said he would like launch strongest protest. Said when engagement made public US Defense Department had guilty conscience and tried to hide true meaning. Wang handed to me two photos as evidence of “crime.” These showed alleged wreckage downed US plane (forwarded with verbatim text). But this was not only case of military provocation against China. Since last meeting 365th through 377th serious warnings issued, indicating US had stepped up its provocations. Had intruded several times into airspace Hainan Island, fired on Chinese fishing boats near Hainan and given pursuit into territorial waters. US had repeatedly sent spy planes over China and Wang made strongest protest, demanding US put immediate end to military provocations.

5) Wang claimed US actively instigating Chiang clique to raid mainland and mentioned joint maneuvers, delivery newest weapons, and visits of brass to Taiwan. Said US even had plans let Chiang gang occupy Hainan Island and brag about breaking through Chinese coastal defenses. Said If US linked up Chinese civil war with its war of aggression, more disastrous developments were in store for US.

6) I replied saying US had offered enter discussions without conditions. Said at same time we made clear what we expected get out of discussions but these were not conditions. I stressed firmness American purpose wage war for sake of people South Viet-nam. I suggested lesson of Germany and Japan could apply Wang’s side if they continued present policies. Re Hainan engagement, I quoted Sylvester press replies with additional sentence from guidance telegram. Then spoke of American prisoners as instructed. Again stressed importance of 17-nation appeal, asking when Chinese reply could be expected.

7) Wang said while we spoke of wanting peaceful negotiations my remarks indicated we would continue war at any cost or risk; US attempting intimidate peoples by war threats but this would not succeed. Repeated favorite phrase about Viet-nam and China being interdependent and close as teeth and lips; two peoples were brothers sharing same weal or woe, and aggression against North Viet-nam was aggression against China. China as one of signatories Geneva Agreements had right to safeguard them. US has torn them up. Wang followed with long description of US alleged aggression in South Viet-nam over past years. Said recently we had carried out all manner atrocities including burning people alive and taking out their internal organs. We are not only using conventional weapons but poison gas and napalm. Said US more cruel than Hitler. These acts could not be permitted by Vietnam, China and world’s people. Root cause of war was US aggression and futile try shift blame on others. Only way settle problem was withdrawal US troops from South Viet-nam. If aggression continued debt of blood must be repaid in blood. U–2 and pilotless planes often intrude Chinese airspace and three of them shot down were now on display in Peking. Warned once again if US did not end violation Chinese sovereignty it would certainly be punished. US also had sole responsibility for acts of Chiang clique. Wang said “we do not fear you.” Added if Chiang wants to come, let him; all his men will be annihilated.

8) Concerning 17-nation appeal Wang said Chinese completely agreed to the propositions made by the DRV, and he had nothing to add.

9) I gave obvious answers to Wang’s points concerning Geneva Agreements, alleged US atrocities, adding I knew of no indication we encourage Chiang attack mainland. I said did not know what two photos he handed me proved and repeated our planes had orders not enter Chinese territory. I said it was of interest that Wang claimed Chinese entirely approved North Vietnamese response but I had not seen text of that and did not wish comment now. Repeated I trusted his side would make suitable reply. I then spoke at some length of chronology aggression in Southeast Asia, saying our support to South Vietnamese had come long after North Vietnamese had aggressed against South, which proceeded even before ink dry on Geneva Agreements.

10) Wang then gave another long tirade on “out-and-out imperialistic policies of US.” Said even in Washington large number of people had risen up against our policies demonstrating before the White House. Wang listed number of alleged violations Geneva Agreements on our part but these have all been covered before. Claimed we had turned South Viet-nam into experimental ground for practicing special warfare. Re American prisoners said they had offended Chinese law and of course must receive sanctions of that law. This was question Chinese sovereignty. Said exchange newsmen had always been opposed by USG and while basic problem between us unresolved, discussion specific questions could not come about. Said war in Indochina must also be settled from foundation by withdrawal US troops.

11) I spoke of Communist demonstrations and attacks on embassies and answered Wang’s allegations concerning Geneva Agreements and why elections could not be held in 1956 etc. etc.

12) There followed futile exchange concerning motivations both sides’ actions in Congo and implications support world opinion each side. Wang again accused US of being world’s gendarmes, of using gangster’s logic in our policies. Wang said Chinese never engaged in subversive activities in other countries but certainly would support liberation movements which were just, because people of world had had enough of imperialistic oppression and were determined stand up against it. Re Sino-Indian dispute said no Chinese government had ever recognized McMahon line and China had not made single step outside its legal territory. It was futile for US use India as base from which launch attacks on China. Said Chinese did not like to make relations between China and US tense, but if US compelled them they had no other way out.

13) I observed today’s talks had made it clear Chinese planned continue abetting of North Vietnamese aggression and continue stir up trouble where they could in other parts of world.

14) Wang said Chinese security was directly threatened by US aggression South Viet-nam. We were now committing aggression not only against others but also against China. Chinese share same destiny with people all over world and must join hands with them.

15) Wang suggested July 7 as date next meeting. I said view so many serious things happening in Southeast Asia might be wise for us meet earlier. Wang then suggested June 30. I replied while I was aware it was Chinese turn to set date, I would still prefer a much earlier date than that suggested. Wang said he still would like to plan for June 30 as date next meeting but of course if need arose earlier than that time, meeting could always be called by either side. I said with that provision I would accept date on which he was insisting. (I shall of course be happy to return for earlier meeting if this is indicated.)

Cabot

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Hong Kong, Taipei, Stockholm, Moscow, and Geneva.
2. Telegram 1805 to Warsaw, April 16, provided guidance for the meeting. It was modified by telegram 1811, April 17. (Both ibid.)
3. Cabot commented in telegram 2159 from Warsaw, April 22, that Wang was “rougher this time in both word and manner than at the last meeting.” (Ibid.) He sent a detailed report of the meeting in airgram A–966, April 26. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)