Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

325. Memorandum From Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)¹

Washington, August 28, 1968.

SUBJECT

• The Gimo’s Latest Worries

There was a paragraph in Monday’s evening reading for the President putting Ambassador Chow’s call on the Secretary, in which he asked urgently for a squadron of F4C’s,² in the context of the Gimo’s worries as set forth in the two attached cables.³ I think that was adequate under present circumstances for the President, but I believe I owe you a bit more comment.

You were probably shown these two cables. The gist of Chiang’s reasoning is:

• —Mao will construe the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia as a warning and threat to him; i.e., the Soviets will now be likely, in Mao’s mind, to install anti-Mao leaders as administrators of border areas of China, laying the groundwork for the downfall of Mao;
• —Mao will attempt to consolidate a strong position in South China, hence will need control of flanking areas in Southeast Asia and in the Taiwan Straits area;
• —accordingly, Mao will get more deeply involved in the Vietnam war, and apply pressure to the Offshore Islands—with the possibility of at least air attacks on Taiwan.

Chiang reminded McConaughy of his belief that the five southern provinces should be subtracted from Mao’s control and that the Soviet Union would permit this gladly, but he said he did not wish to raise this again officially with Washington. He merely reiterated his conviction that he must have air superiority over the Chinese Communists. Ambassador Chow’s call on the Secretary Monday morning, asking for a squadron of F4C’s or, failing that, the stationing of U.S. sophisticated planes on Taiwan, is part of his present ploy.

As you know, we have no evidence of Chinese Communist preparation for action against the Offshore Islands or for increased participation in the Vietnam war. While under circumstances of both the Soviets and Chinese Communists being in very difficult straits may raise the possibility of completely irrational action, Chiang’s reasoning as to likely developments still appears to be very far out indeed.

One is tempted, in fact, to wonder whether Chiang is losing his grip on reality. I do not think that this is the correct interpretation. All reports indicate that he is both mentally alert and well informed. I think the explanation for the remarkable line of reasoning outlined in the attached cables lies in his anxious grasping at straws at this particular juncture, and that he fully recognizes that they are straws. I believe that basically his request for highly sophisticated aircraft (a squadron would cost about $50 million) and the tortuous justification is a result of his very deep concern at the prospect of:

• —President Johnson’s retirement from office and uncertainty as to the degree of our continued presence in East Asia;
• —the likely retirement of Secretary Rusk, whom Chiang considers an exceptionally staunch supporter of the GRC position;
• —indications from several Presidential aspirants of a desire for further movement toward contact with Peking;
• —our sharp cut in MAP support;
• —talk of disturbing initiatives in the UN by Canada, Belgium and Italy, etc.

In other words, there is considerable sanity in the Gimo’s “madness” if what he is doing is trying to get a new, high-silhouetted U.S. commitment of support in the later days of the Johnson Administration, which would be difficult to overlook by the new administration. He probably reasons that a new administration may well attempt new initiatives in East Asian policy before the career bureaucracy is given a chance to help with the new administration’s homework. He probably wants to make it awkward for new departures to be taken hastily before the “lessons,” which he believes might emerge from that homework, can be applied.

It makes no sense to give Chiang a squadron of F4C’s and they are committed for many months ahead in any event. Nor would it be wise to “station” a squadron of our own sophisticated aircraft on Taiwan. We should avoid anything which could be called “bases” as such on Taiwan. We might, however, “deploy” to Taiwan a few planes from the area, briefly and intermittently. State and Defense will look into this.

In short, if we can find a way of reaffirming our present commitments to the GRC without escalating them, but possibly with the added increment of a new gesture, it is probably in our interests to do so—partly for some of the reasons which I suppose to be in Chiang’s own mind. We should not, however, humor his present needs beyond the confines of U.S. interests per se. His true needs are not that great—at least as we can now see them.

Al

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. XIII. Secret. A copy was sent to Jorden.
2. Ambassador Chow’s August 26 meeting on the Secretary is summarized in telegram 228356, August 27. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 CHINAT-US)
3. The attachments, telegram 4233 from Taipei, August 23, and CINCPAC telegram 241143Z to CJCS, reported conversations on August 22 between McConaughy and Chiang Kai-shek and Admiral McCain, Admiral Sharp’s successor as CINCPAC, and Chiang.