22. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland1

1533. EmbTel 1622.2 We believe the Chinese Communists will seek to avoid any move that would make it appear that they responsible for breaking off Warsaw talks in view of considerable propaganda advantage that would accrue to our side. Moreover, ChiComs may well wish to continue talks, bearing in mind that Chou En-Lai and Chen I during recent African tour made several public references to Warsaw talks to illustrate reasonableness of their position.

Although it appears unlikely, possibility nevertheless exists that ChiComs, perhaps carried away by bitterness of their dispute with Soviets, may decide break off talks or to have them indefinitely deferred. In that event, Wang might behave in manner you suggest hoping to provoke us to suspend talks (Deptel 138, July 26, 1963, para 10).3 Also possible ChiComs, without necessarily intending to break off talks, may instruct Wang to dramatize ChiCom charges and punctuate his departure by in effect throwing book at you and stamping out.

If any of these situations arise, we want to leave you free to play it by ear as you are so able in doing. For your general guidance, however, you should make it clear the Chinese Communists are responsible for any break or interruption in talks and that the US, in its search for a peaceful settlement of dispute, has been willing and continues willing explore every avenue to this end. We welcome Warsaw talks as effort reduce tension in Far East and lessen threat of war. As relevant to situation, you authorized make statement to press along above lines. If you are asked by press for US position on continuation of talks, merely state US awaiting word from Wang’s side concerning talks.

If ChiComs have decided to break off or suspend talks, it seems most likely that they would do so by delaying naming replacement for Wang. This bridge we will cross when we come to it. If Wang does not agree re date of next meeting, you should not press but merely state US presumes his side intends continue talks and that we await proposal from his side as to date.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Dean and Green, cleared by Popple and U. Alexis Johnson, and approved by Green.
  2. Telegram 1622 from Warsaw, April 1, requested any thoughts the Department might have about Cabot’s response in case Wang should “throw the book at me and then stamp out without waiting for my reply.” (Ibid.)
  3. Telegram 138 provided guidance for Cabot’s meeting with Wang on August 7, 1963. (Ibid.)