Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

117. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, January 12, 1966, 1020Z.

761. Ref: Deptel 707.²

1. Embassy has been kept informed by military [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

2. We know of no order such as that reported UPI story.

3. Jan 10 depth charge attack by GRC Navy on alleged sonar contact in straits is evaluated by US naval authorities as unlikely to be against real target but is rated as “possible”. Sonar contact reportedly made at depth of 33 fathoms (198 feet) which is beyond depth ChiCom subs likely to be maneuvering. Comust DC advises no US or known friendly subs in vicinity.

4. There is no question that the GRC has lost prestige in this and other incidents. President Chiang is reportedly provoked and has directed Minister Chiang and Admiral Ni to conduct an investigation into the HU–16 incident.

5. On day after shooting down of amphibian, Air Force C in C Gen Hsu approached C in C Pacaf General Harris (who was visiting Taiwan) and ATF–13 Commander, General Wilson. Hsu indicated continued ChiCom provocations such as the destruction of the amphibian and recent ship sinking would require a “change in GRC policy”. This was later developed as meaning GRC would have to take reprisal actions. Hsu cited knocking out a radar site and harassment of ships, as possible examples of limited actions intended. Both US officers declined to consider proposal and said this sort of action must be taken up at govt to govt level.

6. Embassy reasonably confident that GRC does not plan unilateral military action at this time. Chiang Ching-kuo had direct request for prior consultation from Asst Secretary Bundy in Washington in September, and indirectly from me in November.³ He has clearly stated [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that military actions (as opposed to intelligence raids) will be consulted upon before execution in accordance US–GRC Defense Treaty. We also have independent confirmation that Ching-kuo is saying same thing to MND officers. General Hsu demarche, as well as GRC Chief of General Staff Ni demarche to comustdc Admiral Gentner Dec 17 (reported separately) are also indications GRC intention to consult.

Hummel

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CHICOM-CHINAT. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Hong Kong and to CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. Telegram 707 to Taipei, January 11, reported that the Department had received reports of a GRC Navy attack on January 10 on a suspected Chinese Communist submarine in the Taiwan Strait and a January 10 UPI report that President Chiang, angered by the Communist downing of a plane carrying defectors, had ordered a full military alert and ordered ships and planes in the Strait to shoot on sight. It requested Embassy’s views. (Ibid.)
3. A briefing paper of June 22, 1966, prepared for Rusk’s July visit to Taipei, states that on November 27, 1965, after intelligence reports indicated impending GRC military actions against the mainland, Hummel, acting on instruction, emphasized to Vice Foreign Minister Sampson Shen the U.S. expectation of consultation before any such operations were undertaken. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 67 D 305, CF 59) Further documentation on this episode is ibid., INR/IL Historical Files, Country Files, China, 1965.