76. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara1
JCSM-41–65
Washington, January 16, 1965.
SUBJECT
- Possible Responses to the ChiCom Nuclear Threat
- 1.
- By a memorandum, I–30032/64, dated 11 December 1964,2 subject as above, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) requested an analysis [Page 145] of possible responses which the US Government might make to the threat of Chinese communist nuclear blackmail, to include consideration of certain specific points which were expressed as questions.
- 2.
- Answers to the specific questions posed are attached hereto as Appendix A.3 The analysis made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which could provide the basis for further interdepartmental studies, is attached as Appendix B. This memorandum and its appendices are based on and supplement the military appraisal of Chinese acquisition of nuclear weapons forwarded by JCSM-1013–64, dated 3 December 1964.4
- 3.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that:
- a.
- There is no military requirement to modify US commitments at this time. The present ChiCom nuclear capability has not materially affected the existing balance of military power between the United States and Communist China; however, the expansion of this capability will pose difficult problems in the future. Maintaining and using in forward areas, as appropriate, flexible forces with both a conventional and nuclear capability becomes most important to provide visible evidence to our allies, as well as to the ChiComs, that the US defense commitment is firm. We should anticipate pressures which would result in requests by threatened countries for more definitive guarantees, including increased nuclear support.
- b.
- With the exceptions of Japan and probably India, the Free World nations in Asia cannot develop a capability for defending themselves without US support. Japan should be encouraged to increase its defense efforts, providing improved conventional forces for use in the common defense of Asia and providing military assistance to other nations in Asia. Asian nations should continue to provide conventional forces.
- c.
- Should pressures build up to the point that our Asian allies believe the development of a national nuclear capability to be clearly in their national interest, refusal to provide some form of nuclear assistance would put the United States in a position of denying to valued allies a nuclear capability possessed by the common enemy. The United States, therefore, should not rule out the possibility of increased nuclear support including some form of nuclear sharing with our allies in Asia when such is required in the US national interests.
- d.
- In view of the foregoing, some program of positive US action
may become necessary. The following appear sufficiently
advantageous to warrant further study:
- (1)
- Improvements to our system of alliances oriented at the threat of Communist China. The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed studying the feasibility [Page 146] of related concepts in JCSM-1013–64, dated 3 December 1964, subject: “A Military Appraisal of Chinese Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons.”
- (2)
- [13 lines of source text not declassified]
- e.
- Specific military courses of action to implement the concepts outlined in subparagraph d, above, should await determination of US policy.
- 4.
- It is recommended that interdepartmental studies be initiated to
recommend US national policy with regard to:
- a.
- Improvements to our system of alliances in Asia and the Pacific.
- b.
- Increased nuclear support of our allies in Asia, including some form of nuclear sharing.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 5127, 471.6 Communist China. Top Secret. Filed as an attachment to a letter of February 18 from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Peter Solbert to William Bundy.↩
- Not found.↩
- The appendices are attached but not printed.↩
- Not found.↩
- Printed from a copy that indicates Wheeler signed the original.↩