Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

63. Memorandum From James C. Thomson, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)¹

Washington, October 28, 1964.

SUBJECT

• The U.S. and Communist China in the Months Ahead

I return to my Far Eastern cable traffic with some thoughts on China policy that may well derive from the heady brew of speech-writing for an optimist. I pass them on to you not because they are particularly original, but because recent events seem to me to give them new validity.

To begin with, I am struck by the quantity of the U.S. Government’s time, energy, and resources now focused on South Vietnam/Laos, as against all the rest of Asia. This is perhaps an inevitable consequence of our preoccupation with the major Communist challenge at hand. But the fact of our concentration on the tail of the dog, rather than the dog itself, has been dramatized anew by recent developments. (I might add that I am not even sure that this tail belongs to that particular dog; there is danger in pushing too far the thesis of Peking’s responsibility for the South Vietnam crisis.)

Given the Chicom nuclear blast, the new Soviet leadership, De Gaulle, Wilson, et al, we are now moving into a period when Communist China’s world position will probably change quite rapidly, regardless of what we do. To what extent can we influence these changes so as to minimize the damage to our security? Also, to what extent can we preserve appearances—i.e., not seem to lose our shirts in the process of these changes?

I have in mind, of course, two virtual certainties: that Communist China will be voted into the United Nations sometime during the life of the new Administration—probably not this year (although that still seems to me an open question), but very probably next year; and that Communist China will soon—one way or another—be brought into international negotiations regarding the control of nuclear weapons. I also have in mind the fact of fast increasing free world trade and travel contacts with mainland China.

Faced with these developments, we can either sit tight in increasingly lonely isolation; or we can seek ways to cut our losses.

So far, we have chosen to sit tight, waiting for Peking to “shape up.” The Kennedy Press conference response of last November 14 and the Hilsman China speech of December 13 are the clearest articulation of this approach at its best. During 1963–4, our gradual detente with the USSR certainly gave it added impetus; our Kremlinologists have urged us not to rock the boat.

It seems to me increasingly clear, however, that our present approach actually serves Peking’s interests—and that Peking has no intention of “shaping up” in terms of taking tension-relieving initiatives with us, either now or in the foreseeable future. On the contrary, Peking is seriously intent on isolating us—while we, in turn, are generally blamed for trying (unsuccessfully) to isolate Peking.

I would therefore urge consideration of a different approach—one designed to cut our losses, to reduce our isolation, and to improve our look as a confident, realistic, and responsible world power.

My objective would be to try to bring our China policy into line with both reality and our long-term interests. Our aim has always been the “domestication” of Communist China. A strategy of containment plus moral preachment has achieved little success in this regard. So why not try modified containment—plus subversion? By the latter, I simply mean the careful use of free world goods, people, and ideas—instruments which have proven their long-term corrosive value in our relations with other totalitarian societies.

The following ingredients seem to me appropriate to a revised China policy over the next several months:

1. After the election, we should indicate anew our willingness and even desire to discuss the problem of nuclear arms control in a forum that includes Communist China sometime during 1965–6.

2. At the UNGA session in December we should base our opposition to Communist China’s membership primarily on Peking’s threat to the independent existence and UN seat of the 12 million people of Taiwan. (Our aim would be to hold the line on Chirep during the present session but to prepare for acquiescence in a “one-China one-Taiwan” seating arrangement at the next GA.)

3. Sometime in January the Secretary of State should find an occasion, ideally during a press conference, to note casually that “of course, the United States has accorded de facto recognition to the Peiping regime ever since President Eisenhower authorized the Geneva and Warsaw conversations of 1954–5; our real problem, however, is Communist China’s continuing threat to Formosa and to its neighbors.” Such a low-key remark would move us toward “one-China one-Taiwan” without igniting public concern over imminent de jure recognition of Peking (a move that I would regard as of little value and of very low priority as long as we maintain our commitments to the security and independence of Taiwan).

4. Early in the year, the Department of State should announce revised travel regulations for American citizens which would in effect permit them to journey to nations we do not recognize, on the understanding that the U.S. Government cannot provide protection for such travellers. (As you know, this travel package was cleared through State last January; the one chief difficulty seems to relate to Cuba, a point on which I have no views.)

5. Depending upon responses here and abroad to the above moves and depending upon new international developments, we should move quietly to place our trade in non-strategic goods with Communist China on the same basis as our trade with the Soviet Union.

6. At the time of the next UNGA meeting in the autumn of 1965, we should focus our energies on the retention of Taiwan’s seat in the General Assembly (and perhaps on preventing Peking from occupying a seat in the Security Council). If we play our cards right—and if the Chinats don’t commit political suicide—we might even succeed in shifting the onus for Peking’s continued exclusion to the Chicoms.

At the same time that we take the above moves, we should maintain all aspects of our present military containment of Communist China—our assistance to Vietnam, Laos, India, and other nations of the region; also, our resistance to Chicom activities in Africa, etc. In other words, we should move toward treating the Chinese much as we treat the Russians: an appropriately tough response wherever or whenever they seriously cause us harm; but otherwise, a groping toward coexistence on the basis of mutual self-interest.

I am under no illusion that the above moves would produce a change in Communist China’s behavior or its view of the United States. I strongly believe, however, that these moves would give us a greater look of maturity and self-confidence, far greater rapport with our major allies, increased respect from the “third world,” a greater degree of maneuverability, and the basis for long-term leverage with the Chicoms. We would also have less the look of a defeated obstructionist by the end of 1965.

I would argue, in addition, that the U.S. political climate can bear the weight of such moves—particularly if the President wins big next week. (Press and Congressional reaction to the Hilsman China speech last year revealed a dramatic ebbing of passions on the China issue over the past decade.)

I might add that I am well aware that much of this strategy is dependent upon early decisions that must be taken with regard to the situation in South Vietnam. I assume that we will have to choose roughly between escalation towards negotiation on the one hand, and a muddle-through towards negotiation on the other.

Even if we were to elect the first alternative, my China suggestions might still make sense. On the basis of my own limited knowledge of the Vietnam situation, however, I would hope that our choice would be the second alternative. If so, my suggestions would hardly run counter to this strategy.

Jim

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. II. Secret. A copy was sent to Komer.