261. Letter From the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)1
Dear Bill:
Shortly after I received your message about General Starbird’s Task Force 728, I received a message from John McNaughton asking me to send my comments on the Task Force proposal to Secretary McNamara in Saigon.2 I have not yet received the Task Force papers,3 but John gave me a synopsis of the Project as it has emerged; and, of course, I had an original acquaintance with it during the meetings which Max Taylor and I had with the JASON Group4 last summer in Santa Barbara.
Unfortunately, I was extremely pressed at the time John’s message arrived and had only a couple of hours to consider and compose a reply which would get to Saigon in time for the McNamara review with Westmoreland. Consequently, my cable5 was rather abrupt and lacking in nuances. However, I enclose a copy to give you the general thrust of my reaction.
Since this message was sent, I had the pleasure of about two hours of discussion with John McNaughton here in Vientiane. During that talk, I was able to flesh out my thoughts in greater detail and give him a better appreciation of my views. He was not unreceptive to my perspective and promised to relay my thoughts faithfully to Secretary McNamara. He suggested that I write them out in a long letter to you so that you could then discuss them with him in Washington. Hence, this epistle.
First, I start from my impression of the group who developed these proposals. They are, as you know, physicists, mathematicians, and a few engineers. They are relatively unsophisticated in politics and quite innocent of knowledge affecting Southeast Asia. The views of most of them are underlain with a considerable emotion about war—and especially about war “between white men and yellow men.”
The thrust of their effort was to create a proposal which would provide the United States with a plausible excuse to terminate the war and evacuate Vietnam. Some members of the group (one father and son combination [Page 518] in particular) were quite intellectually dishonest in the presentation of “facts” and “cost estimates” tailored to their emotions. Others were clearly disinterested. In the Santa Barbara session, neither Jerry Weisner nor George Kistiakowsky was present, so I don’t know their views. However, Murray Gell-Mann, who was clearly the most intelligent among those present, took me aside and described the proposal as totally impractical. He said, however, that he would not resist it because he could think of nothing better to suggest.
Starting from this inauspicious beginning, I move into some of the considerations I mentioned in my cable, and some others which I omitted because I was not sure of the political context in which the proposal was being considered. After my talk with John McNaughton, I feel I can comment more directly on these aspects. I shall therefore repeat here what I told him in Vientiane.
It is my feeling that barriers ought to be considered in two contexts—either as tactical measures to be used during the current fighting phase, or as enforcement measures to define a territory which is politically as well as militarily defensible when the war ceases. It might be possible for one barrier to serve both purposes, but I frankly can’t see it in this case. There is nevertheless no reason why planning and even execution could not go forward simultaneously on both types of barriers.
Let us take the tactical barrier first. John tells me some consideration is being given to establishing this, and then suspending the bombing of North Vietnam. He seemed surprised to learn that I felt, under such circumstances, that we would soon also have to suspend bombing in Laos. It is not only a question of “uncovering” us by the absence of North Vietnam raids. It is also a question of exposing Souvanna to increasing pressure from Soviet and other sources to force a suspension in Laos. There is moreover the factor of predictable public opinion pressure in the U.S.
Therefore, the sorts of barriers Jason proposes, south of the Seventeenth Parallel, and in Laos, accompanied by a bombing pause, would cause all sorts of problems here. It would first lead, in my judgment, to suspension of bombing in Laos. This, of course, would destroy the concept of the vehicle barrier as proposed. It would also make it very difficult, but perhaps not impossible to maintain the personnel barrier. However, it would generate pressures to disclose that a personnel barrier exists in Laos so that you could sustain the logic of your bombing pause. This in turn would raise pressures for the elimination of that portion of the personnel barrier in Laos. In short, I think the Jason barrier plus the bombing suspension is a non-starter for Laos.
If the barrier is mounted in the place Jason suggests, but bombing continues, the political problem would be less. However, we would then encounter some practical military considerations. Our Tiger Hound, Cricket, SLAM and Road Watch operations are a barrier in being. They [Page 519] are naturally not 100% effective, but they did cost the opposition about 1000 trucks destroyed last year and may have been a large measure in his decision to go straight across the DMZ. It is too early in the season to predict, but we currently see very little moving down the Ho Chi Minh trail. This may mean, that from a cost effectiveness viewpoint, our “barrier” has already had a considerable measure of success.
Consequently, we would be loathe to drop it in favor of a new and untested type of barrier which is highly dependent on gadgetry. There may be some resentment from the Stateside “experts” that my “experts” are willing to second guess them on subjects in which the former hold doctorates. But, I submit that my team knows more than anyone else outside Hanoi about the Ho Chi Minh trail. I am therefore most reluctant to consider trading a road watch team for a sono-buoy sensor, or an FAC strike controller for a sack of “gravel.” In short, we have and will continue to have grave doubts about the technical feasibility of this scheme.
There is also one consideration here. If we assume that our current “barrier” operations in Laos have directed the enemy into the DMZ, then we can assume that a new barrier along the DMZ will cause him to consider going back into Laos again. Naturally, from our parochial viewpoint, this hardly represents progress. Moreover, from an international political view, it is a better wicket to have North Vietnamese aggression directly across the DMZ than it is to have it routed through Laos. This shade of difference has significance, especially in our relations with the Soviets.
Now, if we still wish to talk about barriers in the “tactical” sense, for use at the current stage of the war, I have a counterproposal. This proposal would have both a military and diplomatic dimension. I have discussed it in some detail with John McNaughton and he may already have relayed it to you.
It envisages the erection of barriers, both personnel and vehicle, in North Vietnam. The principal line of blockage would be across the narrow neck of North Vietnam, south of Vinh, from the coastal region up into the badlands. This would be a broad strip, sown with “gravel”, mines, or any other beastly devices Jason can devise. It would be laid either by air or by large naval vessels lying off shore, which could deliver their charges by naval gun-fire or by rockets. Everything south of this region (that is to say, Route Package One) would be subjected to the sort of anti-vehicle barrier treatment proposed by Jason for Laos. And all this deviltry would be coupled with a suspension of bombing in North Vietnam north of these barriers.
Now, the virtues of these proposals are (1) that they appear to be a step in de-escalation (2) they address themselves to infiltration heading both into Laos and into South Vietnam (3) they permit our current operations to continue both in Route Package One and in Laos. The drawbacks [Page 520] are the same as those associated with any bombing pause: they permit the enemy to relax a bit and they ease the pressures on the rail link with China. However, they are a better combination by far then current Jason proposals, if those are to be associated with a bombing pause.
If, on the other hand, the Jason proposals are not to be associated with a bombing pause, then they are still a better proposition because they add a new dimension of deterrent in an area which does not degrade anything we are currently doing. Therefore, if we are hell-bent to do the Jason business in any event, this is the way I would like to see it configured.
Finally, I would direct a few words to the other type of barrier—the one we might consider to define, demarcate, and “hermetically seal” the territory of South Vietnam after a settlement has been reached. This, too, was discussed at Santa Barbara and is perhaps not as far-fetched as it may sound. I think it is clear that, at the current juncture of events, it would be extremely costly, both in terms of men and money, to erect a physical barrier along the borders of South Vietnam, to include the DMZ, plus the Lao and Cambodian frontiers. However, this might not be total folly if and when the fighting reaches some level that would free our forces for such an exercise. If we are to begin such barrier, I would suggest that the mountainous regions along the Cambodian border would be the best place to start. It would be internationally defensible and perhaps even of some interest to Sihanouk. In fact, it might be a better occupation for all General Larsen’s troops than their current game of watchful waiting.
Having put all these thoughts on record, I would like to repeat what I said in my cable to you on this subject. I would like a full hearing on any final decisions with respect to this matter and would probably want to participate in the decision. It seems to me to be a matter which could so thoroughly affect our whole posture and all our operations in Laos that it would need the most careful consideration by all concerned with this country.
Please keep me posted, and don’t sell the Crown Jewels.
All the best,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret.↩
- Neither found.↩
- For a summary, see Document 265.↩
- A group of scientists working at Department of Defense’s Institute for Defense Analysis to study bombing and a barrier as a means of checking infiltration. See McNamara, In Retrospect, p. 246.↩
- Telegram 2256 from Vientiane, October 14. (Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 OSD)↩