Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

383. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, October 8, 1968, 0440Z.

9514. Ref: A. Vientiane 8358 (Notal).² B. Vientiane 9181 (Notal).³

1. During past two months, Lao political hopes, military expectations and civic performance have slumped into a subtle depression. Although Souvanna returned to Laos from his sojourn in France prepared to reorganize the armed forces and confront corruption (Ref A) he has achieved relatively little towards his objectives. The military leaders, who usually regain considerable terrain in the rainy season, have had some limited successes in military region two and in the area of Muong Phalane. But, otherwise, in the Sedone valley, in Borikhane, and in other potentially significant regions, progress has been nil. In addressing the problem of revenues lost though the collapse of the gold trade, the National Assembly has failed to levy new taxes or give support to government efforts to improve on old ones.

2. Hence, as Laos faces the end of the rainy season and the onset of the northeast monsoon, it does so in a rather damp and daunted mood. In this mood, Lao leaders begin to look to the stars and other external indicators (rather than to themselves) as a further and fatalistic explanation for their problems.

3. In casting about this way, there are three matters which trouble them. The first is the failure of the Paris talks between U.S. and North Viet Nam to make progress towards a peaceful resolution of the war. They had genuinely hoped that these talks would mean movement towards a cease-fire before the onset of the next dry season. Now, in the absence of progress, they face with some dread the idea of a repetition of last year’s heavy attacks which paralleled the Tet offensive in South Viet Nam.

4. Secondly, the overtones from Czechoslovakia are disturbing, not just because of sympathy for the Czechs, but rather because they signal a setback in the process of U.S.-USSR detente. To most thinking Lao, the foundation for some hope of independence of their country rests on U.S.- Soviet agreement, as exemplified by the Vienna meeting of 1961 and the Geneva Accords of 1962. If the bases of this agreement should crumble, they see Laos falling once again into the crevasse.

5. Finally, there is the question of the U.S. elections. Once again, they are nervous because they fear the prospect that the policy which began with the Kennedy administration in 1961 may be reversed and that current Lao leadership may be put in jeopardy. They see General Phoumi inching towards a return, moving from Songkla to Bangkok, with Thai consent. They see the Pathet Lao talking about “bi-polarization” of internal politics and suspect the old cleavage may be revived.

6. With all this gloomy accumulation, it is rather difficult to get the Lao to think in dynamic, constructive terms. There is a very real discouraging tendency towards a sauve qui peut policy among the leadership. Thus, attacks on corruption are being deflected and evaded. Those whose hands are deepest in the till, for example, have been counter-attacking against Finance Minister Sisouk, insisting that he has been raising revenue by “illegal” forfaitaire contracts. The generals whom Souvanna has been trying to bring under control have been developing counter-schemes which would give them dominance in an expanded military control scheme.

7. This, of course, is not the first time Laos has been in this mood, but it is perhaps one of the most pervasive and enduring depressions I have observed without some immediately discernible micawber moonbeams to enlighten the future. We will provide additional report of circumstances and prospects in subsequent cables.

Sullivan

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 LAOS. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, London, Moscow, Paris, Saigon, and CINCPAC.
2. In telegram 8358, August 9, the Embassy reported on a discussion with Souvanna about ways to end corruption in the FAL. (Ibid.)
3. In telegram 9181, September 19, Sullivan reported that Souvanna told him that he had made strides in reforming and taking control of the FAL. (Ibid., DEF 6 LAOS)