351. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
Vientiane, March 27, 1968,
0610Z.
5412. Following sent action immediate Seventh AF; info COMUSMACV, CINCPACAF, CINCPAC, CSAF, 16 Mar; sent to you for info. Request this be given absolute minimum distribution to be determined by Mr. Read, S/S, only.
“Personal for Gen. Momyer from Amb. Sullivan.
Reur 141246Z Mar 68.2
- 1.
- I thoroughly concur that post mortem of loss Site 85 is in order. Suggest your people and mine work out procedures for such analysis at next weekly Udorn meeting.
- 2.
- Believe you should understand, however, that enemy force was not “relatively small.” Our intelligence indicates their numbers between five and seven battalions, with artillery and rocket support, considerably [Page 694] outnumbering local defense forces, which never numbered more than 1,000 men in 12 kilometer defensive perimeter which drawn around Site 85.
- 3.
- We made clear from the very beginning that this site could not be defended against a determined and superior enemy force. We gave regular and accurate estimates of its progressive deterioration, and as early as Feb. 26, advised you that it could probably not be held beyond March 10. Therefore, its fall should have come as no surprise to anyone.
- 4.
- The manner in which enemy accomplished its fall is, however, instructive, and should, I think, be carefully studied with view to future operations. Artillery fire, at relatively long range, was surprisingly accurate. According fragmentary reports of survivors, direct hits were scored, very early in the barrage, upon personnel quarters, operations structure, and bunkers. It seems possible that installations were rendered effectively inoperable even before destruction order was given. There may be some lessons in this which should be studied with respect to length of time technical personnel should be required stay at their posts after installation falls within artillery range. In hindsight, it seems to me we should have pulled all technicians out morning March 10 even if this meant losing the last several hours of the installation’s capabilities.
- 5.
- What concerns me most is not the defense action, but the disruption of pre-planned evacuation procedure. It is still not clear why technical personnel went over cliff to a narrow ledge rather than down trail to chopper pad. CAS and local personnel subsequently went up same trail to installation searching for technicians, so we know trail was traversable, even if under artillery fire. It is also not clear to me how small Vietnamese suicide squad got to installation site, although it seems they must have scaled the cliff which all of us considered impassable.
- 6.
- We can give you details of action taken by 224-man local defense forces at the site and casualties which they suffered in fighting. In their defense effort, these amounted to 8 killed, 18 missing, and 33 wounded. Their defensive tactics, of course, are based on guerrilla doctrines, and we will be pleased review with your people how we think these should be handled in future instances, and especially the role which air power can play in these tactics.”
Sullivan