Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

334. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Laos and Cambodia Affairs (Herz) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy)¹

Washington, February 27, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Air Support for Counter-insurgency Mission in Laos

1. The Issue. Ambassador Sullivan is not asking that any air resources be assigned for use in Laos. He is asking for much less. Although he has excellent working relations with Seventh Air Force, he believes they generally give him tactical air strike support for targets in Laos only after requirements in Vietnam are satisfied. In asking that the 56th Air Commando Wing (ACW) at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, be “dedicated” to Laos, he is not trying to break the general rule that the Air Force needs flexibility in assigning its aircraft. All he wants is a “first call” on some planes. In view of the increasing enemy pressure in Laos, and the important but fleeting opportunities there to inflict damage on the enemy, we think Sullivan’s request should be strongly supported.

2. U.S. Interest. Although the US has no formal commitment to defend Laos, we have a keen political-military interest in preserving its independence as a buffer to protect the Mekong lowlands bordering Thailand. The current enemy dry-season offensive, hitting from north to south, is beginning to crumble the RLG’s ability to defend itself, and North Vietnamese/Pathet Lao troops are pressing ever nearer the heavily populated areas along the river. However, Sullivan’s request is not keyed to any emergency. He is bringing up a long-standing problem because it is more acute now; but the problem has existed for some time.

3. A rule of thumb used to be that we were supporting RLG operations in the North in order to have a fairly free hand in the Panhandle, where our air operations were largely related to the war in Vietnam. This is less true today. The RLG urgently needs our support also in the South. The Lao have not so far expressed any dissatisfaction with US air support, but this is due to the fact that they do not know everything we are doing, or could do, in the Panhandle. The fact is that effective operations in the Panhandle serve also the security of the neighboring countries. Besides, those operations are very productive in terms of trucks destroyed and North Vietnamese killed (some 7,500 to 8,000 NVN/PL killed annually in all of Laos, the majority through air power).

4. Needs: With the priority attention of the 56th ACW, Ambassador Sullivan believes he would get the number of daily sorties he needs: (a) nine A–26 sorties, (b) eight T–28 sorties, (c) eighteen A–1 sorties. In addition, U–10s and C–123s would be regularly available for Forward Air Control (FAC) and flare ship roles. He is asking for prop planes, not jets. We do not know exactly how much he is getting now, but he is getting substantially less than the sorties he says he needs. “Dedication” of a specific 7th AF unit seems to be less important than getting some kind of assurance that Sullivan will get the number of missions specified above.

5. Mission. Sullivan has stated the priorities for which tactical air is needed: (a) hitting fleeting targets identified on motorable roads; (b) enemy logistical facilities and troop concentrations; (c) support for irregulars who are being infiltrated into hostile areas, attacking enemy positions, or defending base areas. The last-mentioned point is the most politically important one in Laos, and perhaps the least appreciated by the military: The counter-insurgency mission in Laos may be small potatoes to 7th AF, but upon it depends the morale of tribal elements (half the total population) and also, in the last analysis, of the entire FAR. Counter-insurgency missions have been highly successful when all three key elements (Lao irregulars, perishable all-source intelligence, and air power) have been present. Without one of these elements, they fail.

6. The Larger Context. Although Sullivan is immediately concerned about protecting Site 85, where we have the TSQ–81 and a TACAN, the lack of sufficient air strike assets for Laos has been flagged by him repeatedly, including in his periodic discussions with the Joint Chiefs, since 1965. He has been proven right in his “Sopwith Camel” approach—that propeller-driven craft are superior to jets in the Laos situation. He has also stressed the importance of hitting NVN traffic as far north in the trail structure as possible (i.e., in the vicinity of Mu Gia) before it disperses under jungle canopy further south. We are, and he is, not taking a parochial Laos point of view: “Dedicating” air assets to Laos will improve also our posture in South Vietnam as well as Thailand. Also, we are not adjudicating a dispute. It is merely a question of upping the priority slightly in one country, in the interests of our position on that country and in the interests of the overall war effort.

1. Source: Department of State, EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394, TS. Top Secret. Drafted by Slutz and Herz.