Office of the Historian

263. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Hong Kong1

Washington, May 18, 1967, 6:40 p.m.

197313. Ref: Hong Kong 7983.2 Eyes Only for Rice and Bruce from Secretary.

1.
You should consider problem of Hong Kong in following context:
a.
We do not know whether Peking will press the British out of Hong Kong; we are inclined to doubt it because of substantial economic losses which would occur but they are fully capable of acting irrationally.
b.
We do not believe that British themselves would make a major effort to defend Hong Kong against any major Chinese Communist military assault.
c.
United States would not expect to defend Hong Kong for British, nor do we expect British to ask for this support.
2.
You should not intimate in any way readiness to discuss joint military planning.
3.
None of above means we should not be as cooperative with and amenable as possible to British and Hong Kong government suggestions as how we can be helpful, short of involving us in moves that could lead to US military involvement in defense of Hong Kong.
Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 HK. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Rusk; cleared by Bundy, Jacobson, Barnett, Eugene Rostow, Jenkins, and McNamara. Repeated to London. Walt Rostow sent a copy to the President with a May 19 covering note: “Mr. President: You should be aware of Sec. Rusk’s formulation of our posture toward Hong Kong in the wake of the brief discussion at Tuesday’s lunch.” The note is initialed with an “L” in Johnson’s handwriting. According to Johnson’s Appointment Diary, he had lunch on Tuesday, May 16, with Rusk, McNamara, Humphrey, Helms, Rostow, Press Secretary George Christian, and General Wheeler. (Johnson Library) No record of the discussion has been found.↩
  2. Reference should be to telegram 7938 from Hong Kong, May 16, in which Rice stated that the question of approval of a visit to Hong Kong by Admiral Sharp, which had been left to the Consulate General, was one that should be answered in the context of general U.S. policy concerning Hong Kong and he did not know what the thinking was on this subject in Washington or whether people at a sufficiently high level had focused on it. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 HK)↩