Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

248. Memorandum From the Central Intelligence Agency to the 303 Committee¹

Washington, September 8, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Status Report on CIA Counterinsurgency Operations in Laos

1. Summary

From the Fall of 1965 to date an estimated 70,000 North Vietnamese personnel have been committed to a priority campaign in cooperation with the puppet Pathet Lao forces in Laos to:

A. Occupy and control the strategically important North and Northeast area of Laos.

B. To develop and maintain a complex road network through the Panhandle of Laos (the “Ho Chi Minh Trail”) in order to funnel personnel and supplies to the Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam.

Because of the magnitude and severity of this predominantly North Vietnamese drive, coupled with the war in Vietnam, it has been of priority importance to use CIA-trained and -armed tribal assets as elements of a coordinated Country Team program against these two major North Vietnamese efforts.

During late-1965 and early-1966 there was a major enemy buildup in all three Northern project areas (see Tab A).² Twelve battalions of North Vietnamese infantry, ten battalions of North Vietnamese engineer troops, fifteen battalions of Pathet Lao with North Vietnamese advisors, and twenty-five battalions of Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese entered in Northern Laos.

In the Sam Neua compartment the enemy took a number of long-held friendly positions in a series of bitterly contested engagements. Meo units under General Vang Pao moved to positions north and west of the line of advance, remaining in position to put constant pressure on the enemy’s flanks during his drive south. In the Nam Ou corridor, south of Phong Saly in North Laos, the enemy succeeded in clearing the significant Nam Ou River Valley of friendly opposition and then proceeded to buildup his logistical channels from Dien Bien Phu down the Nam Ou to the north of Luang Prabang both east and west of the river. Along the Nam Tha corridor enemy action reflected a trend similar to that of the Nam Ou area in efforts to expand south attempting to clear the river valley of friendly influences, secure the rice-producing area, and consolidate gains. In April 1966 the United States Air Force with Forward Air Controllers joined the action. A close collaboration was established between the Headquarters of General Vang Pao (Leader of the Meo Paramilitary force), the 7th Air Force, and CIA/Vientiane [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to provide detailed and timely intelligence to the strike aircraft operating in direct support of ground action. Concurrently a series of guerrilla actions were initiated by friendly forces. The merger of these two actions enabled friendly units not only to contain the enemy offensive but to mount a counteroffensive which regained 90 per cent of the area lost during the previous enemy offensive. Although outnumbered, our paramilitary forces now have the initiative and are engaging the enemy on an almost daily basis. With direct air support provided by 7th Air Force planes who receive target briefs from the target analysis and control base at Udorn, they are tying down a large DRV force, inflicting significant troop casualties, destroying supplies and effectively interrupting logistical lines.

During this same period, we have trained and deployed 29 roadwatch teams along the “Ho Chi Minh Trail” in Southeast Laos to provide tactical information on the movement of men and materiel into South Vietnam. This information is transmitted by radio to the Central Control Base in Udorn, Thailand, and to FAC aircraft to facilitate Air Force interdiction attacks against the Trail. Techniques to facilitate this Country Team interdiction campaign are being improved constantly. Tribal assets are employed to provide security for forward team launch bases.

Additionally, a Country Team area security program called the Sedone Valley Project is proving successful in consolidating the western-half of the lower Lao panhandle and providing a secure base for operations into the “Ho Chi Minh Trail”. CIA directs the security aspects of this program.

In the conduct of this counterinsurgency program, CIA provides logistics, salaries, and subsistence to the tribal forces and provides support base and training facilities. One of the largest cost items is the provision of air support for forward supply of field forces and infiltration/exfiltration of teams.

2. Problem

CIA programs in Laos should be continued and in some cases expanded to deal with NVN/PL incursion, as an integral part of the war in Vietnam.

[Here follow sections 3, “Factors Bearing on the Problem” and 4, “Coordination,” totaling 14 pages.]

5. Recommendation

Because of the importance of the counterinsurgency program in Laos to the overall United States effort in Vietnam it is requested that the Committee endorse the continuation and expansion of the program as outlined above and summarized in the attached chart (Tab B).³

It should be understood that continuation and expansion of this program as recommended will necessitate raising the funding level in FY 1967 [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. It will therefore be necessary for CAS to request supplemental appropriations for this purpose in the amount of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in FY 1967.⁴

1. Source: Department of State,INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee, 9/15/66. Secret; Eyes Alone. No drafting information or attribution appears on the source text. A September 13 memorandum from William Bundy to Alexis Johnson commenting on this report indicates that it was prepared by CIA. Bundy supported the recommendations that the operations be continued and expanded by 3,000 persons in FY 1967, but he believed that the justification for these operations were not tied exclusively to Vietnam. Bundy believed that they were important for the security of Laos and the Mekong Valley. (Ibid.)
2. Attached, but not printed.
3. Attached, but not printed.
4. This recommendation was approved at the 303 Committee meeting of September 15 as an “exemplary success story.” U. Alexis Johnson reiterated Bundy’s belief that the operations aided the U.S. position in Thailand. (Minutes of the 303 Committee, September 15; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee, 9/15/66)