82. Airgram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State1
SUBJECT
- Conversation with Minister of Defense on U.S. Nuclear Deterrent
On Friday, April 9, I had the following at the Residence for lunch: the Minister of Defense, General Chiang Ching-kuo; Chief MAAG General Sanborn; CG 13th Air Force General Wilson; and interpreter S.K. Hu. The purpose of the lunch was to discuss certain important military matters with the Defense Minister.
I stated that at our March 20 meeting with the President he had expressed very grave concern over the condition and capabilities of the [Page 158] Republic of China’s air defense. I said the President had stated the Communists had 14 TU4’s and when they had developed a nuclear weapon these 14 planes could be used for an attack on Taiwan. The President stated that with the current state of air defenses it would be impossible to assure that at least one of these planes would not penetrate the air defense net for a nuclear attack on the Island. The President had asked that a missile allowance be increased to guard against this contingency and that the current status of aircraft spares be increased to provide more effective employment of intercept aircraft. The President had requested also that the Republic of China be given high priority in MAP allocations, particularly in air defense. The President had stated that his principal concern was public consciousness of the vulnerability of air defenses and their apprehension about air defense weaknesses if the present shortages of equipment were publicly known.
I told the Minister of Defense that we appreciated the President’s thoughts in this matter. I said that no air defense system, however elaborate, could guarantee against the penetration of a small number of planes. I stated that even the air defense system of the United States was inadequate to give this assurance. I stated also that having no anti-missile capability, U.S. defense against a missile attack was probably non-existent. I stated that in realization of this fact the United States had placed the maximum air defense reliance on the Strategic Air Command and that retaliatory capability of this organization was the principal contributing factor to our deterrence against such a nuclear attack against the United States. I stated that by far the largest component of our military expenditures in the air defense field were allocated to the Strategic Air Command.
I stated also that the deterrent effect of this nuclear capability was equally applicable and effective in the air defense of Free World nations which were associated with or allied with us in opposition to the Communist threat. I stated that our strong defensive alliance with the Republic of China has certainly placed them in this category and that the entire retaliatory capability of our nuclear forces would be equally effective in deterring an attack against Taiwan. Recognizing the possibility of penetration of Taiwan air defenses by Chicom aircraft, I said that this was most unlikely in the face of the probability of large-scale U.S. retaliation against the Communist mainland.
I stated that I shared the President’s concern in the ability to convince his people of the strong defensive potential of our retaliatory forces and that I would do anything I could along these lines to assist him in informing and educating his people of the unlikelihood of any nuclear attack on Taiwan against the possibility of retaliation by the United States.
[Page 159]Generals Sanborn and Wilson seconded my thoughts and, in addition, added the thought that Chinese defense systems as they were were in excellent shape and although many more forces could be used, those which we had would make a good showing for themselves in the event of an attack. Both emphasized the need for good organization and coordination with the forces and facilities which the United States might make available.
The Minister expressed appreciation for our thoughts and said that the President was principally concerned with the factors of time and space. He said the Formosa Strait was a very narrow body of water and therefore the time interval in which an attack could be conducted was extremely short. He said it was his opinion an active joint study should be conducted which would develop the maximum coordination of Chinese and United States efforts in the matter of air defense.
I replied that the committee recently established and consisting of the Minister, Admiral Gentner, General Sanborn and their respective assistants had been charged with a detailed study on air defense matters and that the findings of this committee would be available to both our governments. I assured him that the United States would give very careful consideration to anything this committee might propose.
Comment: I think the meeting was extremely useful in bringing to an important member of the Government and a close associate of the President our thoughts on the value of our nuclear capability in deterring an attack on Taiwan. In our previous contacts with the President he has tended to ignore this deterrent and has concentrated on getting more military hardware for air defense. We will continue to keep the facts of air defense life before both the President and all of his principal military and political advisors with the hopes of generating a greater appreciation of the unlikelihood of Chicom nuclear attack on Taiwan against the likelihood of United States retaliation.
I then raised the question of the 20 per cent increase in the military budget. I stated that the military budget was a matter entirely internal to the Republic of China. I stated, however, that an increase in the budget must be at the expense of funds available for the economy. We of the United States sincerely hoped that the economy could continue to grow at the rate which over the past two years has made such a tremendous impression on the outside world and be of such enormous benefit to the people of the Republic of China. I said any slow-down in economic growth of the ROC would be sure to have an adverse effect in their world position, both politically and commercially, and particularly would affect their ability to borrow needed funds in the international money market. I sincerely hoped, speaking for the U.S. Government, that military expenditure would not prevent a continuation of this very satisfactory economic growth.
[Page 160]The Minister of National Defense stated that he appreciated my thoughts on the matter and that the effect on the economy of the increased military budget had been carefully considered by the economic branches of the Government. It has been decided that the effect would not be damaging.
Comment: In the minds of myself and my assistants I believe it is inevitable that there will be increased inroads into funds otherwise available for economic growth in order to meet the demands of the military establishment, particularly in those fields in which U.S. military aid is being reduced. We will continue to observe this important matter and bring it up with the higher echelons of the government as necessity and occasion arise.
Ambassador
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1–4 CHINAT. Secret. Drafted by Wright. Repeated to CINCPAC.↩