Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

281. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, April 17, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Soviet Demarche on Laos

The Soviet memorandum handed Foy [Kohler] by Dobrynin on Laos² is the first real sign of life the Soviets have shown in their responsibilities as Co-Chairman for the implementation of the 1962 Agreement.

We believe the demarche should be treated in the larger context of another signal from Moscow that they cannot let further intensification or escalation of our bombing of North Vietnam go without reaction on their part. This opinion is confirmed in a more casual discussion which Zbigniew Brzezinski had with Yuri Zhukov of Pravda. This underlines our view that we should undertake as a matter of urgency a new line of discussion with the Soviet leaders, particularly before they get further involved in Vietnam. The closer they come to confrontation with us, the more difficult it will be for them to retreat, and the harder it will be to achieve a settlement.

We believe our response to the Soviets should be in the form of a follow-up to the long and useful conversation you had with Dobrynin in January.³ We think that the demarche should be answered head-on, but that the opportunity should also be taken of pressing the Soviets to agree to serious and early discussions to achieve a settlement of Vietnam of which the situation in Laos is only a part.

With respect to the demarche itself, we suggest a reply along the following lines:

We call Soviet attention to the fact that the North Vietnamese, by refusing to withdraw their forces from Laos upon signing of the Agreements in 1962 had, in fact, violated the Agreement from the very moment it was to come into effect. In fact, the continuing presence of the North Vietnam troops in Laos and Hanoi’s continuing use of Laotian territory for the dispatch of personnel and supplies to South Vietnam not only created the present difficulties in Laos, but has largely been responsible for the situation in South Vietnam as well.

We wish to submit a list of Hanoi’s violations of the Laos Agreements (attached).⁴ We would remind the Soviet Government that, in addition to these substantial violations, the spirit of the Harriman-Pushkin agreement has been broken. (The essence of this agreement is attached.)

But no useful purpose can be served by an exchange of charges. The United States has always supported and continues to support the carrying out of the 1962 Agreements. We believe that it is important to take whatever steps are necessary to restore and reaffirm them. Various attempts have been made since 1964 to reconvene the Laos Conference of 1962. The U.S. position remains that we welcome any opportunity in any forum which could restore peace and stability to Laos. In particular, we support the reconvening of the Laos Conference of 1962 and believe that this could help make the Laos Agreements more effective.

The USSR, the DRV, and most especially Communist China, would probably refuse to agree to reconvening the Conference at this time. We believe that our stated readiness to attend such a conference would have substantial advantages and few, if any, discernible disadvantages. If a conference were held, the possibility of working out (coincidentally, albeit outside the plenary sessions) a Vietnam settlement might be enhanced. If a conference could not be held because of the refusal of Moscow, Hanoi and/or Peking, our record would be good.

It is suggested that you ask the British Co-Chairman to include in his response to the Soviet demarche a strong pitch for reconvening the Laos Conference.

In sum, we believe that our response to the Soviet demarche could be the wedge to open up wider and more useful discussions with respect to Vietnam. If you agree, we will prepare some further thoughts on this.

Mr. Bundy concurs with this memorandum.

Attachment⁵

PUSHKIN-HARRIMAN UNDERSTANDING RE LAOS

On September 12, 1961, Pushkin told Harriman that the Soviets truly desired a neutral independent Laos on the model of Finland, and he specifically suggested that the “Soviets could and would control North Viet Nam and continue support Souvanna against possible Pathet Lao political or military aggression.” His idea was that “Soviets to police Communist bloc to assure adherence agreement, whereas British should police non-Communists. He was particularly suspicious of Thailand and South Viet Nam.” (Rome’s 882, September 13, 1961)⁶

On October 9 Harriman reminded Pushkin of this statement and asked how he intended to formalize the understanding. Pushkin objected to a bilateral written agreement between the Co-Chairmen, but expressed readiness to add a sentence to the article on Co-Chairmen “which would give them responsibility for seeing to observation of obligations by thirteen signatory states.”⁷

On October 13 Pushkin handed MacDonald a redraft of the Co-Chairmen article which contained new language reading, “The Co-Chairmen will exercise continuous supervision over the fulfillment of this Agreement and will when appropriate consult with the members of the conference.”⁸ The Western Powers ultimately accepted this proposal with a slight revision in text. Thus, the Harriman-Pushkin agreement is reflected in the third paragraph of Article 8 of the Protocol to the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos which reads as follows: “The Co-Chairmen shall exercise supervision over the observance of this Protocol and the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos.”

1. Source: Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, McNamara, Robert. Top Secret; Nodis.
2. For a summary, see Document 280.
3. Rusk and Dobyrnin talked on January 18. They discussed non-proliferation, nuclear explosions, strategic nuclear weapons, the Middle East, Soviet nuclear tests, Soviet-American relations, Germany, Vietnam, and Chinese nuclear non-proliferation. (Memoranda of conversation, January 18; Department of State, S/S-I Files: Lot 79 D 246, US–USSR Officials Memoranda of Conversation)
4. Not found.
5. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Mark B. Feldman of L/EA on April 14.
6. Printed in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XXIV, pp. 411–412.
7. See ibid., pp. 459–462.
8. See ibid., p. 472.