128. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Berger) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)1
Dear Bill:
The Secretary had me in not long after you left over the ChiRep memo.2 (Joe Sisco was called, but not immediately available.)
The Secretary did not approve the memo, and does not want to take this issue up with the President at this time. In your talks in Taipei he does not want you to go further than:
- a.
- discussing the close last vote;
- b.
- the gradual shift in the General Assembly toward abstention or opposition;
- c.
- the growing tendency in the General Assembly to use majority rule on substantive questions. He thought this should be strongly stressed;
- d.
- the serious problem that may confront us in the next General Assembly.
With this as a setting, he wants you to throw the question to them as to their views in the event it appears impossible to hold the line. He does not want any reference made to two Chinas.
He said the GA is still eight months away, and it is too early to come to conclusions. If, as we begin to approach the Assembly, we find that we are in real trouble, he said he had various ideas that could tie up the issue for a year or more. He mentioned in particular the study committee idea.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, EA/ROC Files: Lot 75 D 76, Bundy Visit to ROC, March 10–12, 1966. Secret; Official-Informal.↩
- A copy of a February 16 memorandum from Bundy and Sisco to Rusk is attached. It states that they considered it highly unlikely that the General Assembly would sustain its past votes on the important question issue and that they needed to begin at once to develop an alternative strategy. They proposed that as a first step, when Bundy visited Taipei in March, he should explain to the GRC leadership the need to think of an arrangement that would “reaffirm Taipei’s seat” but “permit—by the initiative of others—some form of proposal involving an offer of membership for Peiping as well.”↩