Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

289. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, December 1, 1967, 0930Z.

1551. Ref: State 75479.²

1. Further [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] information concerning Kwangtung raid gives added support to conclusion that press story was fabrication planted by pro-GRC newsman in three Hong Kong Chinese language newspapers on November 22.

2. Department’s observation (para 2 reftel) that GRC seems to feel obliged present image of being actively engaged in hastening downfall of Chinese Communists in order maintain credibility of mainland recovery goal, is entirely accurate. Even if President Chiang and top Chinese officials feel this goal is not presently achievable, GRC believes it must maintain claim to be government of all China and keep alive, at least publicly, its goal of mainland recovery, in order to justify its rule on Taiwan and protect its legitimacy. Consequently, GRC pronouncements about mainland recovery are still relatively frequent, even though major emphasis is now on political rather than military action to achieve this end. Latest statement in mainland recovery was made by Defense Minister Chiang Ching-kuo (CCK) Nov 27 in Tokyo. CCK said he believed that “in the not too distant future we will certainly overthrow the Communist regime.” Such statements disturb and concern Japanese, ourselves and other governments. On the other hand, this concern should be tempered by fact that GRC has been making similar and sometimes even more militant statements intermittently for the past 18 years, during which time GRC has undertaken no major military action against mainland.

3. Peking must also be well aware that GRC’s bellicose public utterances and its cautious actual military posture are far apart. GRC statements about mainland recovery are probably analyzed correctly by Peking as propaganda rather than as evidence of firm GRC plans.

4. At the same time we should bear in mind President Chiang’s occasional earnest requests to high ranking visitors for assistance in persuading USG that Peking is major enemy and must be destroyed. It is possible that Sato’s apparent concern about GRC intentions grew out of his conversation with President Chiang during September visit reported Taipei’s 906.³ Chiang reportedly asked Sato for GOJ assistance in persuading USG to support a military counterattack.

5. It is worth noting that our contacts with Japanese Embassy Taipei have consistently given evidence that the latter usually are not very well informed of high level GRC deliberations. Their contacts are, perhaps understandably, chiefly with Japanese-speaking Taiwanese, and the views manifested to us by GOJ officers here often reflect their lack of contact with inner circles of GRC. We note, also, that Amb Johnson’s probing in Tokyo (Tokyo’s 3662)⁴ does not reveal any great GOJ concern about GRC attacks on mainland. (See also Tokyo’s 3701.)⁵ Soundings by Embassy Taipei (reported septel) also fail to indicate Japanese Embassy concern on this point.

6. President Chiang has repeatedly been informed that US does not want wider war in Far East and can not agree to counterattack. A cogent expression of this view was contained in President’s message to Gimo on March 1967 (see Deptel 156346).⁶ GRC officials have been frequently reminded of US views in previous and subsequent conversations by Ambassador, and by Secretary and by Bundy on visits in 1966. GRC’s full awareness of US opposition to military action against mainland clearly indicated by CCK in October conversation with Ambassador (Taipei’s 1052).⁷

7. We have firm evidence that GRC is not seriously considering any major unilateral action in Taiwan Straits area at this time and that GRC military intentions confirm closely with GRC recent public posture of watching and waiting for conditions on the mainland to develop (without GRC intervention). Although President Chiang and some of his top advisors are probably concerned about future implications of apparent abatement of Cultural Revolution activity and partial restoration of order on mainland, we believe it highly unlikely that fear of losing any supposed last opportunity would prompt Gimo to launch rash military attack against mainland. GRC analysts believe Mao has recently regained control of mainland situation. They also believe, however, that Mao’s future policies will again plunge mainland into chaos. This longer range view may be of some comfort to Gimo and others who realize GRC by itself does not have sufficient military strength, logistic capability, or air cover to launch successful large scale attack.

8. We know [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that just concluded KMT Central Committee Plenum did not discuss or develop any new policy or plan indicating a change in GRC’s present cautious wait and see approach to mainland events. We also know [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that GRC is sharply reducing number of officers engaged in contingency planning of unilateral major operations against mainland.

9. A sharp distinction also must be made between GRC propaganda statements concerning mainland recovery and GRC intelligence activities against mainland. While we believe GRC intends no major military action against mainland at this time we know, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that GRC has definite intention continue very small scale incursions by Marine operations along coast and/or intelligence forays along Yunnan border areas. GRC motive in continuing small scale incursions is not only for intelligence gain but more importantly (since most of previous attempts have been unsuccessful) for internal psychological purposes—to demonstrate they are showing the flag and to prove they are continuing offensive against enemy. This determination to show the flag in the mainland may continue to cause some anxiety in Tokyo and other capitals, which may not be fully informed about actual GRC intentions and motivations, and may judge import of GRC actions and assertions to be more ambitious and potentially dangerous than they actually are. CCK, for example, reportedly started at Tokyo press conference Nov 29 that guerrilla raids against mainland would be increased. In recent GRC statements it has been implicit that anti-Mao forces on mainland (not forces sent from Taiwan) were carrying out guerrilla activity. CCK’s statement reported in local press leaves source of guerrilla raids deliberately vague. GRC, as part of its psychological warfare effort, may continue to take credit for anti-Maoist activities on mainland, even though GRC lacks real control over reported events. Our ability to dissuade GRC from this type of propaganda is very limited because these statements stem from very fundamental GRC policies and aspirations, and do not violate GRC commitments to US related to Mutual Defense Treaty.

10. Ambassador has agreement with CCK that they will meet shortly after CCK’s return from Japan. At that time Ambassador intends to reiterate position that US continues to be strongly opposed to provocative actions launched at mainland by GRC other than small scale intelligence collection forays which we have countenanced in the past.

11. We believe that visit here of either Secretary or Assistant Secretary Bundy, as part of tour of the area, would be very useful primarily to reassure GRC of continued closeness of our alliance relationship and our recognition of importance of conservation of GRC economic and defense capabilities as essential elements of free world assets in East Asia during present critical period. This particularly important in light of proposed drastic slash in MAP funds. However, GRC is completely cognizant of US position against use of force against mainland and of GRC obligations under 1954 Defense Treaty and exchange of notes, and we believe special high level visit for sole purpose reinforcing this view would not be necessary or productive.

12. Para 5 reftel requests Country Team assessment of possible GRC reaction to extremely deep cut in MAP. Specifically it is asked if the GRC might attempt to pressure USG to restore the funds by creating serious incident in Straits area to provoke strong ChiCom reaction, which then could be portrayed by GRC as threat to Offshores and Taiwan. Although there is no available evidence pointing to any such intention, the GRC does have the capability launch unilateral actions such as an air strike or raid from Chinmen which might possibly provoke serious consequences—possibly without prior US knowledge. We do know [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that the GRC does have unilateral contingency plans (though no present intention) for unilateral operations.

13. GRC has been sharply warned by US at least twice in recent years that in the event that GRC actions needlessly provoke a ChiCom attack on Taiwan, US might not consider defensive commitments under terms of 1954 Mutual Security Treaty to be applicable. While a deep cut in MAP will somewhat adversely affect US–GRC relations and cause GRC to have further fears of some measure of US “disengagement”, we believe it unlikely that GRC would respond to MAP cut by deliberately staging provocative incident against mainland. Such an action would call for improbable supposition that President Chiang, casting his usual caution aside, would be willing to risk everything on a rash and vengeful act. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] report of recent medical exam by competent physicians and observation of his activities, President Chiang is in exceptionally good health. He is mentally active and alert and is in full control of his faculties. Although in future years, as with any person of advanced age, his mental condition could deteriorate to point where he might make irrational decisions, there is no sign at present of any such deterioration or lessening of his sense of responsibility. Country Team concurs.

McConaughy

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 CHINAT. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Tokyo and Hong Kong.
2. Telegram 75479, November 28, referred to a story in the Hong Kong press that GRC commandos had destroyed 8 MIG-19 jets in a raid on a mainland airbase, noting that a Hong Kong report seemed to confirm the Embassy’s suspicion that the press story was a fabrication. Considering that during Japanese Prime Minister Sato’s recent visit to Washington, he had expressed concern about Chiang Kai-shek’s intentions, the telegram requested Embassy views of GRC intentions and of the advisability of reminding the GRC of the U.S. position with respect to the use of force against the mainland. (Ibid.)
3. Dated September 27. (Ibid., POL CHICOM-CHINAT)
4. Dated May 24. (Ibid., POL 27 CHICOM-CHINAT)
5. Dated December 1. (Ibid., POL CHICOM-CHINAT)
6. Document 249.
7. Document 282.