327. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)1
211948Z. The situation in Laos. In view of the recent developments in the Ban Nam Bac area of Laos2 and current considerations concerning the Laos Panhandle, I am forwarding our assessment of the situation in both of these areas.
We view the increase in tempo and intensity of enemy activity in northern Laos as a kick-off of the dry season activities in that area. While serious, and a situation that may develop further, at this point it is not believed to be a general offensive any more than in past dry seasons. The results of the enemy attack on Ban Nam Bac will probably encourage further attempts at offensives in the area. The current emphasis on enemy offensives in SVN may explain some of the increase in activity in northern Laos. Guidance and direction for such offensives undoubtedly originate in Hanoi and are intended for areas of active conflict. Considering [Page 648] the Communist forces presently available in northern Laos, and the currently reflected performance of the FAR forces in this area, NVN has the capability of reinforcing with one division, moving into the Luang Prabang area and sufficiently controlling the situation to permit a Communist take over of most of northern Laos. This probably is not their intention but the capability is there and the situation appears to present few obstacles should the NVN decide to move in force.
Turning to the Laos Panhandle area, US/ARVN ground operations in this area, over an extended period, could restrict enemy resupply activities and movement of replacement personnel, destroy his supply caches, and deny him the base areas/sanctuaries he needs. In such a circumstance, the enemy would be expected initially to divert infiltration activities further to the west, and attempt to increase his use of sea infiltration to include use of Cambodian ports and overland route. He could consider our blocking of his infiltration/logistical effort of sufficient import to divert forces from other operational areas and, if necessary, provide additional forces from NVN. He may act to intensify the threat in northern Laos thereby causing FAR and other friendly Lao forces currently in the Panhandle to be diverted to assist in the north and thus further expand the war in the north. It is improbable that the enemy would attempt a complete take over of northern Laos as a reaction to US/ARVN ground operations in the Laos Panhandle area, but, with encouragement and material support from China, he might attempt to extend presently held territory in northern Laos to a much greater degree.
In summary, we see the current northern Laos picture as a successful enemy launching of his dry season offensive with limited objectives around the Nam Bac area. The situation is serious but it is not believed that the enemy intends to attempt a complete take over of this entire area. US/ARVN operations in the Laos Panhandle area could create a serious resupply and personnel replacement problem for the enemy. The enemy would be expected to divert to the west and increase his other available means of infiltration. Should our operation be of a magnitude which would result in an unacceptable curtailment of the enemy infiltration effort, he probably would, in an attempt to regain full control of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, reinforce with troops from the north, and may intensify his threat to the northern Laos area.
Warm regards.
- Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, Message Files, COMUSMACV, 1 Jan-31 Jan 1968. Secret. Repeated to Westmoreland.↩
- In telegram 3907 from Vientiane, January 18, the Embassy reported that “the Lao seem to be keeping their ‘sang froid’” over the fall of Nam Bac, a major military defeat by the North Vietnamese/Pathet Lao. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)↩