Office of the Historian

145. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson1

Washington, April 30, 1966, 9:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

Ambassador Goldberg proposes here2 (and in a telephone call to me) that we:

1.
Decide soon to encourage the Canadians to propose a “successor State” position on the ChiRep issue at the next General Assembly (two-China policy).
2.
That he be empowered to tell Foreign Minister Martin of Canada on the occasion of his meeting about May 17 that if they take the initiative we would not oppose.
3.
If Canadians agree, we inform the Nationalist Chinese we shall protect their Assembly seat to the hilt but cannot oppose Peking for General Assembly as strongly as in the past.
4.
He is vague on Security Council seat.

When he called me about this, I said:

  • —talk to Secretary Rusk;
  • —let President have the resultant recommendation well in advance of any meeting with him.

The meeting with Secretary Rusk may take place next Wednesday, May 4.

My first reaction is that:

  • —deciding now and telling the Canadians to go on this line with our support is premature;
  • —we must weigh carefully, before we make this historic decision:
    a.
    The impact on an already shaky Taiwan.
    b.
    The domestic political reaction which could go either way; but I recall General Eisenhower told President Kennedy this is the one issue on which he could take after him in public. It is possible the General’s view has changed since 1961. But we ought to know.
    c.
    I believe we have a solemn, secret commitment to Taiwan we would use our Security Council veto to keep the ChiComs out. I’m sure you know, but in any case, we have to think about how to deal with this problem.
    d.
    The relation of any such move to Vietnam.

You may wish to have Secretary Rusk suggest to Ambassador Goldberg that we not make up our minds before the meeting with the Canadians in May, but that Goldberg join in the work of the China ideas group which is being set up as a result of your decision of April 23rd.3

Walt

Have Goldberg talk to Secretary Rusk and bring issue to you shortly thereafter

[Page 296]

Have Secretary Rusk set aside immediate decision and invite Goldberg to put views into China study group for later decision by you4

  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 3. Secret; Exdis. A copy was sent to Bill Moyers.↩
  2. A copy of Goldberg’s April 28 letter is attached.↩
  3. An April 23 memorandum from Rostow to Rusk recording several Presidential decisions made that day states that the President “reiterated his desire that the regional Assistant Secretaries develop new constructive proposals with the assistance of the best brains that can be mobilized from outside the Government.” Concerning China, it states: “Imaginative ways of handling the China problem, which would get us off the defensive, and deal with the ChiRep issue in the next General Assembly. In this connection, the views of Ambassador Goldberg should be solicited.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Non-Vietnam)↩
  4. The source text bears no indication of the President’s reaction. A memorandum of a May 3 telephone conversation between Rusk and Rostow reads in part as follows: “R wanted Sec to know of President’s response to R’s memo re Goldberg’s letter on going to the Canadians; R read Sec the alternative responses the Pres had checked, Sec thought the next step was that Sec should talk to Goldberg. R told of his conversation with Ben Read re setting up China study group and Goldberg having a hall in which to express his views; the Canadian thing was the Sec’s problem.” A copy is attached to Read’s April 28 memorandum to Rostow cited in footnote 1, Document 144.↩