Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

10. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State¹

Warsaw, January 29, 1964, 5 p.m.

1273. Cabot-Wang Talks. 119th meeting 1 hour 45 minutes.² Deptel 1150.³

(1) I opened along lines paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 reference telegram followed by substance all numbered paragraphs reference telegram plus inquiry re Blue Goose.⁴

(2) Wang expressed disappointment nothing new or positive in my opening statement. Said hope for relaxation tensions Taiwan Straits and Far East and improvements in our relations in the New Year depend on Washington not Peiping. Said China was victim of aggression. Said USG must [garble] change in its erroneous China policy of aggression and mil encirclement. This policy leads to blind alley. US seizure Taiwan by armed force is root of bad relations. If this key issue were resolved other questions would not be difficult. Converse all attempts resolving side issues of no avail until key issues solved. Two-China policy will not be tolerated. Quoted recent statements Secretary and Undersecretary Harriman in attempt prove we had assumed proprietary air in saying US would never “turn over” Taiwan. Wang complained of trade and travel restrictions, our UN policy, mentioned 272nd through 276th serious warning, complained of spy aircraft penetrating deeply into mainland and support of Chiang attempt invade [or] harass mainland for which we held answerable. “Big Dipper” exercise was military provocation. Complained our activities South Vietnam and Laos and masterminding of aggression and subversion in Cambodia, of military bases Thailand, and alleged we were resurrecting Japanese militarism to use for our purposes. Complained of aid to India and activities attempting encirclement in crescent from India to Japan.

(3) I pointed out once again we were not occupying Taiwan but fully intended fulfill our treaty obligations to GRC. Gave brief examples historical sequences indicate our posture in Asia was reaction to Chicom hostility. Said if his side believed any Chinese being prevented from returning to Mainland we would like to know of case. Followed with paragraph (G) paragraph reference telegram serious warnings⁵ plus some of third paragraph Deptel 1154⁶ and paragraph (B) reference telegram re Seventh Fleet.⁷ Gave obvious rebuttals to South Vietnam and Laos charge staying it was Chicoms who were aiding Pathet Lao and sending arms to South Vietnam.

(4) Wang gave standard upside-down version post-war history FE ending with assertion Chicom policy was winning sympathy and support all over world.

(5) Refuting charges our insistent hostility to China I pointed out warm feelings American people had had for Chinese for many decades, when we had helped China in its need on more than one occasion including in World War II when we fought as allies. I said it was clear from recent public statements Wang’s side felt free to subvert governments which did not happen to like. Chicoms had urged Soviet Union intervene in Hungary and there were more recent examples to be noted. Asked whether his side believed in non-intervention or whether it believed in toppling other governments which it may not agree with.

(6) Wang gave as proof of our constant hostility lack of diplomatic recognition, blockade and trade embargoes, UN policies, and occupation Taiwan. Said his side believed in ability each country manage own affairs and was against outside interference. Much of world’s trouble due to interventionist policies of US. Said had no information re Blue Goose. Said our intention toward other interested parties re disarmament discussion was matter for us to entertain.

Date of next meeting April 8.

Cabot

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Taipei, Hong Kong, Stockholm, Moscow, and Geneva.
2. Cabot commented on the meeting in telegram 1277 from Warsaw and reported it in detail in airgram A–630, both dated January 30. (Ibid.) For records of previous meetings in the series of Ambassadorial talks between representatives of the United States and the People’s Republic of China, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, volume III; 1958–1960, volume XIX; and 1961–1963, volume XXII.
3. Telegram 1150 to Warsaw, January 21, transmitted guidance for the meeting. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US)
4. Paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 stated that the United States sought to promote a relaxation of tensions and to seek a just and enduring peace and that it had refrained from responding in kind to the hostility which appeared daily in the Chinese press. Paragraph 2 stated that the “United States cannot tolerate a situation where your side continues to introduce arms into Viet-Nam and seeks to increase the level of insurrectionary activity in South Viet-Nam.” Other numbered paragraphs requested release of four U.S. nationals held as prisoners in China and gave Wang information on three deportee cases. The Blue Goose was a plane missing since October 1, 1958; information concerning it had been requested at several previous meetings.
5. It stated that serious warnings 270–275 (concerning alleged U.S. violations of Chinese territory or territorial waters) related for the most part to the Hsi Sha islands and that the United States did not recognize Chinese Communist sovereignty over those islands but would be willing to check into claimed violations in other areas.
6. Telegram 1154 to Warsaw, January 22, provided additional details for Cabot’s guidance. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US)
7. It stated, with reference to Seventh Fleet maneuvers in the Indian Ocean, that U.S. fleet maneuvers on the high seas were a matter of U.S. concern.