85. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) and Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff1
(Conv at time of bombing of Khang Khay, after bombing & reaction from Unger)
H—What’s your reaction to this morning’s take? The Secy made a good addition (tel to Unger).2 Bill (Bundy) is off the track. He is quite for going on with this thing (further bombing) regardless.
[Page 164]F—No one is in favor except him. McNamara is not in favor.
H—It is interesting, his thought that we should put some attack planes in if there is an attack. That is an entirely different proposition. They are worried about something coming from overhead. Then they have the sublime (faith) in the T–28’s. I have never imagined they would do much damage.
F—Unger asked for a high-level letter (to SP) from LBJ. We are against it. Do you feel you could do a comforting letter?
H—I think it’s the wrong thing to do, but I am perfectly willing to do it if it is the net balance. Seems to me this is a job Unger ought to do. It’s certainly not a good thing for the President to do. If anybody should send it, I should. The idea of his thinking we could keep things quiet like the Soviet press, is fantastic. I have never seen anything which made me believe that we had taken a commitment not to say anything (to the press re fighter escort plane).
F—Prior to shooting down one of these planes it never occurred to Unger what we do if we get hit. They failed to think it thru.
H—I took up cutting out those two letters (on the plane). Bob McNamara said I can’t handle it on the Hill. The announcement we would have made would have been exactly as Unger suggested if we took out those numbers. So I raised it. Bob said, “I can’t live with it.” You will get found out sooner or later so we accepted that. Unger has to understand. Trueheart has been getting something to the Secy to take to the President. It is interesting that SP suggested a certain operation if the other people did something. I think that would be a very, very dangerous thing to do.
F—That is way down the road.
F—The next step if we do anything at all is to change the fleet movement.
H—Bob thought that was probably the best. Do you think we are on the wrong track—that Unger is right about this? I don’t see it myself.
F—No.
H—The trouble is that Bill (Bundy) didn’t send enough background stuff. I just can’t understand why they didn’t do it. It’s a one-man show, instead of getting a team play. When you’re active yourself you feel as if you are achieving something, but it isn’t done. I still believe it was a wise thing to do. I hope that the President thinks so. Incidentally to take the conceit out of some people who will be nameless. It is really preposterous. Not the ones we talk to. The ones in the background. This is two flops—yet they come forward next time with just as much assurance. It is a damn good thing because otherwise you couldn’t win wars. But they shouldn’t be allowed to sit in on policy discussions.
F—I tried to persuade Mac (Bundy) to let me and him pull over here to the White House some of the working people to try to begin to blow a [Page 165] new course. He says no. He wants to leave it to Bill to try.—To push State to taking the lead. I said if it will work.
H: The trouble is Bill is so (involved) in operational details.
F: I hope for a meeting tomorrow and then with the President the next day.
H—I think it is too early. I think if you try you are apt to rush decisions. This is what President Kennedy wanted, but not President Johnson who wants things thought through. I don’t think we’ll have things digested enough.
F—I don’t have the feeling that everybody is thinking very much.
- Source: Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. Secret; No Distribution; Personal.↩
- Reference is to a revision in Document 84 made by Rusk. In the last sentence of the third paragraph, Rusk revised the following sentence, which originally read: “If as we expect Communists again respond by propaganda attack to firing by June 9 mission we shall certainly have to concede such firing did take place arguing that it was in response to hostile fire.”↩