66. Memorandum for the Record1
MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT ON UNITED NATIONS MATTERS
PARTICIPANTS
- The President, Secretary Rusk, Assistant Secretary Harlan Cleveland, Ambassador Stevenson, McGeorge Bundy, George Reedy, Samuel Belk
[Here follows discussion not related to China.]
[Page 126]Chinese Representation
Stevenson then told the President that we faced a difficult problem with ChiRep. This year our position was badly eroded; next year it would be irretrievable. The Canadians, for instance, were deserting us for the first time. As of now, we had a slight simple majority on our side, and we might have to revert to asking for a 2/3 majority (“important question”).
Bundy then reminded the President that there was more to it than just what we might do this year: Could we get support for a 2-China policy? What was to be done about the seat in the Security Council where the U.S. has the veto? Peiping certainly would not come into the UN unless it got the Security Council seat. This was the matter of seeing how things look that are not going to happen this year.
Stevenson said that unless we start to shift our policy this year, Taiwan would be, at any rate, totally replaced in a few years. We could just allow this to happen or we could begin to shift toward a 2-China policy. The ChiNats might withdraw on their own initiative. He recalled that the ChiNats refused to accept recognition from France when France recognized Communist China.
Stevenson thought we must study the alternatives: admit the ChiComs and throw the ChiNats out; adopt a 2-China policy; get somebody to propose a study group (which is bitterly opposed on Taiwan as the beginning of the end); get the ChiComs into disarmament talks. Stevenson told the President that we would need guidance as to how to go about it. He did not think we should continue frozen, which would in the near future damage our prestige. We could move toward a 2-China policy, which the ChiComs won’t accept anyway.
The President asked what would happen to the Security Council seat if Communist China got into the UN. Ambassador Stevenson said the ChiComs would get it.
Bundy reminded the President that we could keep the ChiComs out by using the veto which was what President Kennedy had said he would do. But the U.S. never had used the veto and did we actually want to use it in the Security Council year after year to keep the ChiComs out.
The Secretary stated to the President that the matter of war and peace lay in the Pacific. If we appeared to falter before the Soviet Union and Communist China this would be interpreted as a reward for the track they have been following, and this would increase the chance of war. If we were to make a move that would signal to Peiping that we were weakening, this would increase our danger. The Secretary agreed with Stevenson that something must be done—perhaps the establishment of a study committee that would allow the matter to fall into complete confusion for an indefinite period.
[Page 127]Stevenson said the sooner we moved the better. He recalled President Kennedy had said that President Eisenhower had told him that “the only thing that will bring me back into politics is to bring China into the UN.”
Bundy suggested that President Kennedy might have been using President Eisenhower’s remark as an umbrella for his own policy.
The Secretary thought that it might be necessary for the President to telephone Prime Minister Pearson and impress upon him that we must not make a move that will be interpreted as weakness in the Far East.
The President agreed. He then turned to the Philippines and recalled that there had been offers from the Philippines to give us support in South Vietnam, but that our military leaders had regarded this offer as embarrassing because, if it were accepted, the Chinese would come in. The President recalled that we had been appealing for more flags and more units instead of ambulance units and that this was an offer of what we wanted and the military had turned it down.
Bundy and the Secretary remarked that Max Taylor and McNamara would be very disappointed to hear this.
Stevenson repeated that the U.S. must be prepared for a loss of prestige unless we were willing to move forward on a 2-China policy in this session—the ChiComs would not accept it anyway. To stand fast with people dropping away right and left—especially the French Africans—was not right. We should not stand still and be overwhelmed by the waves. Stevenson noted, however, that the matter would not come before the UN until January.
The President said that Secretary Rusk’s remarks impressed him; that perhaps better than abandoning our policy and inviting strong partisanship in Congress, the President said that what gave him pause was Secretary Rusk’s statement that to change would be a pay-off for the Soviet and ChiCom hard line.
Stevenson said that he and others had felt for a long time that we should get the ChiComs into the community of nations—then you could manage them better.
The President noted that he did not pay the foreigners at the UN to advise him on foreign policy, but that he did pay Rusk and that he was inclined to listen to him.
The Secretary noted that there was no real basis for some of our allies wanting to get the ChiComs in the UN. There had been no effort on the part of our friends to level off with the ChiComs on the problems that we jointly faced with Peiping. There had been no effort on the part of the French, for instance, to get at the heart of the matter.
[Page 128]Stevenson said that nevertheless there were 700 million people not represented in the UN as against a few million of the Kuomintang on Taiwan.
Cleveland pointed out that, while it was true that our position in the UN was eroding, it was important to remember that it had lasted for fifteen years. The Secretary said this was correct; that he had invented it fifteen years ago.
Cleveland thought one approach we should make would be to go to those who favor admission and emphasize the behavior of the ChiComs on the international scene and say, in effect, “unless your behavior is better, you can’t get in.” Many UN members say we are standing in the way of ChiCom admission but it is the Chinese Communists themselves.
The President remarked that it was just as we are being blamed now for denying the USSR its vote in the GA.
Secretary Rusk agreed that this would be the last General Assembly in which we could use the standing tactic on ChiRep.
Cleveland thought we could succeed this year only if we indicated that there was movement in some way toward a new approach.
The President wondered why Martin would wish to change the Canadian vote. Both Bundy and Cleveland said it was because it would be politically popular.
Stevenson said that he had travelled into nine states during the fall and that he had found the people far ahead of the Congress on ChiRep. Rusk thought it a far less domestic problem than an international one. Stevenson said that, as he travelled through the country, the people asked him about Article 19 and ChiRep. He said it was difficult to give out all the old answers—there were often bad editorials. Stevenson recalled that there had been movement on ChiRep under President Kennedy when he agreed to abandon the Eisenhower position of a moratorium and, instead, to discuss the problem—this had been a step forward. He said he did not know how much longer we could hold the line.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Bundy Files, Memoranda of Conversation, Bundy. Secret. Prepared by Samuel E. Belk of the National Security Council staff.↩