Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

207. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 15, 1966, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Communist China

PARTICIPANTS

• Zentaro Kosaka, Former Japanese Foreign Minister
• Kazuo Chiba, First Secretary, Embassy of Japan
• The Secretary
• Richard L. Sneider, Country Director for Japan

At the invitation of the Secretary Mr. Kosaka reviewed the impressions gained from his trip to Communist China. Mr. Kosaka first explained that his trip to Communist China was an effort to wrest contacts with Communist China from Japanese leftwing control. Kosaka said that he had told Chen Yi he was pro-American and gained more respect from Chen Yi. He also told Chinese leaders that the US had no intention of bombing Communist China to which Chen Yi agreed. He felt that the Chinese Communist top leadership wanted its views transmitted to the US and therefore he has made his trip to Washington. Basically his objective is, as a representative of the Free World, to try to make Communist China open its door to the Free World.

Mr. Kosaka then reviewed his major observations on Communist China, as follows:

(1) The “cultural revolution” has excluded rational thinking, eliminated able men, and reflects the senility of Mao.

(2) The young generation is being force-fed Mao’s thoughts and there is no feedback of the popular views to the highest level. Mao’s objective is to divide his friends from his enemies, i.e. those accused of being pro-American, bourgeois elements and pro-Soviet revisionists.

(3) The success of Mao’s effort depends on an increase of agricultural production to meet rising population. Mao is seeking to spread his cult to agricultural areas through the Red Guard movement which is pushing for the abolition of private plots and reinstitution of communes. However, the farmers are apathetic and Kosaka felt that the abolition of private plots is not possible. He found that there are only about 120 million hectares of arable land, approximately one hectare per farm family. Farm income is low with a family of 5 to 6 earning from $208 to $416 annually. In comparison industrial workers earn $300 per worker annually. At the same time costs of bicycles, $50, and TV sets, $200, are out of the range of farm families. Clothing is available but coarse. The Chinese leadership to meet agricultural discontent compares farm living stand-ards today with those of 17 years ago rather than with those of other comparable areas in the Free World at the present time.

(4) Generally, Chinese people have enough to eat, more schooling and free medical care which is an improvement over the pre-Communist period.

(5) Chinese leadership claims that agricultural production will increase this year and has offered to export cotton and rice to Japan. Kosaka mentioned that there is a discrepancy between Hong Kong estimates of Chinese Communist agricultural production of 175 million tons and Communist China’s estimates of 200 million tons. Kosaka expressed doubts about production increases because the extensive movement of the Red Guard on Chinese railroads has disrupted transportation. After the crop comes in he expects this will be the basis for criticism of the Mao leadership.

(6) The Chinese recognize that they are now underdeveloped and talk in of terms [of] needing 20–30 years to become a developed economy.

(7) Chinese higher education is now undergoing significant changes. The universities and higher schools are closed until next February and there are plans to shorten the school year and eliminate entrance exams. In the future only students with clear-cut revolutionary background will be admitted to the top universities, with the result of eliminating some of the best students and a general lowering of academic standards.

Kosaka concluded by saying that the key problem of Communist China is when will the current contradictions come into the open. The Chinese leadership says that they will not but Kosaka anticipates that the farmers will be disillusioned after the harvest and maybe cause a basic showdown. He felt that it was important to let the Chinese see the progress occurring outside Communist China and open Chinese eyes. He asked whether there was anything the Secretary wished him to convey to Chinese leadership since Liao Ch’eng-chih, head of the Chinese Communist trade office, offered to convey any message in the utmost secrecy.

The Secretary then questioned Kosaka on other aspects of Chinese Communist developments. Kosaka mentioned that he had contact with the Red Guards at the Peking secondary school. He found them young and very articulate but they all talked the same language. When he asked them why the Red Guards had been formed and the Young Communist League not utilized, they replied that the YCL was “old people” while the Red Guard was more militant and class conscious. In response to the Secretary’s inquiry about Kosaka’s impressions on the internal leadership struggle, Kosaka said that as long as Mao is alive the opposition forces in the Communist Party will be suppressed but they are strong and the struggle will continue. He mentioned that he had tried to see Lin Piao but was advised that Lin as a military man saw no foreigners.

Kosaka mentioned that Chou had stressed Chinese Communist peaceful intentions to the U.S. but there were two differences between the countries: (1) the U.S. refused to recognize the five principles; and (2) the U.S. refused to withdraw from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits. The Secretary said that at Warsaw the Chinese Communists had continually maintained the position that there was nothing to discuss until we surrendered Formosa which the U.S. was not prepared to do.

On Sino-Japanese relations, Kosaka said that the Chinese Communists accepted the present relationship with non-governmental trade and cultural ties and no diplomatic relations. They expressed opposition to Sato but praise for Ikeda and they are evidently trying to split the Liberal Democratic Party. In response to a question by the Secretary, Kosaka said that there were no Japanese government officials in Peking but there is a Liao-Takasaki trade office there and one official who had resigned from the government. He mentioned in passing that the Liao-Takasaki trade negotiations on the renewal of the Liao-Takasaki trade agreement had broken down recently due to the Chinese insistence that the Japanese buy more rice.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 CHICOM. Secret. Drafted by Sneider and approved in S on November 29. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk’s office. The source text is “Part II of III.”