276. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)1
161906Z. Restrictions on operations in southern Laos (C). A. COMUSMACV MACJO1567 Eyes Only 141325Z Feb 67.2
1. Ref A stresses importance the NVN have placed on the infiltration routes in the Loatian Panhandle and concludes that the enemy is making his main infiltration effort through that area. Specific restrictions hindering effective military operations to counter this enemy effort are enumerated and the recommendation made that political and diplomatic sectors seek accommodations which will eliminate or temper these restrictions.
2. It is recognized that during the past two years there has been a gradual removal of restrictions and increased authorization for military operations in the Laos Panhandle. During the same period the enemy use of this area as the route of infiltration and support for his aggression in SVN has increased rapidly. New roads and trails have been completed, concealment and camouflage improved and work crews enlarged and increased. The influx of men and materials has increased [Page 556] despite considerable air effort expended to hinder infiltration. The gradual removal of restrictions has not kept pace with the rapid build up and use of the infiltration routes by the enemy.
3. It is evident that the reluctance to remove certain restrictions and to authorize increased freedom of action in military operations is based primarily on political considerations. The importance of these considerations is recognized, but difficult to accept unless the military threat is kept in proper perspective. I concur with Westy that we have reached a point where more effective use of our military assets is required not to reduce infiltration. We are using these assets to their maximum under the guidelines authorized. What is required is a lifting of certain restrictions now. The restrictions on ground operations are the most severe at present. The limitations on the size of Shining Brass, reduced area of operation and mode of ingress severely restricts a capability that has proven to be most effective.
4. From background message traffic it is apparent that the restrictions are not all AmEmb Vientiane originated. It is imperative, however, to convince Bill Sullivan that we need his support in convincing Washington. By separate message3 I am asking Westy to document4 in considerable detail the contents of para 1, Ref A. There is the possibility that the complete picture is not available to Sullivan. It is possible that our requirements for additional freedom of action have been too fragmented. With the exception of the Shining Brass restrictions, the other restrictions on an individual basis could be lived with. It is the compounding effect of one on top of the other that seriously hurts.
5. It is suggested you delay action in Washington until Westy and I have the chance to present our case to Bill Sullivan. The coming Baguio Conference in early March will provide the opportunity. In the interim, a convincing analysis can be developed on the extent operations are hindered by these restrictions. Hopefully, this analysis will lead to Bill Sullivan’s support in improving the situation.