Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

43. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, April 29, 1964.

SUBJECT

• National Security Council Meeting—29 April 1964

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Messrs. McGeorge Bundy, Forrestal, Smith, Valenti, Governor Harriman, Mr. William Bundy, Mr. Sullivan, Secretary McNamara, Mr. McNaughton, General Taylor
• Mr. Rowen, Mr. McCone, Mr. Cline and Mr. Colby

1. The meeting opened with a CIA briefing on the situation in Laos by Mr. Cline.² This included the current situation, the 29 April conclusions of the Watch Committee, and a short statement of the results of recent photographic coverage of road communications from North Vietnam into and in Laos.

2. Governor Harriman then commented that we do not have a clear idea of the implications of the Plaines de Jarres action, that we are pressing the Communists to abstain from actions against the neutralists and rightists³ and are prepared to move to pressure Siho and the rightists to support Souvanna’s neutralist government. With respect to the area around Tchepone he said that we have some indications of a step-up in North Vietnamese logistic capabilities and that patrols will be authorized in the Tchepone area for intelligence purposes under certain policy restrictions. Also a limited number of low level air photographic reconnaissance missions will be run into this area.

3. The President asked what Lodge’s position was on this. Secretary McNamara said that Lodge would generally support such actions, but that some reservations had been expressed by Ambassador Unger. He then said it was believed necessary to take some of these steps in any case.⁴ The Director requested at least twenty-four hours delay on the air photo recommendations in order to process these properly through COMOR. Secretary McNamara also requested twenty-four hours to secure JCS comments on the patrol idea. It was thus agreed that these matters would be processed through these channels and taken up at a later meeting. (It was later set for Saturday.)⁵

4. Following the President’s departure it was agreed that Ambassador Unger’s comments would be sought on the air photography point and that this matter would be processed through COMOR. With respect to patrols, General Taylor was the center of an animated discussion in which he took the position that only battalion size operations had any change of success.⁶ He finally settled on the position of being given the mission of conducting intelligence probes within this area with the limitation that his forces could not exceed 50 to 100 man patrols. A cable so specifying will be prepared by Mr. William Bundy. In the course of this discussion General Taylor commented that CIA’s crossborder operations to his knowledge had never produced any real information and that these must be run on a more substantial military basis. His primary target in this discussion was the State Department as he expressed some impatience over the need for detailed information south of Tchepone beyond what was available unless it was proposed to do something about these areas.

5. The Director and Secretary McNamara discussed some other matters privately.

WE Colby

Chief, Far East Division

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Meetings with the President, 1 Apr-31 May, 1964. Secret. Drafted by Colby on April 30.
2. According to Bromley Smith’s account of this meeting (in which the starting time is given as 5 p.m.), Cline stated that the expanded Pathet Lao forces had a “50–50 chance” of overrunning all other non-Communist forces, but if joined by pro-Communist neutral and North Vietnamese troops, all Laos could fall quickly without warning. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Tab 1) Smith’s summary record of the meeting is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 267–277.
3. Smith’s account states that Harriman told the President that the Department of State was attempting to convince the ICC to return to the Plain of Jars to help stop the fighting. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Tab 1)
4. In Smith’s account of this meeting, the President ordered that proposals for reconnaissance be presented to Unger again in light of new information on infiltration and the military build up so that Unger could give his best estimate of the political effect of the reconnaissance in Laos. (Ibid.)
5. May 1. No record of the meeting has been found.
6. In an unattributed memorandum with an attached summary of CIA directed cross-border operations into Laos from July 15, 1961, to November 2, 1963, given to McCone on April 29, it was concluded that “the results of these efforts, encompassing operations run over the past two years, have not been outstandingly productive and have lead the CIA to the firm conclusion that large team operations offer the only reasonable chance for worthwhile intelligence missions.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Meetings with the President, 1 Apr-31 May, 1964)