309. Memorandum From Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)1
SUBJECT
- U.S. Policy Toward the GRC
Attached is the most thoughtful paper on the vexing Taiwan problem which I have seen in some time.2 It was prepared by Tom Shoesmith to serve as the basis for the discussion of Taiwan which consumed most of the second day of the two-day China Panel sessions. I recommend it in toto.
Shoesmith’s basic thesis is that the “Taiwanization” of Taiwan is proceeding slowly but surely, and that this trend is in the U.S. interest. We need not indicate overtly that the U.S. foresees the possibility of an eventually independent Taiwan, and certainly our defense commitments should remain intact. At the same time, we should take steps 1) to encourage a reduced military burden for the Island, 2) to further its economic progress, and 3) to prompt an increased role in regional economic and political affairs. He advocates a more relaxed acceptance of ChiRep trends in the United Nations, although for the foreseeable future our own policy should not change. (He believes that most of the considerations [Page 673] arguing for no change in our own ChiRep policy are likely to figure in the decisions of the majority of UN members—at least pending changes on the mainland and in Taiwan which might then, in fact, cause us to accept with equanimity some form of a “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan” proposal.)
I am in general agreement with this paper, as were practically all of the participants in the Panel, with the notable exception of George Taylor. Lucian Pye and Paul Varg expressed some relatively minor reservations.
I mentioned in staff meeting that there was overwhelming belief in the Panel that Taiwan was inexorably becoming more Taiwanized and many, most notably John Fairbank, believed that ultimate independence was the most likely prospect as trends could now be judged. (I have asked CIA for a modest study of this trend.) In addition, there are increasing indications that Chiang Kai-shek has reassessed his own role in history, that he has possibly accepted the unlikelihood of his return to the mainland (although he can never say so), and that he is turning his energies toward showing how Chinese can come to grips with the 20th Century in a way in which he realized he could not have shown on the mainland.
While I believe most of the thinking in this paper to be realistic, I hope the “liberals” on this subject will not seize upon its long-term implications in order to “erase the GRC fiction” prematurely. In any event, we certainly should not take any moves with respect to Taiwan in the hopes of improving thereby our relations with the mainland. Present Peking leadership clearly does not consider that it is in Peking’s interest to improve relations with the United States. When the time comes for a mainland leadership’s advocacy of, or acquiescence in, improved relations, it is my contention that Taiwan and our commitments there may well not stand seriously in the way.
Taiwan is growing in its own strength in almost every way, but it is not yet strong enough or independent enough to weather safely an overt shift in U.S. policy. The death of Chiang or an economic setback, for instance, could cause to emerge power rivalries, policy differences and mainlander-Taiwanese animosities which could seriously weaken the polity, which will be fairly vulnerable for some time to come. We can perhaps keep long-term probabilities for Taiwan better in mind than we have so far. And we can take certain practical steps, such as the tailoring of MAP in the hopes of shaping the military establishment to accord with its likely future role. (It is interesting to speculate on the possibly increased utility for purposes of regional reserve forces of an ultimate Taiwan military establishment as distinguished from a GRC military establishment.)
Above all we should remember that the whole mainland-Taiwan China tangle is not just a U.S. problem, but is one for the world, and particularly [Page 674] for our Asian friends. Our past policies, basically justifiable as you know I have considered them, have rather tended to convince the world that the China problem is pretty much a U.S. problem. The ultimate fate of Taiwan will depend not so much on what we do or do not do (short of scrapping our defense commitment) although our policy will certainly remain a major factor. Taiwan’s fate will at least as much depend on what happens on the mainland and what course is taken on Taiwan—primarily by Chiang Ching-kuo—after the Gimo’s death. Whether Ching-kuo then opts for a relatively popular base for government or looks to military support for a “tight little island” will in turn have considerable effect upon U.S. policy toward Taiwan.