Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

387. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, October 23, 1968, 1141Z.

9859. Subject: Lao SNIE.² Ref: State 257699.³

1. Summary. We do not expect any major change in enemy intentions in Laos during next twelve months.⁴ In period of evolving détente involving withdrawal of NVN troops from SVN and continuing discussions concerning a negotiated settlement to war in SE Asia, we assume NVN would not wish increase level of belligerence in Laos to point change nature of war here and invite reprisals in NVN. Enemy at present probably has sufficient troops to implement whatever intentions it may have and is in advanced positions at beginning dry season. For next six months (dry season), we expect enemy to put pressure on Meos in NE, and move against renewed irregular activity in NW; enemy will maintain threat to Mekong Valley and protect Ho Chi Minh Trail; country wide, enemy will probably seek extend areas it controls for purposes propaganda and eventual political bargaining. In following six months (wet season) we would expect enemy to attempt hold as much territory as possible. NVN troops withdrawn from SVN would not be necessary for implementing enemy intentions during next twelve months, but, of course, could make enemy task easier.

2. Choices for US policy are limited. During next six months we must a) reassure Lao of continuity of policy and support; b) assure ready and continual availability of US strike aircraft in support of RLG forces; and c) work with the FAR to make enemy attempts at territorial conquest as costly as possible, building on some positive developments. For the next wet season (following six months) we must be prepared to encourage and assist RLG forces to recover as much territory as possible for political purposes.

3. Assumptions. “Release” of NVN assets from SVN would be part of military détente package which would include projected withdrawal of some NVN units from SVN into Laos.

4. Part of this détente would be agreement or at least tacit understanding that NVN units withdrawn would not stay in Laos, but would eventually go home.

5. Since situations in Laos and Viet Nam inextricably intertwined under direction of Hanoi, Hanoi in own interests would not agree to military de-escalation in Viet Nam while at same time increasing posture of belligerency in Laos to point of changing nature of war.

6. Within limits of 5. above, there is scope for considerable enemy aggressive military action.

7. Although discussions may be underway concerning a negotiated settlement of the war in SE Asia, firm decisions concerning a settlement in Laos have not been made during the period under consideration.

8. Enemy intentions and capabilities. Key question, therefore, is one of enemy intentions in Laos which to date has kept rein on enemy capabilities. Tactical situation in Laos has not been determining in most respects; even with great asset of complete air superiority, FAR and CAS irregulars are not capable of stopping most determined enemy advances during dry season (as most dramatically re-emphasized during last dry season). A bigger or better FAR and irregular force can, of course, make such advances more costly to the enemy and to this extent have an inhibiting effect in local situations. The point, however, is that the RLG armed forces do not, and cannot, protect Laos from a NVN/PL military takeover should Hanoi make this decision (the RLG knows this). Furthermore, this action probably could be carried out with the forces the enemy presently has in Laos or with additional in-puts which are available in NVN.

9. The military situation, therefore, would not be materially affected by additional assets available to NVN through withdrawal of troops from SVN. Availability of additional NVN troops probably would allow enemy more flexibility in spreading out and physically occupying more terrain, however, which might be desirable for political bargaining purposes.

10. Last dry season. To review briefly the status of the general military situation in Laos (considerable details are contained in CAS and ARMA reports which are readily available to the Intelligence Community in Washington):

During the last dry season enemy forces estimated at 48,000 NVN and 51,000 PL wiped out most territorial gains made by the RLG in previous two years from north to south; enemy offensive destroyed effectiveness of FAR in north and “road” to Luang Prabang wide open; in NE, Site 36 alone was only major base to survive onslaught; enemy within easy reach of Mekong Valley urban centers in middle and central Laos; in south, Attopeu and Saravane invested. At that time, enemy could have moved into Mekong Valley with Meos providing only serious, rolonged organized ground resistance country wide, but they would have been most vulnerable to air attack. It should be noted that for this campaign Hanoi augmented its forces in Laos by 19 battalions (7575 men) 7 battalions (2775 men) in north and 12 battalions (4900 men) in south. We have no evidence NVN troops have been withdrawn from Laos.

11. Objectives of dry season offensive varied according to area and represented different mix of pol/mil factors. In addition to opportunity destroy FAR reserves and eliminate advance guerrilla base, victory at Nam Bac important for adverse pol/psychological shock effect it had on RLG; other side of coin was significant boost it gave to NLHS frayed prestige and fortunes in north.

12. In NE, NVN roll back of Meo’s due sensitivity of Hanoi for security its frontiers and concomitant concern for loyalty its tribals as well as desire knock out installations at Phou Pha Thi. Security of PDJ also enhanced, area important politically in Lao domestic scene.

13. In center, appears enemy motivated primarily by desire take territory (such as Phalane) “illegally” held by RLG (a major theme to justify offensive throughout Laos) and keep RLG nervous and off-balance.

14. In south, similar elements involved, but overriding consideration was protection of Ho Chi Minh Trail and pinning down RLG forces in static defensive positions. As Dept recalls, we had good evidence enemy also intended seize and hold Saravane and Attopeu, prior to failure offensive to achieve its major aim of general uprising of urban population in key areas of SVN. Enemy had at that time (and has now) military capability to take these towns, as well as other major towns in Mekong Valley. (If Tet offensive had succeeded, it possible enemy might have thrown caution to winds and moved towards Mekong, counting on disruptions in SVN to inhibit our response.)

15. Wet season. During the current wet season which is rapidly coming to a close, the RTG forces with few exceptions have done little to regain territory lost to the enemy during the last dry season and, hence, improve defensive posture for coming dry season. (In fact, FAR hard pressed to maintain necessary security in area still under RLG control as evidenced by enemy forays against Rte 13.) With the exception of the FAR victory at Muong Phalane (which included a healthy in-put of irregulars), and reoccupation some of the area north of Paksane by MR V, the only real offensive action has been carried out by CAS irregulars. For example, in Sayaboury, irregulars are engaged in a continuing operation, in coordination with the RTA, against CT troops and infiltration routes supporting insurgency in adjoining Thai Provinces. In the northwest, the irregulars are aggressively carrying the war to the enemy in a series of small clashes. In the NE, Vang Pao has reoccupied area east of Routes 61/68 lost to enemy last dry season and is attacking around Phou Pha Thi and the SE edge of the PDJ in an effort to establish forward defensive positions against expected renewed enemy pressure in the coming dry season. In the south, irregulars are active, of course, along the length of the Ho Chi Minh Trail as well as Rte 110.

16. FAR inactivity is due to several factors. First, the FAR has still not recovered after the clobbering of the dry season. It is still in process of general (and apparently interminable) reorganization at the top, still plagued by recruiting and training deficiencies. In this respect, as of 30 Sept 68, ARMA estimates that of 73 bns, only 23 can be considered “combat ready.” To some degree related to the above, is a marked decrease in the “combative” spirit of FAR commanders. For example, Phasouk as usual is extremely cautious and has not undertaken his planned campaign to recover the Sedone Valley; Bounpone and MR III appear to be manufacturing excuses not to do anything; Sayyavong, despite apparent good intentions, has been ineffective in MR I, possibly because he must reply on Bounchanh who has his head stuck in the sand. As a result, Luang Prabang is no better defended now than it was immediately following the fall of Nam Bac. In MR V Kouprasth has mounted several sweep operations at our insistence (primarily to protect road building projects) but the hard core enemy areas remain intact.

17. Next six months. As we look toward coming dry season (November–May), military situation on ground is as follows: The enemy with exception of NE Laos is in generally same positions as at end of last dry season. Enemy forces consist of 47,295 NVN troops, and 51,130 PL troops. RLG forces consist of FAR/FAN 63,000 and CAS irregulars 40,000. As mentioned earlier, FAR is in bad shape, although enemy also in pretty sorry condition, his capabilities are probably sufficient to implement Hanoi’s intentions in Laos.

18. We do not, of course, know what Hanoi’s intentions are for coming dry season. We assume, however, they will reflect to great degree situation in SVN. If this is in direction of detente, we would not expect enemy to jump off from advanced positions to move into Mekong Valley thereby clearly and overtly destroying Geneva Accords, thus releasing US and others from present inhibitions in Laos as well as inviting direct retaliatory action in NVN. Even if situation is in direction intensification of hostilities, we doubt Hanoi would take such risks for little apparent gain, since protection of infiltration routes does not depend on physical possession of Mekong Valley. Also, we assume USSR would use its influence with Hanoi to preclude such occurrence.

19. For coming dry season, therefore, we would expect enemy not to risk overturning delicate balance in Laos by overly adventurous military action, but to protect infiltration routes; also enemy will seek to keep pressure on RLG by: a) maintaining threat to Mekong Valley; b) moving against resurgent irregular activity in NW; c) driving against Meo forward outposts with eventual aim of taking Site 36 and shutting Vang Pao up in Long Tieng; d) disrupting USAID activities where possible. In sum, enemy will attempt maximize its control over or presence in as much territory as possible within limits dictated by prudence. NVN troops withdrawn from SVN could be useful in this effort, although not essential.

20. Major domestic purpose of enemy maintaining territory won and “nibbling” against area under RLG control is to strengthen bargaining position of NLHS in eventual negotiations leading to reconstitution of provisional government of National Union. In this respect, we note that both Pathet Lao and Radio Hanoi claim “liberated zone” comprises one-half to two-thirds of Lao territory and 50 percent of population which may be good indication of initial NLHS bargaining positions in such negotiations.

21. Second six months. Although projection this far into the future is difficult, we believe the enemy will attempt to hold as much territory as possible during the next wet season for political purposes. Given the logistical problems the weather imposes, the enemy would have stockpiled supplies during the dry season and might consider augmenting his forces to inhibit or defeat successful RLG wet season offensives. Here again, NVN troops withdrawn from SVN could be useful to some extent.

22. Conclusions. Under the circumstances, choices for US policy are limited during the period under study. We must reassure Tha Lao of the continuity of US policy and support.

23. We must assure that US strike aircraft are readily and continually available in sufficient numbers to support RLG forces. This is particularly true in NE, which is not “sensitive” internationally (like the Mekong Valley) but extremely important domestically and where Vang Pao and the Meo will be very hard pressed. We will continue to prod the FAR into more effective action to make the enemy’s “nibbling” as costly as possible, thereby hoping to preclude loss of additional fringe areas during the dry season, with eventual aim of recovery of some areas if possible in next wet season. In this respect, we hope to build on some encouraging signs of past few months (increasing employment of FAR and guerrillas in joint operations; establishment of air/ground op centers country wide) which indicate possibility of more united and coordinated efforts by RLG forces.

Sullivan

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, INT 2–2. Top Secret.
2. Reference is to SNIE 58–1–68; Document 389.
3. In telegram 257699 to Vientiane, October 18, the Department asked for an assessment of the Laos situation for the upcoming SNIE. (Department of State, Central Files, INT 2–2)
4. As of October 21, the White House received weekly Laos Situation Reports that reported on the military situation and internal political/administrative developments. The set can be found in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVIII, Memos, 1/68–1/69.