Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

291. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, December 14, 1967, 0310Z.

1634. Ref: State 82115; Taipei 1594.²

1. Tight security precautions and continued state of martial law have long been considered by ROC as absolutely essential to its protection against the threat posed by Communist China. Legalistically, GRC looks upon Taiwanese independence movements as secessionist in nature, and like all other such threats to political status quo, as merely variant forms of “rebellion”, designed to weaken it in the face of the Communist threat. Practically speaking, GRC probably estimates that without strict security controls a mainlander government could not effectively control a population which is over 80 percent Taiwanese.

2. Police sweeps of various types are a periodic exercise on Taiwan. For example, prior to Chinese New Year’s there are local sweeps directed against petty criminals. A more general sweep is also an annual occurrence. Such a sweep was conducted June 8, 1965. On May 14 and 18, 1966, there were two sweeps in anticipation of Chiang’s inauguration for fourth term. This fall there seems to have been two sweeps: a small one in late August directed at Taiwanese independence advocates or their associates, and a general sweep on October 5, timed to catch potential security risks by double ten.

3. Only the pattern for the general police sweep seems at all established. Reportedly, the garrison command sets a quota of persons to be picked up for each municipality or county and mobilizes all available regular military police, and special security forces. Curfew is put in effect about 1:00 a.m. on an unannounced day, and no one except police is allowed to move until 6:00 a.m. Trains are stopped at their nearest station. During this period everyone, at home or in public places, has his household registration and identity card checked for irregularities and against lists of wanted criminals. In this year’s general sweep, the press reported the next day that about 100 were arrested in Taipei. According to one Embassy source in the garrison command, 80 out of the 100 detained in Taipei in October were picked up from the wanted list of habitual bad check passers. Only part of the remaining 20 (a “handful” according to garrison command source) were detained as “threats to social stability”. The exact number detained in the two sweeps late this year is unknown: 230 is the largest island-wide estimate the Embassy has heard. Presumably this excludes temporary detention.

4. One reason that the exact number detained in such sweeps is not particularly significant is that certain police subdivisions, finding it hard to meet their assigned detention quotas, apparently detain a few of the local social misfits (petty racketeers, vagrants, etc.) for a few days just to fill out their list. The percentage of Taiwanese detained in this year’s sweeps is not accurately known. The Embassy has, however, heard complaints from Taiwanese in the past that police sweeps pick up an even larger percentage of Taiwanese than their proportion in the general population would make likely.

5. Martial law on Taiwan is justified by GRC as necessary consequence of existence of a state of hostilities with the Chinese Communists. It covers a wide variety of threats to public safety and public order. Any case considered to involve either rebellion or sedition would fall under its provisions. Article 5 of the rules regarding the punishing of rebellion and sedition provides for ten years to life imprisonment for “participation in a rebel organization or meeting.” Article 6 provides for 7 years to life for “spreading a rumor or disseminating untrue information which might endanger public peace or order or disturb the mind of the people”. Article 7 provides 7 years to life imprisonment for a person who “uses written articles, pictures, books or speeches for publicity purposes for the benefit of a rebellious organization.” Article 4 provides for the death penalty, life or imprisonment for not less than ten years for a series of actions such as sabotage, espionage, etc., but also including the “collecting of funds or supplies for or furnishing money or properties to a rebel”, “providing protection to or hiding a rebel”, “instigating a labor, student or market strike or disturbing public peace and order … under the instruction or for the benefit of a rebel”.

6. Despite stringent nature of law, very few of those picked up in this year’s sweeps are likely to be tried under its provisions. For example, those passing bad checks probably were forced to pay up or their family made to provide guarantees for release. To Embassy’s knowledge, there have been no trials or political grounds of any of the persons picked up during either August or October sweeps; but under martial law, trial need not be public.

7. Embassy strongly doubts that large number of Taiwanese active in independence movement or other anti-KMT activities were picked up during August and October police sweeps. Story of sweeps has been common topic of discussion among U.S. students studying here and among Taipei correspondents. It has also been heard in Hong Kong and in Tokyo, where it has been covered in Taiwanese independence movement periodicals. However, only seven names have come to attention of Embassy from all these sources as persons who may have been arrested on political grounds and two of these names appear to refer to same person. As a result, Embassy is inclined to believe that only a handful of those arrested in general sweep were arrested on political grounds.

8. Taiwan’s security system is closely related to maintenance of minority government rule over Taiwanese population, ramifications of this issue are very great, and totally beyond purview of MOFA or any other Ministry. Long established U.S. policy of encouraging broader Taiwanese participation in government has produced little effect, since policy is established by top leadership which firmly believes strong centralized control is absolutely essential, especially during period of national emergency. If United States representations were to be made on this subject, they would have to be made to President Chiang himself. What we know as to recent sweeps would not justify any demarche to him based on conduct of those sweeps.

9 Case of Kuo Hsi-lin, recent deportee from Japan, appears to be one that would give Japanese some opportunity to make representations if GOJ should feel warranted. Iijima, First Secretary Japanese Embassy, called on Embassy Taipei on Dec. 12 to ask what U.S. knows of Kuo’s probable future. Stated that Japanese immigration service was given assurances Kuo would not be tried for political crimes and that GRC Embassy Tokyo also gave Kuo a written statement to that effect. Kuo case could easily fall under martial law as interpreted here. In such an event, prosecution of his case would probably follow lines of Huang Chi-ming case. (A–193³ and previous.) Exit from and entry into Taiwan are responsiblity of a department of the garrison command. (There is no separate immigration service.) Violation of immigration laws might be treated as security offense. Even without such a decision, if maximum penalties sought for all laws broken by Kuo in his illegal entry into and exit from Taiwan, sentence could probably be as severe as if membership in Taiwanese independence movement were charged.

10. Several specific details in this report come from very sensitive sources and should not be released in any public manner. Embassy hopes, however, that background will be of some value for briefing interested parties in U.S.

11. FYI. Embassy is preparing a series of airgrams on internal security and political stability situation on Taiwan that should begin appearing next month.⁴

McConaughy

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 29 CHINAT. Secret. Repeated to Tokyo.
2. Telegram 82115, December 9, requested information for a follow-up report to Senator Fulbright about the early fall security sweep mentioned in telegram 1594 from Taipei, December 7. (Both ibid.)
3. Airgram A–193 from Taipei, September 13. (Ibid.)
4. A series of six airgrams on this subject, sent between March 1 and May 17, is ibid., POL 2 CHINAT.