Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

40. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, April 29, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Views of Ambassador Unger on Operations in Eastern Laos

The following notes are based on my conversation with Ambassador Unger and Mr. Nes of the Saigon Embassy on Sunday morning, April 19, just before we received news of the attempted coup. They thus reflect his judgment of the reaction in Laos to possible scales of operation, as it related to a political situation that assumed Souvanna Phouma back in control.

1. Southern Laos. The Ambassador reported that a substantial expansion of Kha operations would get underway in early May and would build up out of FAR bases, principally in the Saravan area, so that there would be 15–20 teams, each with radio, operating in the area from somewhat north of Saravan all the way down to the Cambodian border.

I referred to General Khanh’s conversation with Secretary Rusk in which he had expressed particular concern over the southeast corner of Laos.² (This is also the area apparently covered in the conversations between the Vietnamese and Oudone Sananikone over the weekend of the 19th, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]).³ Mr. Nes noted that General Khanh believes there are two Viet Minh battalions and a hospital installation in the corner area.

(Parenthetically, we agreed at this point that there was inadequate coordination between our people in Vientiane and our people in Saigon on intelligence concerning eastern Laos, and that Vientiane should send over a man at least once a month to be sure that Saigon had all the information that Vientiane was getting through our various operations in the area.)

2. General Standards for Operations in Laos. The Ambassador said that we must consider carefully any action that would be detected and cause a reaction on the part of Souvanna, in the first place, and the Communists in the second. As to Souvanna, he said that Souvanna is perfectly well aware that the Communists use eastern Laos but that he thinks (or thought as of April 19) that he got some hopeful indication in Peking that might enable him to work toward free circulation in discussions with the three tendencies, and that he might also now be able to get more help out of the ICC. Souvanna’s basic feeling is that if there is really a resumption of hostilities for any reason, it would be the end of Laos. Therefore, he would be (again, as of April 19) in a very go-slow mood, and in essence would be opposed to any action that might be detected, i.e., in Ambassador Unger’s judgment, any operation that was not: (a) small; (b) under Montagnard or other cover; (c) kept away from population centers.

In this connection, Mr. Nes said that it was the current MACV judgment that anything larger than a small patrol would be detected and clobbered in eastern Laos, in view of the substantial number of Viet Minh battalions operating in the area.

On the Communist side, Ambassador Unger thought that once the Communists learned of the significant operations beyond the limits stated above, they could and would move readily against Saravan (which was the key base for Kha operations and which could be taken at any time) or Attopeu, which was also important.

3. Phoumi Attitude. Ambassador Unger thought that Phoumi basically would like to get us into a fighting war, and that his contacts with Khanh might be encouraging him to think he could do this. He also noted that Phoumi has continuing GRC contacts via Bangkok.

4. Soviet Leverage. Ambassador Unger said that the Soviets were now reasonable in Vientiane, but that they had only the most marginal leverage and that their action had now became “very threadbare.” They had no real weight any more with the Pathet Lao, and were often reluctant to use what little they had for fear of cutting across the Soviet effort to maintain some entree with Hanoi. The Ambassador recalled that despite Pushkin’s assurances to Governor Harriman two years ago, Khrushchev had twice refused to reaffirm what Pushkin had said.

5. “Hot Pursuit”. Ambassador Unger said that, as it related to Laos, this was really a fiction, since there had been no genuine case that he was aware of. He also thought that Souvanna Phouma, who might once have been agreeable to such operations, was now opposed (as of April 19).

Referring to the outgoing State Department cable of April 7 (1630 to Saigon and 836 to Vientiane),⁴ Ambassador Unger was opposed to operations as large as those described in paragraph 2c of that message (i.e., up to battalion size), and also leery of the operations described in paragraph 2d and paragraph 2e (operations up to battalion size to relieve friendly Lao forces on the border, and GVN encadrements of FAR units near the border.) He particularly thought that identifiable GVN forces would be disruptive in Laos.

6. Reconnaissance Operations. Ambassador Unger thought that lower level reconnaissance should be conducted in Laos only down to an altitude of 10,000–15,000 feet. He thought these would have serious consequences if an aircraft were lost, but did not think that unmarked aircraft, unless lost, would cause a serious problem at the altitudes stated.

William P. Bundy ⁵

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Memos, Vol. II, 4/16/64–4/30/64. Top Secret.
2. See paragraph 8 of Secto 71 from Saigon, April 19, printed in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, p. 247.
3. The CIA telegram number was not indicated and has not been identified.
4. In telegram 1630 to Saigon and also sent to Vientiane as 836, April 7, the Department asked for comments on and sent tentative guidelines for South Vietnamese cross border operations into Laos which it outlined in the telegram. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.