33. Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency1
SUBJECT
- Background of the 19 April Rightist Coup in Laos
1. The coup mounted by rightist elements in Vientiane on 19 April appears to have been only marginally successful. Denied the support of key rightist elements, weakened internally by the shifting allegiance of General Kouprasith and opposed by the Western powers, the coup group’s authority appears limited to Vientiane and its environs. On one count, however, it must be scored a success: the current coalition seems finished and it is problematical whether it will be possible to preserve the tripartite coalition formula.
Conditions Leading to Rightist Opposition to the Coalition
2. The conditions which prompted the coup attempt have been present and festering since the coalition was formed in June 1962. From the outset, leaders of the conservative faction doubted Souvanna’s ability to resist Pathet Lao encroachments. Rightist fears were multiplied when Communist China stepped up its road-building activities in northern Laos in late 1962. About that time, it was also becoming clear that left-wing neutralist Quinim Pholsena was exerting increasing influence over national policies through his position as foreign minister. More recently, Souvanna’s efforts to secure neutralization of Luang Prabang without exacting commensurate concessions from the Pathet Lao sharpened rightist doubts regarding his value as national leader.
3. Other, less obvious, grounds existed for rightist opposition to Souvanna’s coalition experiment. Under Souvanna’s plan for military demobilization rightist forces would be reduced from approximately 60,000 to 10,000 men. Aside from impairing rightist ability to resist Communist subversion and reducing both the numbers and the influence of the military, this reduction would erode individual power positions, such as Boun Oum’s “fief” in south Laos under the command of General Phasouk Somly, and Phoumi’s power base in General Siho’s 6–8,000 man security force.
4. In short, the coalition formula has been viewed by the rightists as opening the way to Communist encroachment within the government and as a vehicle for changes which could adversely affect the interests of a substantial portion of the right-wing elite.
[Page 60]Manifestations of Rightist Opposition
5. Rightist opposition to the coalition concept was evident even before the signing of the Geneva accords of July 1962. It took US economic sanctions and the military disaster of Nam Tha in May 1962 to bring around the rightists to support of the tripartite formula.
6. Since the formation of the Souvanna government, rightist opposition has taken the form of resistance to measures designed to implement national reunification. In most cases, rightist opposition has had more than adequate justification in the face of continued Communist military and diplomatic maneuvering.
7. Basic rightist opposition has also been reflected in the coup rumors which have been heard in Vientiane from time to time. Right-wing elements—generally those with power bases in the Vientiane area, i.e., Kouprasith and Siho—repeatedly have been cited as preparing to topple the government. Many of these rumors probably were trial balloons launched almost wistfully to test US reaction. The rightists continued to hope that US policy toward Souvanna would change and that the US—while not explicitly promising support—would not oppose his ouster.
8. Most rightist leaders, subjected to repeated US rebuffs to such probes, generally took the line that they would not act without US acquiescence.
9. More recently, General Phoumi reportedly had been planning to take control of the government upon Souvanna’s expected resignation. However, reporting indicated that he intended to hold off any move until Souvanna had actually submitted his resignation. Souvanna, following the failure of tripartite talks in the Plaine des Jarres on 17–18 April, had come close to the end of his rope. He indicated to Western diplomats and the press his intent to submit his resignation to King Savang on 20 April. Western powers began to mount intensive efforts to dissuade Souvanna or—failing that—to convince the King to decline the resignation. In view of Souvanna’s known proclivity to issue—and then back off from—resignation threats, there appeared to remain a chance that he could be led to reconsider his decision.
10. At this point, General Siho, jumping the gun, mounted his coup early on the morning of 19 April. With the apparently reluctant support of Kouprasith, the roundup of the neutralists was a simple matter and Vientiane quickly was under Siho’s control. Siho’s reasons for such precipitate actions are obscure. He is inordinately ambitious, and he may have thought he saw a way of emerging from Phoumi’s shadow and obtaining recognition in his own right. It is also possible that the politically unsophisticated Siho saw in the recent coups in South Vietnam the key to US recognition and support for a more vigorous opposition to Communism. That something of this was in Siho’s mind is suggested by [Page 61] Siho’s reported view that his coup was “similar” to General Khanh’s in South Vietnam, and had the purpose of stepping up “the war against the Pathet Lao and Communist enemies.”
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. II, Memos, 4/16/64–4/30/64. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Drafted by the Office of Current Intelligence.↩