140. Memorandum From the Consul General at Hong Kong (Rice) to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)1
SUBJECT
- United States Policy Towards Communist China
You asked me for comments on things we might do and say now in the hope of reaching a better relationship with mainland China.
Our Policy Objectives
I think we should have as our objective not only avoiding hostilities with Communist China—hostilities which are likely if past and recent trends are extended much farther. We should also have the objective of reaching a live-and-let-live relationship with China. If we do not begin to pursue the latter objective we are much more likely to get into war with China. And if we are to maximize chances of achieving a live-and-let-live relationship we obviously need a strategy for achieving it and a program to implement that strategy. The possibility for a better relationship must be made evident if it is to be considered a realistic option by Mao’s successors when he passes. The standard Chinese Communist line is that we are China’s irreconcilable enemy. If we do not now plant the seeds of doubt that this is so, we are unlikely to gather their fruit. If we wait till Mao dies and then make efforts to influence the succession we may only ensure the elimination of those among potential new leaders who were inclined towards more pragmatic policies.
Obstacles to a Better Relationship and US Courses of Action
From our point of view, a China which we can live with should be one which pursues live-and-let-live policies towards other governments whose overthrow it now seeks. We cannot expect Chinese Communist leaders publicly to disavow the doctrines which call for such overthrow. We can hope for emergence of leaders who may concentrate more on solving China’s enormous internal problems and divert fewer resources to pushing world revolution. Meanwhile we must seek to see Communist China contained. Some countries will be more disposed and better able to deal with threats posed by Communist China without our interventions than with them. They may also be clearer-eyed about China if they have first-hand experience with the Chinese Communists. Our seeking to isolate them from the relevant contact, expecting them to take [Page 283] our evaluation of Chinese Communist objectives at second-hand, may be no more appreciated by the non-Communist leaders of those countries than by those of Communist China itself. Thus we must pursue a policy of containment for the indefinite future as in Vietnam, conceivably but not necessarily by similar means.
There are other obstacles in the way of a better relationship. One is the fact that, according to Communist dogma and by definition, we are China’s main enemy because we are the strongest non-Communist power. We cannot change the dogma but we can undermine its credibility, and challenge the validity of Chinese Communist views that war between us may be inevitable and, perhaps, ultimately necessary.
Our standing in the way of Chinese Communist acquisition of Taiwan is another obstacle. The mainland regime cannot be expected overtly to accept this separation as final: When China has been divided, nationalistic feelings always have created pressures for reunification. But we can hope the Chinese may learn to live with the situation.
There are other obstacles we can do something about. One is the fact that we still are apparently committed to the overthrow of the Chinese Communist regime. We appear committed to such a policy by virtue of our alliance and intimate relationship with a Government on Taiwan which proclaims return to power on the mainland its overriding objective. We should seek publicly to disassociate ourselves from the GRC objective of reconquest of the mainland. We lend credence to our own presumed commitment to overthrow of the mainland regime by a whole set of courses of action, overt and covert. Pursuing the policy of seeking the overthrow of European Communist regimes ended a decade ago. Such a policy is probably no more realistic towards China.
But courses of action designed to support it have not been reviewed, evaluated and—where counterproductive—modified or abandoned. Speeches going in a contrary direction will in any case evoke a hostile propaganda response from the present Chinese leadership. They may be believed by some in the world audience, which would be helpful in taking the monkey from our backs and putting it on the backs of the Chinese Communist leaders. But speeches accompanied by concrete actions may favorably affect the viewpoints of numbers of Chinese Communists, including some who will succeed to leadership before long.
An inventory of the overt and covert actions we have been taking against China can be supplied (e.g. by the Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research). These courses of action should be evaluated from the standpoint of their utility. Those which do not produce results which justify their costs, or which stand in the way of attaining the objectives we should now set for ourselves, should be modified or abandoned.
Illustratively I might mention some I am dubious about: [Page 284]
- 1.
- Our naval vessels sometimes cruise up and down through Communist China’s claimed territorial waters. If we and the Soviets do something similar with each other, neither of us feels humiliated, but the Chinese Communists remember all China’s own past humiliations, know China cannot do to us what we do to them, and distrust us more than the Soviets do. If the situations were reversed—a good touchstone of judging our international conduct—we would feel the same. I find it hard to believe that cruising ten miles from China’s coast is necessary either to uphold our reservations to a 12-mile limit, which we nearly accepted at one point ourselves, or for other good reasons.
- 2.
- During the past century the West forced China to recognize that no country can refuse to trade with the rest of the world. We now enforce an opposite stand in our own embargo policy. With even the Chinese Government on Taiwan allowing at least some indirect trade with the mainland, we are being more Catholic than the Pope.
- 3.
- We are considering a project which, according to some of the planners, would “assault” mainland China by radio. Initiation of such a program would be regarded by the Chinese Communists as another step in our pursuit of a policy of seeking the overthrow of their regime. If it were conducted in the spirit of an assault, their beliefs that we were conducting political warfare to that end would be confirmed. This factor should be placed on the losses side of the ledger in evaluating the project, which should be judged on the basis of its utility in serving the policy objective of reaching a live-and-let-live relationship with China. And unless we had a clear Government policy towards China controlling such a radio project, its personnel would of necessity formulate their own and pursue it. I am not optimistic it would, in such circumstances, serve the national interest.
- 4.
- India serves itself ill by not trading territory in dispute with China which it cannot use or defend for similar territory it can use and defend. An undefined, disagreed border is like broken skin; it invites the entry of dangerous foreign bodies. A fair settlement would erect an obstacle to Chinese expansion in its place. We publicly supported India in its quarrel, and might now privately encourage it to try for a dignified and fair settlement.
Communist China, in short, has national interests, both pretended and genuine—perhaps even a valid legitimate interest in exerting such regional leadership as it peacefully earns through cultivating relationships of mutual helpfulness with its neighbors. We would do well to recognize by word and deed those of its interests which are legitimate.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. 6B. Secret. Rice was in Washington on consultation.↩