385. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)1
SUBJECT
- Contingency Planning for Enemy Action in Laos
At a recent meeting between Mr. Katzenbach, Mr. Nitze, Mr. W. Rostow, Mr. Helms and Mr. Bundy concern was expressed over the possibility that, in order to create additional pressures on the US and her allies, the North Vietnamese might utilize forces recently withdrawn from South Vietnam and/or North Vietnamese forces already in Laos to increase military pressure against RLG military forces, and perhaps even to attempt to overrun Laos.
Mr. Nitze has asked ISA to pull together the various concepts and opinions within the Department of Defense regarding military actions which the US Government could employ in response to North Vietnamese actions in Laos. He would like to examine possible responses to three alternative courses of action by the North Vietnamese:
- 1.
- That the forces withdrawn from South Vietnam will remain in Laos but not engage in any overt action against the RLG forces but will remain as threat to the security of Laos and re-entry threat to South Vietnam.
- 2.
- That the North Vietnamese will provide enough additional support to PL forces to create a threat of overrunning Laos gradually measuring our responses as they go.
- 3.
- That the North Vietnamese will provide sufficient additional support to the PL forces to support an attempt to overrun Laos quickly.
Mr. Nitze would like an appraisal of the military courses of action with which we might respond to these three contingencies, including the effect our actions might have against the capabilities and intentions of the PL/North Vietnamese forces, the time it would take to initiate and bring to full force the various courses of action, the effect such action would have on US deployments and capabilities elsewhere, and the operational cost of conducting such actions. Mr. Nitze would like an examination of (1) stepped-up air campaigns, and (2) the introduction of US ground forces in conjunction with these air campaigns. Mr. Nitze also requests that you clearly identify assumptions and soft spots in your analysis. In addition, if deemed appropriate, you may wish to examine the ramifications of an invasion of North Vietnam or other military actions you believe might cause the North Vietnamese to desist from any attempt to overrun Laos.
Mr. Nitze would appreciate having your general thoughts on this subject by October 30th. He recognizes that this is insufficient time to develop fully the requirements, costs or ramifications of various courses of action and that the initial submission will not be complete.