Mr. President:
I though it might provide a sense of the situation on our Viet Nam flank,
which may become important in the year ahead whether Viet Nam moves
towards negotiations or towards more intense conflict.
On the whole, the situation is much better than anyone might have guessed
a few years ago.
Attachment2
TEXT OF CABLE 3977 FROM VIENTIANE
When the National Assembly was dissolved early last fall and
elections for the new Assembly were scheduled for January 1, the
Department expressed concern over developments and asked my views on
probable consequences. At that time, I speculated that Souvanna
would survive, although his neutralists would suffer; and that the
Lao army would emerge as the most powerful and successful sponsor of
the new Assembly members. I assumed that the army would be acting
very largely under General Kouprasith’s inspiration.
Most aspects of this reckless prophecy have indeed come to pass as
the result of last Sunday’s election. Souvanna seems intact and at
least for the time being in better political shape than ever; his
neutralists are a shadow of their former selves; and the army has
emerged as the most important force behind the scenes. However, in
one significant respect, my prophecy was well wide the mark.
Kouprasith has not
functioned as the primary inspiration of military politics. If
anything, he has been very largely isolated and his influence
restricted to the Fifth Military Region.
It is, I believe, instructive to examine why Kouprasith slipped. If I were to fix
any one causative event, I would suggest the October 21 abortive
coup of General Ma. This coup
was, of course, aimed primarily at
[Page 544]
Kouprasith, who had harassed
General Ma into extremis. And
although Ma failed in his
immediate quixotic goal of killing Kouprasith, he nevertheless can take some
satisfaction that his rash attack eventually resulted in cutting
Kouprasith down to
size.
This consequence came about partly because other generals in the army
were shocked by the disruption which Kouprasith’s harassing tactics had produced, and
partly because, in the aftermath of Ma’s affair, Kouprasith very decidedly “blew his cool”. He lashed
about so extravagantly that he produced reactions. My own rather
conspicuous rebuff to him on that occasion made it plain to the
other generals that Kouprasith
was not our “chosen instrument,” as some rumors had pretended. All
these factors therefore stirred the other generals to more
foresighted and more deliberate action in the political field to
forestall Kouprasith’s
expected initiatives. They also caused the Sananikone family, which
has always had a healthy respect for American power, to decide that
Kouprasith was not
necessarily the best standard bearer for the family’s fortunes.
The final result has been that General Ouane Rathikoun, General Van
Pao and General Phasouk Somly
(especially General Phasouk)
with their broad-based regional influences, have developed a
political presence that overshadows Kouprasith and leaves him very decidedly just one
among the group. The case of General Phasouk is particularly interesting, since he has
always been (with good cause) the most respected officer in the
army. The fact that he has now also emerged as a political figure in
his own right (largely assuming the neglected mantle of Prince Boun
Oum) provides a new dimension which we will wish to study and upon
which we will wish to comment with some deliberation.
Before closing this retrospection, I feel I should emphasize two
caveats. A) Kouprasith may be
currently somewhat down, but his ambitions are by no means out, and
he can still be expected to press for greater leverage. B) The new
Assembly, girded as it is by the army and rather loosely pledged to
support Souvanna, is a totally untried animal. We don’t know how
seriously its members will take their pledges to Souvanna, how
united the United Front will be, or how the army will exercise its
newly acquired political influence.
These several unknowns should assure us that political life in Laos
will remain interesting.3
