Office of the Historian

126. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State1

Taipei, February 22, 1966, 0311Z.

905. Ref: Hong Kong’s 1359 [1539] to Department.2 Following is joint Embassy/TDC/[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] message:

1.
Blue Lion planning since its inception in 1962 has not changed ground rules, which ChiComs almost certainly realize involve only unilateral GRC plans within GRC’s own capabilities. USG refuses to comment on any GRC plans that do not fit this framework. On Jan 24 we bluntly rejected a GRC request to consider a contingency plan for large scale landings in South China with US logistic assistance. Believe it possible that ChiComs know of this rejection. We doubt that ChiComs have any rational grounds for thinking that USG and GRC are jointly planning aggressive moves against mainland.
2.
Ref para 11 B unusually good and extremely sensitive sources give us considerable information on GRC plans and high level deliberations. We have taken suitable occasions to remind GRC of its treaty obligation to obtain prior USG agreement before using force against mainland, and our sources confirm that GRC is taking obligation seriously. When Ambassador arrives we shall open up more overt channels for discussing GRC desires and obtaining additional information on GRC intentions. At present above reports on high level GRC deliberations [Page 260] reveal no GRC intention embroil US in war with ChiComs, but of course this motivation could become significant element of GRC policy later.
3.
Independent GRC air and naval capabilities have not increased but have actually decreased in recent years in comparison with ChiComs. This is particularly noticeable in ChiNat Air Force where relative tactical superiority in 1958 Quemoy crisis is demonstrably diminished because of better ChiCom tactics and equipment. ChiCom successes in air and naval clashes in recent months should have result of increasing ChiCom confidence. ChiComs are probably well enough informed on modest state of GRC readiness and capabilities so that they do not see significant threat of unilateral GRC action.
4.
Emphatically agree with para 11 C that this is not the time to be thinking of basing B–52’s on Taiwan.
5.
Peking has at various times in last few years shown extreme sensitivity to imagined attacks in situations where no such attacks were in offing. This may be the case at present, but we are inclined to believe that (a) ChiCom moves of recent months are precautionary in the main, occasioned by concern that US might expand air war in North Vietnam and into south China; and (b) reftel analysis tends to take scattered lower level indicators (as in para 7) and assume they represent high level ChiCom policies.
6.
There is certainly cause for concern about ChiCom fears of US action against them, and it may be advisable to consider appropriate channel for conveying calming message to Peiping. Seems to us here, however, that ChiCom fears should have effect on preventing adventurous or provocative actions in Vietnam, and also should diminish chance of ChiCom provocation against offshore islands if we, and GRC also, refrain from actions Peiping could consider provocative.

Hummel
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-CHINAT. Top Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Hong Kong, CINCPAC, Bangkok, Moscow, Saigon, and Vientiane.↩
  2. Document 125.↩