248. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State1
2798. 1. DefMin Chiang Ching-kuo called on me at my residence at his own request March 14 principally to suggest regular exchanges of views on China Mainland, and policies and actions directed thereto. He thought meetings should be held at least once a month.
2. He began by giving categorical assurance that GRC major policies are “fully coordinated” with those of the US, that they have been in the past and will continue to be so in future. He said that as Gimo had told Amb Goldberg, it is important that we achieve close coordination of views and actions, and asked for my assessment of present Mainland situation.
3. I thanked him for assurance of close coordination and welcomed regular exchange of views. I outlined for him the US view that Mainland tensions were being damped down, probably for tactical and pragmatic reasons, and as at least a temporary measure to prevent economic chaos. I covered, inter alia, role Chou En-Lai seemed to be playing, our puzzlement at the virtual disappearance of Lin and Liu from the stage, our feeling that Mao’s views were unlikely to have undergone fundamental change, and the probability that both the power struggle and the ideological controversy are far from over. I said I would like to obtain latest assessments from Washington and Hong Kong and to continue the discussion next week.
4. CCK said he agreed with my analysis, that the Mainland situation is “highly abnormal” and that we will all need more time to observe events before we can come to firm conclusions. In response to my question, CCK said the ChiComs would not change their views on the Vietnam war, and would do their best to block any peace settlement. A settlement would not only be a sharp reverse for ChiCom foreign policy, but would have serious internal consequences as well. He said he thought the ChiComs could get through the spring planting season without too much trouble, but that there would be a critical period at the time of the fall harvest.
5. I asked for any indications of ChiCom intentions in the Taiwan Straits, referring to the recent incidents of ChiCom boat incursions near the Offshore Islands. He said that aside from these incidents there were no particular indications. Some ChiCom troops in the Fukien area had [Page 538] been rotated, but overall numbers remained the same. Psywar activities, however, had been stepped up, especially those aimed at Taiwanese soldiers, with Fukienese dialect replacing Mandarin as the language used in broadcasts and over loudspeakers. There had been a doubling of the number of balloon-bearing propaganda leaflets (to 380 in the past month) over the similar period last year, when prevailing winds permit such ChiCom operations. He was somewhat concerned that rumors are being spread on Taiwan that the leaflets are released here by a strong Communist underground, and to counter this, the GRC is making known that they are carried to Taiwan by balloon. The leaflets and other materials, which include books on Mao’s thought and on the Cultural Revolution, are more specifically targeted toward GRC armed forces, although they use familiar themes that the US is disengaging from and will eventually abandon the GRC, that GRC troops should assist in efforts to liberate Taiwan, and exhorting troops to stage a coup and overthrow the government.
6. CCK said he was getting questions from the Legislative Yuan on the level of US military assistance, and mentioned a newspaper report that a sum of US$200 million had been earmarked for division between Korea and the GRC. I said this could not be true, since Congress had not acted on the appropriation request, and since in any case they do not earmark MAP funds by country in this manner. I assured him that the GRC’s needs were put forward vigorously, but I cautioned him that Vietnam needs had priority, and that there seemed to be strong Congressional sentiment for economy elsewhere. I said that some other countries (including Korea, Thailand and the Philippines) had special requirements, and that it could be impossible to divide up a reduced appropriation among the recipients to the satisfaction of all.
7. CCK said he was sure I understood the GRC need. He said the ChiComs watch carefully all news of US military assistance, and there is a political impact caused by any change in level. I said I would try to get additional information from Washington on current prospects for MAP, although there could be no positive estimate at this stage.
8. CCK invited me to go with him on a brief visit to Matsu Island early next month, travelling by sea, without any publicity for the trip. I said I would of course like to go, but I would need to seek Washington authorization, and they might feel that Matsu was a somewhat more exposed position than Quemoy.
9. Comment: Believe we have enough information in Embassy derived from Hong Kong reports and Baguio discussions so that I can continue substantive discussions of Mainland situation next week. However would appreciate any new information or assessments that are available.
[Page 539]10. Re paras 6 and 7 above on MAP levels, realize there is little that can be said now, except to continue give warning of possible reductions. However would appreciate any additional guidance available.
11. Re Matsu trip (para 8), I will make recommendation at later time. Response to invitation can be deferred.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT–US. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Hong Kong.↩