Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

31. Letter From the Charge to the Republic of China (Clough) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)¹

Taipei, May 22, 1964.

Dear Bill:

The Chinese Communist shelling of Matsu on May 16, which clearly seems to have been a reaction to GRC artillery fire from Matsu covering a raiding party launched from Matsu against Lienchiang (FCT 8622), caused me to give consideration to repeating to the GRC the warning we gave them last spring that they should not assume the US would assist the GRC should the Chicoms attack the smaller offshore islands in retaliation for raids mounted by the GRC from such islands. (Dept’s CA-10363, March 22, 1963, and Embassy’s A–1091, June 21, 1963.)²

While the raid in question was not launched from one of the smaller offshore islands, some of the GRC’s recent raids have been launched from Tungyin. Of course, these have not been of the size that we were afraid the GRC might launch last spring, nor has there been any evidence that the GRC is deliberately seeking to provoke a Chinese Communist reaction against the offshore islands. On the contrary, the lack of success of the raids appears to have deterred the GRC for the present from any further activity in that general area (FCT 8622).

I assume our policy continues to be to oppose any action which might heighten the risk of the US becoming involved in military action in the Taiwan Straits area. We have not objected to the small scale raids the GRC has been running recently and I do not believe actions on that scale significantly increase the risk of a Chinese Communist reaction which would involve the US. However, if the GRC should continue to use Tung-yin or other minor offshores as a base for raids against the mainland, it would be easier for the Chinese Communists to build up a case in the eyes of the world justifying a military assault by them against these islands. Consequently, I believe we should consider repeating our warning of last year, if raids from the offshores should be resumed.

The timing of any such action would be influenced by measures we may take to cope with the serious situations in Laos and Vietnam, which might ultimately involve the Chinese Communists. It would be untimely, I think, to be warning the GRC against their minor harassing activities against the China mainland, just at the moment we were undertaking strong measures in Southeast Asia.

I have been in touch with Bill Nelson and other members of the Country Team on this matter, and will, of course, discuss it with the Ambassador.³

Sincerely,

Ralph

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CHICOM-CHINAT. Secret; Limit Distribution.
2. Not printed. (Ibid.)
3. Wright raised the subject of the May 16 clash at Matsu with Shen on June 19. He warned him that launching raids from the offshore islands was dangerous because it invited retaliation against the islands and that it would be unwise of the GRC to rely on U.S. assistance in such a situation. Shen said this was the first he had heard of the episode but that he would pass on what Wright had told him. (Memorandum of conversation, enclosed with airgram A–1110 from Taipei, June 26; ibid.)