97. Memorandum From the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) to President Johnson1
New York, June 16, 1964.
REF
- Some Unsolicited Comments on Situation in Laos and Vietnam
- 1.
- We should continue to support Polish proposal but not be too sanguine that such meeting will ever come about or, if it does, will last long. If PL refuses to attend, several other prospective participants may well fall away. There seems to be more disadvantages than advantages to agreeing to a 14-nation conference at this time.
- 2.
- We should not be too certain that our various “signals”, political and military, to the Communists will really deter them. If they believe their vital interests (which in their view might include (a) control of substantial parts of Laos and/or (b) demonstration of success for revolutionary insurgent movements), are threatened, they will react on the ground despite our “signals”. Page 31 of Questionnaire2 seems to be unduly optimistic [Page 192] about the prospective passivity of ChiComs. Both North Vietnam and Communist China of course have the capability of substantially increased ground commitment in northern and eastern Laos. We should watch closely for their “signals”. Remember Korean precedent.
- 3.
- We should, if and when necessary, be prepared to occupy and hold the Laotian river towns, at least from Vientiane south. Any attempt to occupy and hold with American troops the Plaine des Jarres and Luang Prabang would be extremely hazardous and seriously risk involving ourselves in Dien Bien Phus. We should be under no illusion that we can drive the Communists out of Laos by military action, but we can hold them approximately where they are and make their presence increasingly costly to them.
- 4.
- The best means of combatting Communist military action in Laos is certainly by air strikes. Strikes by T–28’s seem much more effective and useful than aerial reconnaissance with armed escorts. Except to the degree really necessary for intelligence purposes, the latter involves US prestige openly without adequate benefit and obliges us to react to losses by action we might prefer not to take. Air strikes by “Laotian” planes really do a job and serve just as well to get a “signal” across.
- 5.
- Even “Laotian” air strikes and useful air reconnaissance may bring about (a) increased Viet Minh and perhaps ChiCom intervention on the ground and (b) heavier pressure from friends and neutrals for a Geneva Conference. These possibilities must be kept in mind but should not deter us from air action as long as Communist pressure on the ground continues.
- 6.
- As to Vietnam, it is assumed attack by ground forces north of the 17th parallel would be counterproductive. If the time comes for overt military action in North Vietnam, would it not be feasible for air strikes to be carried out by “South Vietnamese” planes? Direct avowed US participation would almost oblige the ChiComs to respond in some very substantial way. As to targets, new factories, on which the DRV’s hopes for industrial development rest, would be the most impressive loss they could suffer, but these are presumably close to centers of population and should be targets for sabotage rather than air attack. Ports would presumably involve ships of other nations. Lines of communication, though somewhat insubstantial in Southeast Asia, would probably be as productive as any feasible target.