Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

294. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland¹

Washington, January 4, 1968, 0105Z.

92930. Subj: 134th Ambassadorial-level US-ChiCom Meeting.

1. Assuming the meeting materializes as scheduled on January 8,² we anticipate another sterile tirade from Ch’en Tung³ focussing primarily on Vietnam, air incidents, possibly disarmament, and again Taiwan. We believe it unlikely Ch’en will break any fresh ground. We do not ourselves present any new initiative other than to suggest the possibility of bilateral discussions on Astronaut Assistance and Return but will reiterate our existing offers on contacts, etc. Text of proposed guidance as follows:

2. “Mr. Charge d’Affaires. This meeting marks the end of the second year in which I have been participating in these discussions. During this period, I have attempted to the best of my ability to communicate to you my Government’s views and attitudes on a variety of issues. I have particularly emphasized the willingness of the United States to proceed constructively to discuss a variety of matters which I had hoped were of mutual interest to the Govts and peoples of both of our countries. These have included, as I am sure you recall, Mr. Charge d’Affaires, proposals to facilitate

• —the travel by doctors, scholars, scientists, newspapermen, and other persons of our two countries;
• —the exchange of scientific and other types of data, information, and material;
• —the exchange of types of agricultural samples which would benefit the development of scientific research and agronomy in your country and mine;
• —joint investigation of incidents on the high seas;
• —disarmament and the control of nuclear weapons.

3. I have on other occasions expressed my regret that your Government has rejected these suggestions, all of which I take this opportunity to reiterate in their entirety. Some of these we had believed, from the past record of our meetings, at one time had been of interest to your Government but to date I am sorry to see no indication that your Government has considered the benefits and advantages they might bring to both our countries.

4. Mr. Chargé d’Affaires, it might be useful for me to review for you my Government’s views on the purpose of our meetings. Our objectives are threefold: First and foremost, we view them as a forum through which our two Governments can work gradually toward greater mutual understanding and begin to break down the barriers and antagonisms which have stood between us. Secondly, we see in them a point of contact where urgent and critical matters relating to the national interests of our two countries and to world peace can be communicated in private and with full frankness. Thirdly, we see in them an opportunity to exchange views on other problems and issues which either of us may feel it useful to raise with the other.

5. We succeeded, in the opening meetings in this series in 1955, in reaching agreement on the return of civilians to their own countries. In retrospect and even in spite of our many disagreements over the implementation of that initial agreement, it represented a significant step forward toward the resolution of specific problems. As I have noted before, we have never seen why, after gradually releasing so many of the American citizens being detained in your country, you drew the line at the handful who still remain.

6. To date, however, that has been our only agreed understanding in this forum. And in recent years, Mr. Chargé d’Affaires, despite the efforts of my Government to pose various means of improving relations between the peoples of our two countries, your Government has limited itself more and more to repetition of editorials, commentaries, and general statements on international affairs already given wide publicity by your radio and news media.

7. Mr. Chargé d’Affaires, I and my Government are indeed interested in the views of your Government on matters of general international concern. But let us also get on with the substantive, and we would hope productive, business of our meetings.

8. Mr. Chargé d’Affaires, your Government is aware, I am sure, of the existence of the International Telecommunications Satellite Corporation (INTELSAT) established in 1964. I would at this point like to call your Government’s attention to a message addressed by President Johnson to the US Congress on August 14, 1967 on membership in INTELSAT. The President stated: ‘We support a global system of commercial satellite communications which is available to all nations—large and small, developed and developing—on a non-discriminatory basis … We seek no domination of satellite communications to the exclusion of any other nation—or group of nations.’

9. Mr. Chargé d’Affaires, the scientists of your country have demonstrated their skill, ingenuity, and competence in many fields. Conceivably, one day in the not too distant future astronauts of your country will join those of other nations in venturing into the exciting and enormously important exploration of space. In this connection, my Government believes that it would be in the interest of both our countries for us to reach an understanding on the question of rescue and return of astronauts and space vehicles. I would be interested in the views of your Government on this subject.

10. Mr. Chargé d’Affaires, as your country continues to carry out nuclear tests, I am sure that the enormous power and destructive potential of nuclear weapons is becoming increasingly clear to the political, military, and scientific leaders of your country. The need to control these weapons, to avert their use, and to move gradually toward disarmament can hardly be open to doubt by anyone today. We have sought repeatedly, Mr. Chargé d’Affaires, to have your Government clarify and spell out in detail its views on controlling nuclear weapons and on constructive moves toward disarmament which would preserve the security of all states. Unilateral declarations on the use of nuclear weapons and calls for uncontrolled and uninspected disarmament obviously do not answer the real problems of security and assurance in a world in which mutual trust and confidence are imperfect.

11. Mr. Chargé d’Affaires, my Government, together with other nations, has been engaged in serious negotiations designed to conclude an agreement barring the further spread of nuclear weapons. On July 31, 1963 your Government issued a statement on disarmament, part (2) C of which specifically called for ‘the prohibition of the export and import of nuclear weapons and technical data on their manufacture.’ As I understand your language, its spirit is precisely in keeping with the purpose of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to which I just referred. I would hope your Government will be willing to look at the Treaty in this light and join with many other states in seeking by practical and progressive steps to deal with this and other problems of disarmament.

12. FYI: If Ch’en raises ABM question, you should make statement below, but not otherwise. Mr. Chargé d’Affaires, I am sure your Government has noted the various public statements in recent months about the United States decision to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system, but I would like to underscore one or two points. In the first place, it is clear that it is purely defensive. It employs components which cannot conceivably in themselves present a threat to any nation. In the absence of mutual assurances that offer hope for an end to the arms race and the spread of nuclear weapons, we reluctantly felt that prudence demanded we make the deployment. Our interest in putting an end to the arms race and the huge expenditures of human and material resources that it entails remains undiminished. We would much prefer ourselves to devote our resources to the enormous tasks that remain unfinished, both in our own country and in others, in housing, education, transportation, health and welfare. Is this not a common goal we both share and toward which we should both be able to work and cooperate?

13. Mr. Chargé d’Affaires, I mentioned earlier the achievements of your country’s scientists in many fields. I would like to take particular note of your achievements in the field of insulin chemistry. Such progress, like that in heart surgery recently achieved in South Africa, and that in synthesizing a protein virus in my country, should be shared with all scientists without regard to politics. We regret that, at the present time, the PRC is the only major scientific country in the world which is unwilling to permit open, widespread exchange of scientists and scientific, unclassified research and information with the US. We would like to see such exchanges and I am prepared to discuss with you now or at a subsequent meeting means of remedying this situation, and assure you of the USG’s desire to encourage exchanges of visits between your scientists and ours.

14. Mr. Chargé d’Affaires, I have discussed with you at length on previous occasions my Government’s views on the Vietnam conflict, our reasons for involvement in that conflict, and our limited objectives and willingness to withdraw our forces from Vietnam when the threat to the security of SVN has ended. I have made it clear that we do not seek to invade North Vietnam or to destroy or change the Government in NVN and, in the same context, made clear we do not seek a wider war, that we do not intend to attack your country, and do not have any territorial aspirations in that entire area. We sincerely hope your Government understands this. (FYI: If in his opening statement, Ch’en includes direct threat against US, you should note that this is a matter of gravest consequence you can only report to your Govt and follow with remainder of para 14. End FYI.) We also hope your Government has considered—as we have—the grave consequences which a war between our two countries would have. To wish to avert such a conflict is not cowardice or a sign of being what your Chairman calls a ‘paper tiger’. Secretary Rusk responded on October 12 to a question whether the main US objective in Asia was the so-called ‘containment’ of your country with an emphatic ‘No. The central objective is an organized and reliable peace.’ But we will assist those countries that feel themselves threatened and to whom we have pledged our support and friendship. There should be not the faintest germ of doubt in your Government’s appreciation of that fact.

15. It is sometimes difficult for one country to understand the psychology, the ‘style’ of another. And because the American system permits all views to be expressed openly, allows all kinds of dissent and debate, it is sometimes possible for other countries with different patterns and traditions of political and social behavior and action to mistake the workings of the democratic process and the free expression of diverse opinions in the US for weakness or lack of determination.

16. It is true, Mr. Chargé d’Affaires, that we are periodically confronted by incidents involving ships or aircraft of our two countries. We are convinced that you know these are not purposefully and intentionally precipitated. But despite our most persistent efforts, it occasionally happens that as a result of malfunction or navigational error, US aircraft do intrude briefly and shallowly into your territorial airspace. We will continue to take every practicable measure to prevent such occurrences.

17. The serious warnings your Government issues with such regularity, I have noted before and reiterate today, with rare exception, cannot be verified. Many, of course, relate to the Paracel Islands—what you call the Hsisha Islands. As you know, sovereignty over this island group is in dispute. On your claims of US naval violations of your waters, our rec-ords consistently show that US Navy ships have not entered your territorial waters, even if measured by the 12-mile sea limit your Government claims rather than a 3-mile sea limit.

18. Conceivably, there may be some genuine misunderstanding on our part of the charting of your coastal waters. We would welcome receiving more up-to-date cartographic charts of your offshore waters, if you believe our plots are inaccurate, or your marking off your territorial water claims on generally available older charts for our information.

19. If it would be of interest to you, I would also at our next meeting be prepared to provide you with more detailed information on the actual positions of specific US naval vessels to clarify any question relating to their entry into your territorial waters. My Government would welcome similar information from your side including the name or hull number of the ship, time, and coordinates of the position involved. Perhaps this might clarify our respective positions and possibly resolve some of our differences. FYI: Following para to be used only if this specific subject is raised by Wang. End FYI.

20. On your figure of 125 air intrusions by US aircraft over a one-year period, I am unable to accept your figures without specific documentation. I would, however, be interested in receiving any specific plottings by your authorities of specific air intrusions you believe have occurred (excluding, of course, those of whose existence we have already publicly indicated our awareness).

21. Mr. Chargé d’Affaires, I would like to express my appreciation for the release of Mr. David J. Steele, whose sailboat apparently crossed into your territorial waters near Hainan, at the HK border on September 19, 1967. I also note that your authorities on June 17, 1967 released to HK an American citizen named Leon James, otherwise known as Holden Johnson, who had crossed over into your territory without permission. I regret, however, that your Government has not as yet responded to my letters dated August 27, 1967 and September 12, 1967⁴ requesting information on Lt. Robert Flynn (USN) and other crewmen of two US Navy aircraft shot down over your territory on August 21, 1967. (FYI: If Wang deals with this question in his opening statement, but rejects requests for return of Flynn, change preceding sentence to regret rejection.) These planes, we acknowledge, crossed into your territory but with no hostile intent and inadvertently. We note that Lt. Flynn has thus far not been permitted to write his family. Major (formerly Captain) Philip Smith, on the other hand, was permitted to write his family almost immediately and to receive mail and packages. While, as in the case of Major Smith, we continue to hope your authorities will release Lt. Flynn, we strongly urge that he be permitted to write and receive letters and packages while he is under detention by your authorities. I also reiterate my request that you facilitate arrangements for the return of the bodies of the dead crewmen for burial in the US.”

22. FYI: We assume Ch’en Tung will again try to postpone the next meeting for 4–5 months or even longer. You should propose a date in mid-April and see how much you can whittle down Ch’en Tung’s reluctance. We are, however, if need be, prepared to delay until June.

23. Response to contingencies authorized for 132nd and 133rd meetings on break or suspension of talks remain in effect.

24. Para 8 should be used only if subsequent specific authorization received.⁵ End FYI.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Kreisberg on December 27. Cleared by Bundy, Aldrich, Alan F. Neidle of ACDA/IR, Herman I. Chinn of SCI, Harriman’s Special Assistant Frank A. Sieverts, SCA Deputy Administrator Nathan Lewin, and Morton Halperin of DOD/ISA, and approved and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to Taipei, London, Saigon, Moscow, Hong Kong, and CINCPAC.
2. The meeting, originally scheduled for November 8, was postponed to January 8 at Chinese request. (Telegram 1268 from Warsaw and telegram 61850 to Warsaw, both October 30; ibid.)
3. A telephone message from the Chinese Embassy in Warsaw on January 1 stated that since Ambassador Wang could not return to Warsaw for the January 8 meeting, the Chinese Government proposed as a temporary measure that Charge Ch’en Tung take part in the meeting; the United States agreed to the arrangement. (Telegram 1704 from Warsaw and telegram 91928 to Warsaw, January 1 and 2, respectively; both ibid.)
4. The texts of the letters were transmitted in telegrams 25858 and 34505, dated August 23 and September 8, respectively; both ibid., POL 31–1 CHICOM-US. A similar letter was delivered to the Chinese Embassy in Warsaw on November 7. (Telegram 65293 to Warsaw and telegram 1340 from Warsaw, November 6 and 7, respectively; both ibid.)
5. No such authorization was sent.