Office of the Historian

75. Memorandum for the Record1

Washington, June 5, 1964, 5:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • White House Meeting on Southeast Asia, 5 June 1964

PARTICIPANTS

  • Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Harriman, Under Secretary Johnson, Assistant Secretary Bundy, Mr. Sullivan
  • Secretary McNamara, Assistant Secretary McNaughton, General Goodpaster
  • Attorney General
  • Mr. Bundy, Mr. Forrestal, Mr. Cater
  • Mr. Bell, Mr. Gaud, Mr. Wilson
  • Mr. McCone, Mr. Colby
1.
Mr. McNamara suggested that plans be prepared for low level reconnaissance flights over North Vietnam to precede the convening of the Polish sponsored conference now possibly coming up on 23 June.
2.

The meeting then discussed the attached agenda2 and its attached outlines of action.3

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leakage in Vientiane (William Bundy), the fact that the U.S. forces do not seem to be needed in the absence of a further Pathet Lao push (Mr. McGeorge Bundy) and that no Congressional resolution is envisaged which would warrant such an assurance for the time being (Mr. McNamara). Mr. William Bundy pointed out that it might be desirable to send troops into Thailand on an exercise at least or to give such assurances if the pressure on Souvanna Phouma to go to Geneva grows, in which case at least air units might be sent to Thailand. Secretary Rusk indicated interest in how the scenario could be brought around to bring attention to the corridor to South Vietnam. Mr. McGeorge Bundy thought there was time for this as we are not apt to immobilize our efforts in the corridor area in any case by any settlement. The Attorney General commented that there seemed to be very little going on in the early stages of this effort, followed by a large jump as an impasse was reached. He suggested that it might be desirable to do more earlier. Both Mr. William and Mr. McGeorge Bundy replied that we are deliberately moving the whole operation quite slowly. Governor Harriman commented that Siho is a distinct weakness in our armor and would like to know what is being done about eliminating him from the scene. No definite answers were given in view of Siho’s strong position in Vientiane. Governor Harriman also assumed that we would continue with our program of supply of equipment, etc; this was confirmed.

[Here follows discussion of Vietnam.]

4.
Mr. McGeorge Bundy suggested particular attention to the Lao recommendations on low level reconnaissance and fighter escort over North Vietnam. There was no dissent from these. With respect to the idea of a Polish conference, Secretary Rusk expressed interest in the prospect that the USSR and Poles might use such a forum to indicate some support of the Geneva Agreements. The Attorney General suggested that a more vigorous U.S. posture might be useful to the USSR and Poles in order to hold back the somewhat more aggressive DRV.
5.
The meeting then broke up as the President was understood not to be available. After some intervening discussion, however, he arrived and the Cabinet members remained with him.
WE Colby
Chief, Far East Division
  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Memos for the Record, 6 Apr-8 July 1964. Secret. Drafted by Colby on June 8. The time of the meeting is from Rusk’s Appointment Book; according to the President’s Daily Diary, Rusk met with the President at 6:52 p.m. (Both Johnson Library)↩
  2. Not found attached.↩
  3. Apparent reference to Document 73.↩