Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

224. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, March 21, 1966, 1000Z.

1008. Ref Embtel 1006.²

1. In course of day, we have taken several actions in effort restore morale and effectiveness of units defending Muong Soui. Current situation at Muong Soui itself is calm and our people on spot report that troops are somewhat less nervous today.

2. Most important contribution today has been effective series of sorties by USAF, both in immediate vicinity Muong Soui front lines at Phou Kout and also among supply depots further east in PDJ.

3. Additionally, we have finally gotten General Staff to focus seriously on problem and to begin deployment of additional FAR forces to the area for a coordinated FAR-Neutralist defense plan. ARMA will report further on this.

4. Finally, I saw Souvanna this afternoon, got his approval on an overall air operations plan for the PDJ and encouraged him to stimulate more action by his forces. He had already called in Kong Le and sent him to Muong Soui (for whatever good that will do) and has given orders for extensive patrolling north and south of defensive positions.

5. He asked me for additional reconnaissance by O–1 type aircraft north of Muong Soui to track down reports that enemy units are approaching down Nam Khan Valley. We are in touch with Dep Com 2AD to fulfill this request.

6. Comment: Souvanna was considerably depressed and obviously not very confident about abilities of his Neutralist unity. Perhaps a few days of successful air operations will help restore his bounce.

Sullivan

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, 2d Air Division, and Deputy Commander, 2d Air Division, Udorn.
2. In telegram 1006, March 21, the Embassy reported that “we are facing a severe case of galloping blue funk among the Neutralists” which could endanger the Muong Soui region. According to the Embassy, the problem was the chaotic situation among the Neutralists and the virtual abdication of authority by Kong Le. It was compounded by minor but sharp military reserves suffered by the Neutralists, notwithstanding the fact that they had the enemy outnumbered, outgunned, and they held the better ground. (Ibid.)