Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

109. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)¹

Washington, November 3, 1965.

SUBJECT

• ChiRep

1. Attached is a cable from USUN² which recommends that if the substantive vote on ChiRep looks intolerably close (as we get nearer to it), we not take a chance on losing. Instead, we should avoid the vote on substance (which would be politically disastrous if we lose—even if we win on the “important question”) and put up a resolution designed to shift the issue into a study committee.

2. State feels that USUN is excessively jumpy on ChiRep and intends to instruct USUN that we will proceed as already agreed. Among other things, State believes that we will win on the substantive question and that USUN is over-estimating the psychological losses involved even if we do have to take the “important question” route. Moreover, if anybody now gets wind of the idea that we are thinking of a study committee (and it would get out), we would improve our chances of getting to the intolerably close vote that USUN fears.³

GC

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Chinese Representation, 10/65. Secret.
2. Telegram 1734 from USUN, November 2.
3. A note in Bundy’s handwriting on the source text reads, “Let State handle it. McGB.”