111. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Berger) to the Consul General in Hong Kong (Rice)1
Dear Ed:
At the time of Chiang Ching-kuo’s visit to Washington last September we discussed with him means of tuning up our machinery for mutual [Page 227] consultations. We on our side felt this was necessary because of unmistakable indications that Chiang Kai-shek felt excluded from U.S. thinking on Viet-Nam and other Far Eastern policy problems. We found our thoughts on this confirmed by Chiang Ching-kuo’s repeated mention while in Washington of the need for closer U.S.-GRC consultations on policy matters.
We told Chiang Ching-kuo that we would be ready to resume the Ambassadorial level consultations of the “Blue Lion” committee, of which I think you are aware from the time you were in Washington, when our new Ambassador arrives in Taipei. At the same time we made no suggestion that the frame of reference for “Blue Lion” be relaxed and we intend to adhere strictly to “Blue Lion” ground rules in future consultations. These ground rules are:
- (a)
- that the Chinese planners should develop detailed plans for landing on the China coast on the assumption that uprisings had occurred on the mainland;
- (b)
- that planning is to be based upon the GRC’s current capabilities, without any additional materiel support or participation by U.S. forces;
- (c)
- that completed plans would be reviewed by the U.S. side, which would make appropriate criticisms and suggestions to the GRC.
In general the purpose of these restrictions has been to obviate any participation by us in joint military planning with the GRC in connection with operations against the mainland.
One other proposal that we made to Chiang Ching-kuo was an exchange of intelligence appraisals of conditions on the mainland. We hoped in this way to stimulate more realistic thinking by the Chinese on the possibility that widespread dissidence on the mainland would permit a successful GRC counterattack against the Communists. As by-products we might also gain additional intelligence on the Communists and further insight into GRC thinking. There has been a continuing exchange of intelligence on the Communists [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and the GRC on a piece-by-piece basis; however, there has not been the more searching and comprehensive type of intelligence exchange which we have in mind.
The plan is that CIA will produce a study which, after a review in the Department and in Defense, will be submitted to the Chinese; the Chinese will produce a similar study for our review. There might then be a meeting in which we and the Chinese would discuss our studies and compare notes as to conclusions. We think it would be helpful if someone from Hong Kong’s political section could participate in such discussions and we have made this suggestion to Embassy Taipei for comment.
[Page 228]I would very much appreciate your own thoughts on this.2 We will in any case see that you receive copies of all materials on mainland China which are generated as a result of this exchange.
With all best wishes,
Sincerely,
- Source: Department of State, ROC Files: Lot 75 D 76, Blue Lion Consultations. Secret; Eyes Only.↩
- Rice replied in a December 13 letter to Berger that he had “some qualms” about this. Predicting that the Chinese Communists would hear of it, perhaps in a distorted form, he commented, “Some may argue it would be useful to make the ChiComs believe we are working with the GRC on plans for attacking the mainland, but I would consider this a highly dubious and danger-fraught exercise.”↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩