Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

285. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, November 7, 1967, 0645Z.

1318. Ref A. State 61104;² B. State 34987.³

1. I called on Defense Minister Chiang Ching-kuo (CCK) Nov 6 at my request as follow-up to our conversation of Oct 11, with special view to further exploration of his views of “political warfare” against mainland, in light of Ref A. I was accompanied by DCM Hummel [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

2. I said that within the framework, which he understood, of avoiding provocative actions against the mainland, Washington had given a basically affirmative response to his suggestions of Oct 11, and that we did want to improve our joint intelligence collection and analysis. I spoke of the opportunities for identifying potential defectors and agents, and for building channels to them. I reminded him that a team of US intelligence specialists would be arriving from Washington next month to discuss mainland conditions (Ref B) and said that we wanted to expand our exchange of information with GRC and think of ways to improve intelligence cooperation and analysis. I said we were not certain just what CCK had meant by intensified political warfare operations. If he was thinking of getting in touch with anti-Mao elements, I said, then we were favorably disposed toward consideration of such efforts, but we would have to be mindful of the need to avoid provocations and offensive actions.

3. CCK replied that as he had said in our previous conversation of Oct 11, he wanted to intensify joint US–GRC efforts directed at the mainland, and wanted to adhere to the principle of close exchange of info. He had not yet considered what specific actions should be taken, but he meant by political warfare (1) to do what can be done to impede Mao’s efforts to form internal “alliances” that include dissident elements, and (2) to make efforts to see that the internal struggles on the mainland do not stop. He said the GRC wanted to get into contact with elements that are anti-Mao and with those that have failed to make accommodations to Mao’s policies. He said the GRC has been in contact with some of these elements in deep interior areas far from Taiwan where little could be done to assist them. What is now needed, he said, is contact with new elements nearer the coast, and when these contacts are achieved he would be talking with the USG about what to do.

4. In an effort to draw CCK out further, I mentioned influential elements in several areas (Sinkiang, Tibet, Kwangtung and Kwangsi) that seem still to oppose Mao, but it was obvious that he had said all he wanted to say at that time. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] offered [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] knowledge and resources on mainland contact operations, stating that he would be glad to work with NSB head, Gen. Chou Chung-feng, or any other officer CCK might designate, to discuss possible further steps. CCK replied in polite but non-committal terms to statements of Ambassador [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and then changed the subject.

5. Comment: It is conceivable that GRC has indeed made new contacts with dissident elements in the interior of China, but the absence of evidence, and past experience, points against the possibility. In fact it occurs to us here that the embarrassing paucity of GRC contacts may be additional factor in probable overall GRC political disinclination to see us involved in GRC-ChiCom contacts. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] will nevertheless proceed get into contact with Gen. Chou to test whether any further intelligence liaison is contemplated.

6. It seems to me that CCK in raising this subject last month was following instructions, probably from the Gimo, to sound us out in general terms without making any specific proposals for action at this time. CCK’s rather general response to further probing has narrowed the field of subject matter apparently to exclude sabotage and the dropping of large action teams. What he apparently wanted was a general expression of interest, or at least lack of discouragement, from the USG on the subject of making contact with dissident elements on the mainland for essentially political purposes. He now has had this expression of USG interest, hedged with appropriate caveats about avoiding provocative actions. He seems not to want to go further in detailed discussions at this time, and I do not think we should press him.

7. In summary, it now appears that CCK was on a very general fishing expedition rather than on a mission to achieve closer cooperation in intelligence planning and operations.

8. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] concurs in this cable.

9. Memcon follows by airgram.⁴

McConaughy

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-CHINAT. Secret; Exdis.
2. Document 283.
3. Dated September 9. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM)
4. Airgram A–312, November 11. (Ibid., POL CHICOM)