323. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)1

SUBJECT

  • The Use of Propeller and Jet Aircraft in Laos

The enclosed study indicates that propeller aircraft are approximately 9 times as effective as jet aircraft per sortie in destroying trucks and water craft in Laos. It appears possible to substitute two A–1 squadrons for two F–4 squadrons in Thailand and significantly increase the effectiveness [Page 641] of our air interdiction campaign in the Laotian Panhandle without reducing the number of jet sorties in North Vietnam.

Would you please review the enclosed study and give me your recommendations by December 29, 1967.2

Robert S. McNamara

Enclosure

ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF PROPELLER VS JET AIRCRAFT IN LAOS

Summary and Conclusions

1.
Jet aircraft are relatively ineffective against moving targets in Laos. During the first nine months of 1967 jets destroyed or damaged (D/D) only 366 moving vehicles, 1.5 per 100 attack sorties, at a cost of $700,000 for each truck or water vessel destroyed or damaged.
2.
Propeller aircraft are approximately 9 times as effective as jet aircraft per sortie in destroying trucks and water craft in Laos. The prop aircraft destroyed/damaged 996 vehicles, or 12.8 per 100 attack sorties. The cost per vehicle D/D was only $55,000, even though loss rates for propeller aircraft operating in Laos are approximately 4 times greater than the comparable loss rates for jet aircraft.
3.
Two additional A–1 squadrons could be deployed to Thailand in 1968 and two F4 squadrons returned to the U.S. without reducing the jet sorties available for use in North Vietnam. The A–1 aircraft are expected to destroy or damage an additional 1200 moving vehicles in Laos over a 12 month period. This proposal would save about $28 million per year over the current plan for the next 2 years. However, an additional 18 aircraft and 8 pilots would be lost under the proposed plan.

[Here follow an analysis of “Aircraft Effectiveness,” a table on “Attack Sorties, Losses, and Results in Laos,” a “Discussion of Relative Mission/Effectiveness,” a table of “Propeller Aircraft Deployments,” a discussion and tables of “Alternative Deployments,” a discussion and table of the “Cost of Additional Deployments,” a discussion and table of the “Cost of Proposed Plan,” two enclosures on the USAF A–1 Program, and a table on planned sorties in NVN by Thai-based F–4’s.]

  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 72 A 2468, Laos (Laos 385.1), 1967. Secret.
  2. See Document 326.