Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

34. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 10–2–64

Washington, June 10, 1964.

PROSPECTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

The Problem

To examine the situation and probable developments in the world Communist movement.

Conclusions

A. The international Communist movement is now openly split into majority and minority factions oriented respectively toward the Russians and the Chinese. It is also disturbed by other factors, such as the weakening of Soviet authority in Eastern Europe, the example of Yugoslavia, and the independent inclinations of a number of Communist parties, notably the Communist Party of Italy. (Paras. 1–16)

B. The Sino-Soviet dispute will probably continue to have its ups and downs, and in certain circumstances relations between the two states might improve considerably. However, the rift is so deep and the national interest of each party so heavily engaged that there is now virtually no chance of reconciliation under the present leaders. The international movement may now be on the eve of a formal split, but whether or not this step is taken, the bitter struggle for control and influence over the Communist parties will continue. Further tension in state relations between China and the USSR also seems likely, especially on the common frontier. The demise of either or both of the present leaders would offer some prospect of temporary amelioration of the dispute, but we believe that the fundamental differences between the two powers would remain. (Paras. 2–5)

C. The international Communist movement as a whole is likely to be characterized by increased dispersion of authority and by more independent conduct by various parties. Although Soviet power remains a major factor in Eastern Europe, further manifestations of autonomous and nationalist behavior will probably occur. Among the parties out of power, we foresee a trend toward regionalism—as in the Far East, but also perhaps in Western Europe and Latin America. The Sino-Soviet competition for influence will in some cases lead to further splits within individual parties. At the same time, Moscow and Peiping will remain powerful sources of material support for their followers, and will retain considerable operational influence on a bilateral basis. (Para. 11, 24–25, 29–33)

D. For the non-Communist world this situation offers important advantages and some dangers. The assertion of divergent national interests by Communist powers offers an opportunity for the West to deal profitably with some of them individually. The Sino-Soviet conflict is increasingly absorbing the energies of the USSR and Communist China and diverting them from sharp contentions with the major Western powers.² Among the nongoverning parties, a few have already suffered severe setbacks as a result of the conflict. On the other hand, some Communist parties will become more effective and will gain greater freedom of action and respectability because of their more independent status. While in some countries the parties will tend to lose their rationale and elan, in others they will probably emerge as more formidable revolutionary organizations, though more national than international in character. Regardless of internal quarrels, Communists will retain an underlying enmity toward the West if only because their convictions are in so many respects incompatible with traditional Western concepts of political and economic life. (Paras. 37–40)

E. In general, we foresee the emergence of a variety of Communists and Communist parties, some chiefly influenced by Moscow or Peiping, some largely autonomous. In conducting their relations with Communist states and forming their policies toward revolutionary movements, the principal non-Communist powers will probably find it increasingly advantageous to judge each particular situation on its own merits, rather than on the assumptions which generally prevailed when Moscow unquestionably dominated the international movement. This situation offers new opportunities and advantages to Western policy, but it presents new dangers and difficulties as well. (Paras. 40–43)

[Here follows the Discussion portion of the estimate.]

1. Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 110, NIE 10–2–64. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on June 10. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the National Security Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation participated in the preparation of the estimate. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred, except the Atomic Energy Commission Representative, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside his jurisdiction.
2. For discussion of the impact of the conflict on Soviet and Chinese foreign policy, see NIE 11–9–64, “Soviet Foreign Policy,” dated 19 February 1964, and NIE 13–63, “Problems and Prospects in Communist China,” dated 1 May 1963. [Footnote in the source text. NIE 11–9–64 is scheduled for inclusion in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XIV. NIE 13–63 is printed in part in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XXII, pp. 365–367.]