Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

287. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

Washington, November 18, 1967, 0113Z.

71292. Ref: State 70661.² Following summary FYI only and Noforn. It is uncleared and subject to revision upon review.

1. GRC FonMin Wei and Ambassador Chow called on Secretary November 17 to request reconsideration of our decision to vote for, but not lobby for, ChiRep study committee resolution if text tabled same as last year. At outset Wei asked whether we had any confirmation of overnight GRC report from Rome that Italians would not table resolution unless assured in advance of at least 20 favorable votes. Secretary said we did not.

2. FonMin and Ambassador in rather discursive presentation explained GRC did not like being put in situation where trouble came from its friends rather than its enemies. GRC had been working this year, particularly among Latin Americans, to reduce potential support for study committee resolution and, partly as result of US efforts to dissuade Italian and Chilean initiatives, had been able to shift number of Latin Americans to opposition. US decision to vote for resolution would undercut GRC efforts. Greatest problem, however, was how GRC could explain US vote in Taiwan. US vote last year had caused serious difficulties but GRC had been able to weather crisis on understanding that US vote was tactic adopted out of necessity whereas situation this year clearly did not require study committee. GRC recognized negative US vote might jeopardize Italian votes on Important Question and Albanian resolutions but did not believe this too important.

3. Secretary commented that Italians had reached their decision after big controversy in Cabinet. Nenni had used his role in political coalition so that he was in essence conditioning his support of Italian position vis-a-vis Important Question and Albanian resolutions to re-submission of study committee proposal. Originally Italians had in mind far worse text which we had indicated we would have to vote against. Even though US position had to take into account problems of several “soft sisters” on this question (Italy, Chile and others) GRC should be able to relax because it could be certain that study committee resolution would not be adopted by Assembly. After reminding Wei that Taipei ultimately seemed quite satisfied with outcome of last year’s ChiRep debate, Secretary emphasized that we should concentrate on main issues which were to maximize our support for IQ resolution and against Albanian resolution; study committee issue was sideshow which GRC could brush off.

4. Wei reiterated that US vote in favor of study committee could not be explained adequately to President Chiang and GRC and that it would create doubt among people because concept clearly implied two Chinas. FonMin added that he couldn’t understand why Italians and others persisted in this approach when it was so obvious that two-Chinas arrangements were completely unacceptable to Chinese. Given the lack of necessity this year, Wei urged US reverse its position and vote against Italian resolution.

5. Secretary stated that US could not be so casual about reversing decision. Since study committee device did not appear necessary this year, US had tried strenuously to dissuade Italians from pursuing matter, but once sponsors decide to go ahead we had to keep in mind our future position when we might very well need study committee to hold line against Albanian resolution. Moreover, US had other problems to be considered. Nenni, for example, could create grave difficulties if he were to throw Italian Government into real crisis, and there were similar problems in other countries.

6. Referring to a previous conversation in which Secretary had cautioned GRC not to see ghosts where there were none, Chow stressed that he wanted to avoid another crisis of confidence between US and GRC. It was possible overcome crisis last year because GRC recognized US had moved under duress; this was not the case this year and GRC found US support for study committee incomprehensible.

7. Secretary said that while FonMin and Ambassador could feel free to tell Gimo they had pressed us very hard, he urged that they not push him too far on this matter. He said he would give thought to their request and would, of course, be most pleased if the Italians were at last minute to stop short of tabling resolution. However, while US understood GRC’s position, we had broad and long-range considerations to keep in mind not only in terms of our relations with certain other countries but possible future need for device of study committee which might develop in later Assemblies. In any case, US support of study committee would be passive and we would not seek to influence votes of others.

8. At conclusion of meeting Wei and Chow referred again to GRC efforts with Latin American governments saying they feared Italians would deliberately misconstrue US position and thus counteract GRC campaign against study committee. Secretary assured them US certainly would do nothing to shift votes wrong way.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Gleysteen and approved by Popper. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Rome, The Hague, Brussels, Santiago, Tokyo, Canberra, Bangkok, Manila, and Seoul.
2. Telegram 70661, November 17, informed the Embassy in Taipei that Popper had called in Ambassador Chow on November 16 to inform him of a U.S. decision to vote for a study committee resolution that was expected to be the same as the 1966 resolution. (Ibid.)