Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

101. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State¹

Warsaw, September 15, 1965, 1837Z.

396. Cabot-Wang talks.² Deptels 315, 339.³

1. 127th meeting. I opened with substance instructions in Deptels 315, 339. Wang’s prepared reply contained no substantive change in CjioChiCom position. Next meeting scheduled for December 15.

2. Wang devoted his initial reply to my opening comments by restating well-known Chinese position on Vietnam: “The only way to settle Vietnam question is for US to stop aggression in Vietnam, withdraw all its forces and let Vietnamese people solve their own problems.” This formula was repeated several times during the meeting. Wang followed with list of US acts of “aggression” against China, including alleged overflight Hokou, US warships bombarding ChiCom fishing vessels, ramming of Lebanese vessel by US sub in Chinese waters, overflights of pilotless planes, serious warnings, etc.

3. Wang then departed from his written text and discussed Lin Piao’s article. Said “We communists have never tried conceal our views,” and that “Chinese experience over past decades told us it was necessary to use revolutionary war against counter-revolutionary wars to get rid of imperialist aggression.” Wang said Chinese are compelled to take up arms for purpose of self defense.

4. I told Wang US had repeatedly sought means establish peace in sea. I said tide of battle now seems to have changed. Said we prefer to seek peaceful solution rather than lengthy war. I told Wang his side seemed to reject Geneva Agreement as basis for making peace. Said we are committed by our national faith to the defense of the SVN people. I stated most firmly that we will fulfill that commitment.

5. Wang returned to Vietnam question. Said “reason why you shout so loudly for peace talks is that you have come to grief in battlefield … and met powerful rebuff….”

6. Wang then read long article from People’s Daily, Sept. 9, on India’s “frenzied provocative activities,” along the whole Sino-Indian border. Said that after India provoked large scale armed conflict in 1962, the situation on Indian border eased as result series efforts made by Chinese side. But India never stopped intrusions in Chinese territory. Incidents by no means accidental. Also charged India with carrying out aggression against people of Kashmir. Said India-Pak conflict entirely provoked by Indian Government. Claimed India’s attacks on Pak “could not be separated from backing USG.” I said this charge was nonsense and told Wang our principal aim was to restore peace between our Indian and Pakistani friends.

7. I reiterated our strong determination to support GVN against aggression and stressed that American public firmly supports USG policy in Vietnam. I told Wang that Lin Piao’s article looked like blueprint for Communist aggression and that it reminded me of Hitler’s Mein Kampf. This stung Wang who retorted that American actions since WW II resembled those of Hitler, Mussolini, and Japanese aggressors. Wang charged large numbers of US troops deployed all over world and repeated familiar line that US has committed aggression against Korea, Vietnam, Dominican Republic and Congo.

8. Wang reiterated support for Vietnamese people. Said US “aggression against Vietnam also jeopardizes security of whole Indo-China and our own country,” and “no force can shake our determination to support Vietnamese people.” Wang said everybody can see clearly who does not want peace. While US talks of peace it continues send troops and wantonly carries out bombings.

9. Wang also said, “not only are we ready to settle Taiwan and Taiwan Straits matters in peaceful way, we are also ready settle peace in South-East Asia, but if you still refuse to withdraw your forces this question can not be settled.” Wang replied to my charge of Chinese aggression in Korea by stating China was defending own national borders. He repeated VNA statement that 325 Division not in South Vietnam. I refuted this statement saying we had prisoners.

10. I told Wang that I agreed that SVN should be liberated, that they should be liberated from aggression from the North and that was what we were trying to do. I said they should settle their own affairs, and should be free to do so by withdrawal of North Vietnamese as well as by American and other forces, and by the withdrawal of very substantial aid and arms given to the Viet Cong. I concluded by saying that I hoped these talks would have more result in the future than they have had in recent sessions.

11. Following the meeting I made the following statement to the press: “I have, as you know, participated in these talks for the past three and one-half years, first with Ambassador Wang Ping-nan and more recently with Ambassador Wang Kuo-chuan. I believe that the talks have served a useful purpose in providing a ready channel of communications. I regret, however, that during this time there has been little progress towards the achievement of a deduction of tensions in the Far East. I am sure that my successor will continue our efforts to reach a peaceful solution for the grave problems confronting Asia.”

12. The meeting lasted two hours thirty-six minutes.

Cabot

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Also sent to Taipei, London, Hong Kong, Saigon, New Delhi, Karachi, and Moscow.
2. This was the 127th meeting of the Ambassadorial talks. Cabot commented in telegram 412 from Warsaw, September 16, and reported on the meeting in detail in airgram A–271, September 20. (Ibid., POL CHICOM-US and POL 1 CHICOM-US, respectively)
3. Telegram 315 to Warsaw, September 10, conveyed guidance for the meeting. (Ibid., POL CHICOM-US) Telegram 339, September 13, added a paragraph referring to recent Chinese notes to India. It stated that unfounded Chinese allegations in the most recent note appeared to be designed to convey a threat of Chinese military action and stated that the U.S Government deplored “even the making of such threats, which if pursued, could create a most dangerous situation, which it would be difficult to confine to the areas or parties initially affected.” A note from William Bundy to Rusk, attached to the telegram, states, “I understand this conforms to the discussion at the White House meeting today.” (Ibid.) Telegrams 332 and 345, dated September 11 and 14, transmitted additional guidance. (Ibid.)