123. Telegram From the Consulate General at Hong Kong to the Department of State1
1448. 1. Classification and channel used because several items below so require, but I hope it will be distributed to those in Department and other agencies who are involved in the matter discussed.
2. I have had a growing feeling that we are reaching the point when the USG (including the ConGen) must give more attention than in the past to what might be called the question of how much the traffic will bear in Hong Kong. In other words,there is some optimum level of US activities, requests and pressures, both direct and indirect, which if exceeded would detract from rather than advance over-all US interests. This level is difficult to define, but I believe it is important that we all make a conscious effort to recognise that a potential problem exists. Otherwise, we may inadvertently step across the line and be suddenly confronted with a major problem. The purpose of this message is to share some of our thoughts; it is not intended to make specific recommendations regarding specific matters.
3. My concern has been prompted by a variety of matters, some mundane in isolation, others of major importance in themselves. The list includes the R & R program from Vietnam; liberty visits (which have been increasing) by Seventh Fleet ships, including nuclear-powered ships and carriers which conduct air strikes against the DRV; a considerable [2 lines of source text not declassified]; strong pressure on the Brit Govt to take whatever steps are necessary to prevent Hong Kong registered ships from going to the DRV; almost constant pressure on the HKG on textile matters; GRC use of Hong Kong as a base for sabotage attempts against the mainland; and an expanding US official population (such as the currently active questions of the FBI liaison officer, the AID-requested position for monitoring trade in items that might end up in DRV or Viet Cong hands, and the second FAS officer position). Each of these can probably be justified in itself, but we may be reaching the point where a decision on one may adversely affect our interests regarding another—or all of them.
4. In trying to determine the optimum level of our activities and pressures, there are a number of unknown, variable, and related factors. One is the ChiCom attitude, which in turn may increasingly become a function of the Vietnam situation. Even if we were to assume that the [Page 253] leaders in Peking were wholly rational, trying to estimate their tolerance level would be difficult; the problem is compounded by what is apparently an element of irrationality in their outlook. We do not mean to suggest that ChiCom thinking is on the verge of a conclusion that some drastic action should be taken against HK, but we do judge that the ChiComs are thinking more about Hong Kong and how it fits into the over-all confrontation between them and the US and the West as a whole. This is, of course, at a time when the Chinese Communists have suffered repeated frustrations in their efforts to put pressures on us elsewhere in hope of indirectly affecting the course of events in Vietnam.
5. A second factor is of course the attitude of the HKG and the Brit Govt. This is to a large extent, but not entirely, directly related to ChiCom attitude and actions. HKG and the Brits have about as much difficulty as we do in predicting ChiCom reactions to matters affecting HK, so we can not take much comfort in the idea that if the HKG concurs in some matters, our problems are over. The HKG attempts to be as cooperative as possible, but obviously insists upon retaining the option of reviewing a situation after the event even though it has previously concurred.
6. A third factor is the attitude of the people of Hong Kong, particularly the press, businessmen and other leaders of influence. In general, Hong Kong has been remarkably insulated from political problems of the area, but we sense the beginning of uneasiness, accompanied by the initiation of Chinese Communist efforts to use labor unions and other organizations as sounding boards for propaganda directed against our activities here. The HKG is no democracy, but it is acutely conscious of the need to maintain an atmosphere of stability and confidence. Apart from its relationship to law and order, such an atmosphere is essential to Hong Kong’s economic well-being. Hong Kong is something of an economic miracle, but its success has been largely the result of intangibles, which are not the soundest base for continued stability.
7. There is also the possibility that events in the area and our military use of Hong Kong are almost inexorably leading us towards some sort of commitment for the defense of Hong Kong against any ChiCom action. (In fact, local press has on several occasions suggested that continued visits of USN ships is to demonstrate such a commitment.) As far as we know, this has not been subject of any recent US–UK discussions. Nevertheless, it is a point we need to keep in mind.
8. In sum, we think that Peking, the HKG and the HK people are giving increased attention to the future of HK, and that we must do the same in order to avoid jeopardizing the usefulness which we now derive from Hong Kong. This may mean at times foregoing something in one field in order to protect our overall interests, and this may cause an outcry from those involved primarily in that field. We will of course try to exercise this overall judgment within the ConGen, and we hope that all [Page 254] developments which may significantly affect our interests in Hong Kong will be similarly coordinated in Washington.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL HK-US. Top Secret; Priority; Roger Channel. The telegram does not indicate the date and time of transmission; it was received at 9:52 a.m. on February 5.↩