Office of the Historian

332. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Bohlen)1

Washington, February 23, 1968.

SUBJECT

  • Air Support for Counter-insurgency Mission in Laos

Ambassador Sullivan has requested our assistance in obtaining a re-ordering of air support priorities in order to give him sufficient tactical [Page 653] air strike support for key targets in Laos at the time he needs it.2 He has specifically asked that the 56th Air Commando Wing (ACW) at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, be “dedicated” to Laos. In view of the increasing enemy pressure in Laos, and the important but fleeting opportunities there to inflict damage on the enemy, we think Sullivan’s request should be strongly supported.

The over-all counter-insurgency mission in Laos is to harness in an efficient manner three elements—Lao irregulars; perishable, all-source intelligence; and air power—in order to inflict the greatest damage possible on enemy personnel and logistical facilities. Operations have been highly successful when all these elements are present.

With the priority attention of the 56th ACW, Ambassador Sullivan believes he would get the number of daily sorties he needs: (a) nine A–26 sorties, (b) eight T–28 sorties, (c) eighteen A–1 sorties. In addition, U–10s and C–123s would be regularly available for Forward Air Control (FAC) and flare ship roles.

Sullivan would use this air support in the following order of priority:

a.
hitting fleeting targets identified on motorable roads which the enemy uses in Laos;
b.
striking enemy logistical facilities and troop concentrations throughout Laos; and
c.
providing close air support to irregulars who are being infiltrated into hostile areas, attacking enemy positions, or defending base areas.

[2 lines of source text not declassified] A specific and immediate area of high concern is Site 85, a guerrilla base and command post in northern Sam Neua province, which has been the target of concentrated enemy pressure for several months. The USAF installed its TSQ–81 navigational device there last fall. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

Recommendation

That you discuss Ambassador Sullivan’s request urgently with the Joint Chiefs with a view to getting a sufficiently high priority for air support operations in Laos to meet his requirements.3

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret. Drafted by Slutz and cleared by Herz.↩
  2. In telegram 4585 from Vientiane, February 20. (Ibid.)↩
  3. In telegram 120863 to Vientiane, February 27, the Department informed Sullivan that in light of a CIA presentation to the JCS about an imminent attack on Site 85 and the urgent requirement for increased air support for the defenders, the JCS contacted CINCPAC about Sullivan’s request and the Department “weighed in” with the Department of Defense. The question of “dedicating” air support for Laos was more fundamental and required resolution at a high level. The issue was being considered by McNamara. (Ibid.)↩