Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

378. Paper Prepared by the East Asian and Pacific Interdepartmental Regional Group¹

Washington, September 10, 1968.

REPERCUSSIONS IN LAOS OFDE-ESCALATION IN NORTH VIET-NAM

I. Nature of U.S. De-Escalation

A. Complete cessation of bombing in NVN.

B. Cessation of air reconnaissance except for high level reconnaissance.

II. Consequences of U.S. De-Escalation

A. Decreased area available for air interdiction of trail system and other traffic into Laos, particularly if no-strike buffer zones are established along the border (e.g., Mu Gia Pass).

B. Air interdiction in the trial area would become more costly since there could be a greater concentration of enemy AA for the smaller area to defend.

C. Greater conspicuousness of US bombing, particularly in north Laos (no “cover” missions from Thailand to NVN), would prompt Soviets and others to increase pressures on Souvanna to stop all US bombing in Laos.

D. Greater vulnerability of RLG forces, particularly in the north, because of the reduced effectiveness of US bombing of NVN troop and supply centers near Lao border.

E. Anxiety in Thailand as well as Laos about US intentions.

F. Even less effective bombing in areas near the border if there is a cessation of reconnaissance on traffic in North Viet-Nam headed for Laos, particularly should there be no-reconnaissance buffer zones along the border.

III. Conclusions

A. If the DRV maintains its present policy toward Laos, each step in de-escalation in the Viet-Nam conflict has a serious consequence for the security of Laos and hence of Thailand. The general Southeast Asian situation must therefore continue to be part of the substance of negotiations with the DRV.

B. In the absence of any significant reciprocal de-escalation on the part of North Viet-Nam, US air operations in Laos must be increased in order to provide the same deterrent effect, against both DRV traffic for SVN and communist forces operating against the FAR.

C. The present level of US MAP support should be considered as essential for US minimum goals in Laos until such time as the DRV abandons its present policy toward Laos. The possibility of increasing US MAP support should not be excluded if the DRV should attempt to make significant territorial gains in Laos to diminish the repercussions of what it might consider a setback in South Viet-Nam. Similarly, CIA assistance to the Lao guerrilla operations must remain at least at the same level.

D. It may be necessary to modify the composition of the US air forces: to include more propeller aircraft dedicated to operations in Laos, to re-orient the direction of attack of the B–52’s, to employ naval aircraft in Laos to greater extent, and to make other adjustments of US assets.

E. If we must institute no-bombing buffer zones on Lao territory close to the DRV border, there should be no similar limitation on reconnaissance.

F. To provide partial cover for US air operations, there should be an increase in RLAF air operations. To this end, the capabilities of the RLAF should continue to be improved (including improving the command structure to attract and use effectively more combat pilots).

G. With decreased cover (i.e., fewer flights from Thailand to North Viet-Nam) US non-admission (and Lao denials) of US bombing in Laos will be increasingly ineffective. US and Lao public position, including detailed press guidance, should be thoroughly worked out in advance.

H. There will be pressure to acknowledge US air operations officially—and in effect to renounce the Geneva Agreements—in order to encourage our allies and assure some elements of the American public that something is being done against infiltration into SVN. There should be contingency planning on how to resist these pressures.

I. The RLG will not only be opposed to official US admission of US bombings, but in recompense for the risk to which Laos exposes itself by permitting US bombings in the trail area of south Laos it will expect as a quid pro quo augmented US air support in the defense of areas of importance to the RLG, particularly in north, northeast and central Laos.

J. Current ground operations in the trail area from South Viet-Nam (Prairie Fire, Igloo White) should be continued within their present scope and pattern, particularly to support tactical air operations.

K. CAS roadwatch operations from the Lao side should be continued at a level necessary to fulfill their surveillance mission. Capability of CAS-directed guerrillas in south Laos should be increased for greater protection of RLG interests there in the event of a DRV reaction in south Laos and also for operations from the west against certain parts of the infiltration routes.

L. Contingency plans for a standdown of US operations should be devised for the eventuality that the DRV may wish to use the trail complex for unannounced exfiltration from South Viet-Nam. These plans should include provisions for air reconnaissance of the trail area.

M. We should inform the Lao and Thai governments of US intentions in adopting de-escalation, but our counter-actions will in the long run be the most effective reassurance.

N. To provide maximum justification for increased air operations (which will be at best an open secret), there should be increased assist-ance to the Lao government’s program publicizing North Vietnamese aggression in Laos, as an unacknowledged justification for US air actions. Other Asian nations should be encouraged to be more outspoken in their recognition (and hopefully condemnation) of DRV interference in Laos.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam 5 EE 910 Laos, 10/67–12/68. Secret. According to a covering memorandum from the Staff Director of the Group to its members, including William Bundy who was its chairman, the EA/IRG (formerly FE/IRG) was asked on May 29, 1968, to prepare a paper on the repercussions in Laos of de-escalation in Vietnam. This paper, coordinated with the relevant agencies and with the Embassy in Laos, was the result. The staff director asked for any final comments or changes before it was discussed by the EA/IRG.