Office of the Historian

307. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China1

Washington, March 9, 1968, 2340Z.

127768. Refs: [2 document numbers not declassified];2 C. State 61104.3

1.
Although our knowledge of mainland situation and of GRC resources limited, we seriously doubt GRC could take type of action CCK had indicated without exposing its involvement and thus giving rise to provocation in which US almost certainly would be implicated. At same time, we agree on inadvisability of totally negative response. Thus, we believe our response should re-emphasize primacy our interest in developing more complete information on mainland situation and should avoid appearance of approving CCK’s specific plan.
2.
With respect your recommendations ref B, para 7: a) we agree to informing CCK of US interest in any information GRC may develop concerning conditions in Kwangtung; b) we not in position provide any intelligence material on Kwangtung in addition to that which Embassy already passing through Dean-Wang channel and otherwise [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]; we would not want encourage GRC to expect special papers or appraisals on this subject; c) no objection [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] with GRC intelligence agencies responsible for political action indicated by CCK, but such liaison and consultation should be limited to intelligence function and, as noted in ref C, para 4, should not involve us in joint planning of such operations.
4.
From CCK’s description of operations he has in mind, we assume they would not involve providing arms to opposition groups, a course of action we would wish to discourage.
5.
We were interested in CCK’s apparent endorsement of Tibetan independence and wonder whether this is official GRC position. If so, might GRC be receptive to suggestion that it make some public statement to this effect?
Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINA–US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Shoesmith, cleared in draft by Jacobson and Holdridge, and approved by Bundy.↩
  2. One of these messages is paraphrased in the attachment to Document 304.↩
  3. Document 283.↩